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ABSTRACT
Public Corruption for Gain in America: The Costly Consequences
of Violating Public Trust
by
Yvonne Gates
Dr. Lee Bernick, Examination Committee Chair
Dean of Public Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In recent years, researchers have suggested that public corruption has emerged as a
serious problem in the United States, eroding and violating the public’s trust in our
government and elected officials. This is attributed to many high-profile cases in which
prominent elected officials, whether federal, state, county, or local, have been convicted
and sentenced to federal prison for public corruption offenses. Several empirical
analyses have explored corruption in government to determine the factors that contribute
to the corrupt behavior of elected officials without exploring whether there are
differences or similarities in what causes a federal, state, county, or local elected official
to engage in public corruption. Few studies have extensively explored the factors that
contribute to the corrupt behavior of county commissioners in county governments.
This study will focus, explore, and enhance the research on the causes of public
corruption among elected county commissioners by examining four domains of
corruption causality: individual characteristics of elected officials, county government
characteristics, county government fiscal performance, and community characteristics. In
addition, this study will attempt to determine which factors uniquely situated within each
of the four domains can predict corrupt behavior of elected county officials and
iii

convictions for public corruption. Lastly, this study will attempt to determine if General
Strain Theory can provide a theoretical framework for understanding the causes of public
corruption and, if so, to what degree it can predict whether elected county officials will
engage in corrupt behavior.
The quantitative study sample for this research consists of data collected on large
urban counties in which county officials were convicted or indicted of public corruption
between the fiscal years of 2000 and 2009. Additional study samples consist of data
collected on more than 100 large urban counties with no cases of public corruption. Both
categories of data were derived from counties with populations of 300,000 or more in
which there were indictments, convictions, and no indictments or convictions of county
officials for the 2000 2009 fiscal years. The unit of analysis consists of county
commissioners from large urban counties convicted and not convicted of public
corruption. To determine which factors contribute to the specific research questions and
related hypotheses, the study will explore 26 explanatory variables within four domains
contained in the research General Models. It will use logistic regression procedures and
analytical prediction of probability tools to discover relationships between the dependent
and the independent variables.
This study attempts to determine the causes of public corruption by examining and
answering four specific research questions:
1. Are there specific personal characteristics that encourage or discourage county
officials to engage in public corruption?
2. What are the governmental characteristics that contribute to public corruption?
3. What role does government fiscal stability play in explaining public corruption?
iv

4. Do communities with high civic involvement have less public corruption?

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project has benefited from the help of numerous people. First, I would like to
thank various individuals at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, including my
dissertation committee and Dr. Thom Reilly, a former faculty member, who was always
responsive and offered important assistance and support. Dr. Lee Bernick and Dr. David
Damore provided guidance, wisdom, and encouragement that have been essential to my
academic pursuits and completion of this endeavor. Dr. Damore provided critical
assistance during my quantitative analysis process (reminding me often of my objective),
and Dr. Bernick, my committee chair, provided direction at key stages of the process and
was encouraging throughout. Dr. Dina Titus took the time to review my research in
detail and offered valuable suggestions. Dr. Christopher Stream offered guidance and
support in identifying additional corruption cases.
Special thanks are offered to many friends who provided encouragement and a
special friendship; their support was invaluable. Bobby, Melissa, Leon, Casey, Patricia,
and Winnifred were the best; their friendship is rare and greatly appreciated.
I thank my husband and children for being there, providing me with encouragement
and understanding throughout my pursuit. My achievements would not have been
possible without my family’s support.
Lastly, the support and reassurances of my sisters, particularly Isophine, were what I
needed to get through this journey; their support made it possible for me to achieve this
goal.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................................................x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1
Prologue ........................................................................................................................2
Research Study Overview ............................................................................................4
Statement of Problem ....................................................................................................6
Purpose of the Research Study .....................................................................................7
Research Approach .......................................................................................................9
Significance of the Study ............................................................................................11
Limitations of the Study..............................................................................................13
Structure of the Research Study..................................................................................14
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OFTHE LITERATURE ............................................................15
Theoretical Perspectives of Corruption
Agency Theory ............................................................................................................16
Game Theory ...............................................................................................................19
Kohlberg's Cognitive Moral Development Theory .....................................................21
General Theory of Crime .............................................................................................24
General Strain Theory ..................................................................................................26
Subcultural Theory.......................................................................................................31
Public Sector Corruption .............................................................................................34
Elected Officials' Characteristics and Public Corruption.............................................40
Government Characteristics and Public Corruption ....................................................47
Government Economic Performance and Public Corruption ......................................51
Community Characteristics and Public Corruption ....................................................54
CHAPTER 3 PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN AMERICA .................................................57
Historical Framework of Public Corruption
Federal Criminal Laws Used In Public Corruption Cases ...........................................61
Defining Public Corruption..........................................................................................64
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS .....................69
Research Design.........................................................................................................69
Design Summary........................................................................................................69
Data Analysis .............................................................................................................70
Quantitative Design ...................................................................................................70
Unit of Analysis .........................................................................................................71
Data Sample ...............................................................................................................73
Research Model ..........................................................................................................73
Data Sampling Process ...............................................................................................75
Relational Measures, Data Collection and Sources, and Coding Procedures .............76
vii

Quantitative Procedures .............................................................................................77
Analytical Considerations ..........................................................................................78
Treatment of Missing Data ........................................................................................78
Multicollinearity .......................................................................................................79
Research Questions and Hypotheses .........................................................................80
Elected Officials' Profile Doman .......................................................................................81
Outside Employment ................................................................................................83
Age .............................................................................................................................85
Gender ........................................................................................................................86
Education ..................................................................................................................87
Race........................................................................................................................... 88
Religion ......................................................................................................................90
Marital Status .............................................................................................................91
Tenure ....................................................................................................................... 92
Community Characteristics Domain ..................................................................................94
Poverty Rate ..............................................................................................................96
Crime Rate ................................................................................................................97
Civic Involvement .....................................................................................................98
Community Post-Secondary Education Level ..........................................................98
Labor Force ...............................................................................................................99
Age of Community (65 years and older) ................................................................100
Population Growth ...................................................................................................101
Ratio of County Population to State Population .....................................................101
Per Capita Income ....................................................................................................102
Political Party Affiliation ........................................................................................103
Government Characteristics Domain ..............................................................................104
Ethics Laws .............................................................................................................106
Management Structure of Government ...................................................................107
Office of Inspector General ....................................................................................108
Open Meeting Laws/ Transparency ........................................................................109
Employment Growth ...............................................................................................110
Fiscal Stability of Government Domain ..........................................................................111
Financial Stability ...................................................................................................113
Federal and State Aid ...............................................................................................114
Auditors ...................................................................................................................115
General Model of Public Corruption ...............................................................................117
CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ...............................................................119
County-Level Characteristics...........................................................................................119
General Model: Corruption and County-Level Characteristics ..............................120
Descriptive Data Analysis .......................................................................................121
Logit Regression Analysis - Corruption and County-Level Characteristics ..........128
Individual-Level Characteristics ......................................................................................132
General Model: Corruption and Individual Characteristics .....................................132
Descriptive Data Analysis........................................................................................133
viii

Logit Regression Analysis - Individual-Level Characteristics ................................136
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS............142
Discussion and Summary of Results........................................................................142
General Model: County-Level Characteristics ........................................................142
General Model: Individual-Level Characteristics ....................................................146
Contribution of the Research Study ........................................................................149
Conclusion ..............................................................................................................151
Study Limitations .....................................................................................................152
Recommendation for Further Research ..................................................................157
EXHBIT I

MODEL VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA ...............159

EXHBIT II

RATING AGENCIES ...............................................................161

EXHIBIT III

MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA CODING........................162

APPENDIX I

INDICTMENTS AND CONVICTIONS...................................164

APPENDIX II

LARGE U.S. COUNTIES WITH SOME FORM OF PUBLIC
CORRUPTION .........................................................................165

APPENDIX III

91 LARGE U.S. COUNTIES WITH NO CASES OF PUBLIC
CORRUPTION ..........................................................................166

APPENDIX IV

DISSERATION QUESTIONNAIRE-INDIVIDUAL
CHARACTERISTICS ..............................................................168

APPENDIX V

STRAINS ...................................................................................170

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................171
VITA .......................................................................................................................186

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1-1
Table 2-1
Table 2-2
Table 2-3
Table 3-1
Table 3-2
Table 4-1
Table 4-2
Table 4-3
Table 4-4
Table 4-5
Table 4-6
Table 4-7
Table 4-8
Table 5-1
Table 5-2
Table 5-3
Table 5-4
Table 5-5
Table 5-6
Table 5-7
Table 5-8

Public Corruption among County Officials: Four Domains...................... 8
Kohlberg's Theory of Cognitive Moral Development ..............................23
Games Politician Personality System ......................................................43
Gain Politician Personality System ......................................................... 43
Corruption Rate By States ....................................................................... 58
Top 10 Most Corrupt States ....................................................................60
Summary of Large Urban Counties with a Population of 300,000 or
more ........................................................................................................72
Large U.S. Counties with Some Form of Public Corruption ................. 72
Overview of Dependent and Independent Variables ...............................74
Counties with Missing Data ....................................................................79
General Model: Elected Officials' Profile Characteristics Domain ..........93
General Model: Community Characteristics Domain .......................... 104
General Model: Government Characteristics Domain ..........................111
General Model: Government Fiscal Characteristics Domain .................117
County Level Characteristics Bivariate Statistics .................................122
County Level Characteristics Bivariate Statistics (chi squared) ........... 123
County Level Characteristics Bivariate Statistics (chi squared)........... .125
Descriptive Statistics General Model: County Level Characteristics ...127
Logistic Regression General Model County Level Predictors .............129
Elected Official Participation in an Act of Corruption by Individual
Characteristics .......................................................................................135
Descriptive Statistics Individual Level Data (t-test) ..............................136
Logistics Regression: General Model Individual Level Predictors .......138

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Mary Buckelew was once called the most powerful woman in Jefferson County,
Alabama. She was the first woman ever elected to the county commission, in November
1990, and served in the position until 2006. She even served as president of the Board of
County Commission from 1990–1998. Commissioner Buckelew was a savvy political
operative who developed a reputation for having an uncanny ability to find consensus
among a bitterly divided board. To highlight her accomplishments, in 1997 Governing
Magazine honored her as one of its “Public Officials of the Year.” But Mary Buckelew’s
power and popularity evaporated when she was forced out of office for public corruption.
Commissioner Buckelew’s downfall began in 1996 when the Jefferson County
Commission entered into a court-ordered consent decree that mandated the renovation of
the county’s sewer system. To fund the renovation, the County Commission decided to
participate in several bond offerings and numerous bond swap agreements. Between
March 2003 and December 2004, the commission approved five bond offerings and four
swap agreements worth billions of dollars.
Commissioner Buckelew and the Jefferson County finance committee participated in
the approval of all these transactions. During the process, Commissioner Buckelew, a
number of county administrative staff, and an investment banker hired by Jefferson
County to oversee the bond transactions traveled to New York City on several occasions
to discuss them with other investment firms and officials. During one trip to New York,
Commissioner Buckelew visited a Salvatore Ferragamo store on Fifth Avenue and saw a
pair of shoes and a purse she admired on sale for about $1,500. On another trip,
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Commissioner Buckelew admired other items at the same store costing a total of $1,119.
It was later discovered that the investment banker hired by the county had purchased
these items for Commissioner Buckelew on both occasions and mailed them to her office
at the Jefferson County government building. During a third trip to New York in 2004,
this banker paid approximately $1,400 for Commissioner Buckelew to spend the day at a
New York City spa. In total, Commissioner Buckelew received nearly $5,000 in gifts
from the investment banker hired by the Jefferson County Commission to oversee and
manage the bonds allocated to renovate the county’s sewer system. The investment
banker and his firm received approximately $7.1 million in brokerage fees.
Mary Buckelew would later plead guilty to a charge of obstruction of justice and
agree to cooperate with the investigators probing public corruption in Jefferson County.
As part of her plea agreement, Buckelew faced imprisonment for up to 20 years, a fine of
up to $250,000, or both; supervised release of not more than three years; and a special
assessment fee of $100 per count. Buckelew was later sentenced to three years’
probation, 200 hours of community service, and a $20,000 fine for lying to a federal
grand jury during its probe of the county. In recent months, Jefferson County has
defaulted on its bond payments and is considering filing for bankruptcy.
Prologue
The corruption of public officials like Mary Buckelew, and public corruption in
general, are not new problems. Public corruption has existed for at least 4,000 to 5,000
years, if not longer, according to Bardhan (1997). 1 Explanations of the reasons behind
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The fact that corruption is not a modern phenomenon is also emphasized by Vito Tanzi (1998), who stated, “Corruption is not a
new phenomenon” (p. 559). Two thousand years ago, Kautilya, the prime minister of an Indian kingdom, had already written a book,
Arthasastra, discussing it. Seven centuries ago, Dante placed bribers in the deepest part of Hell, reflecting the medieval distaste for
corrupt behavior. Shakespeare gave corruption a prominent role in some of his plays, and the U.S. Constitution explicitly names
bribery and treason as two crimes that can justify the impeachment of a president.
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public corruption have been offered for nearly as long. However, the “study of
corruption by academics, policy-makers or self-styled analysts is a more recent
phenomenon” (Mukherjee 2004, p. 1). 2
As early as the 1960s, political scientists, economists, and sociologists focused their
attention on political corruption in terms of its impact on government policy and the
economy. Benson (1978) notes that “Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic book,
Democracy in America, identifies corruption as a danger of and to democracy, as well as
a potential component of it” (p. 1).
This research study will review and identify the impact public corruption has on our
governmental systems, citizens, and the legitimacy of democracy itself. The presence of
corruption in the United States, if unchecked, could undermine the purpose of
government and the rights and the needs of the governed, and create widespread
economic problems for both government and the governed. Indeed, according to Warren
(2004), “Corruption creates inefficiencies in deliveries of public services, not only in the
form of a tax on public expenditures, but by shifting public activities towards those
sectors in which it is possible for those engaged in corrupt exchanges to benefit.” He
goes on to point out that “corruption also undermines the culture of democracy [by]
eroding trust” (p. 328). Clearly, corruption in the present-day U.S. can compromise the
purpose of government and ruin the economic, political, and social stability of its people.
Consequently, it is important to explore those factors that account for public corruption in
county government.
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One of the earliest academic works on corruption is The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Banfield 1958). Other prominent
works written after World War II include “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption” (Leff 1964); Political
Corruption: A Handbook (Heidenheimer et al. 1989); Comparative Political Corruption (Scott 1972); Political Order in Changing
Societies (Huntington 1968); and Corruption in Developing Countries (Wraith and Simkins 1963).
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An analysis of public corruption in county government is vital because counties are
major institutions in our political system. County governments serve as agents of the
state, with monies flowing from state government to counties to implement programs and
services that citizens need. In many cases, large urban counties have greater authority,
provide a greater degree of service, and have a greater span of power and influence than
cities do. The power, authority, and influence that county government has, as well as its
overall responsibilities in the delivery of services, justify the need to study public
corruption in county government.
Research has shown the negative impact public corruption can have on government
(Warren 2004), but that is not the focal point of this research. Rather, this study seeks to
understand why public corruption exists in our system of county governments. It will
review literature, develop models, and study the cases of various county officials in an
attempt to understand the elements and factors that contribute to the corruption of public
officials in county government.
In a close review of the literature, several theoretical perspectives emerged about
corruption among county officials. The rest of this section will discuss the limitations
and important components necessary to explaining corruption among county officials and
reveal a platform for selecting the best-suited theory for this research study: General
Strain Theory (GST).
Research Study Overview
The presence of public corruption in government suggests that corruption has a
broad effect on people: it creates a system of mistrust among citizens, thereby
diminishing the importance of government and influencing the rule of law and regulation,
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which in turn inflicts enormous economic, political, and social costs on society. This
research study is a comprehensive review designed to examine, explore, and explain
public corruption among officials in county government utilizing GST. Agnew (1992)
described GST as an individual’s “actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively
valued goals, actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli, and actual or
anticipated presentation of negative stimuli,” all of which can result in strain (p. 59).
Strain emerges from negative relationships with others, leading individuals to engage in
criminal behavior. This research study will evaluate how GST manifests itself in the dayto-day activities of county officials in their efforts to carry out their duties as
representatives of the public.
To further understand how the theoretical perspective of GST could explain a county
official’s decision to engage in public corruption, explanatory variables were developed
with the intent of examining the relationship between public corruption and the personal
characteristics of elected officials. The General Model will also explore the relationship
between public corruption and county-level characteristics as they may apply to large
urban counties with cases of public corruption, as well as those counties with no cases of
public corruption.
The application of GST is appealing in this instance because of the limited research
conducted to understand the effect the theory has on corruption in county government.
Although recent progress has advanced our understanding of public corruption and
explored how it affects government, there is little information (and few empirical studies)
describing specific variables that explain elected county officials’ decisions to engage in
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corrupt behavior. In fact, GST has limited exposure in the area of public corruption
hypothesis testing, which creates an opportunity worthy of review.
This research study builds on the premise that GST might explain the factors that
contribute to white-collar crime, including public corruption committed by elected county
officials.
Statement of Problem
Some county officials choose to engage in public corruption in today’s political
environment, while others do not. In the context of this study, the following questions
merit answers:
1. What factors explain public corruption in today’s county government?
2. Will answering the question of public corruption provide insight into what
may deter, reduce, or minimize corruption in county government?
Amundsen (1999) stated, “Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the
contemporary world. It undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public
policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the public sector and private sector
development, and particularly hurts the poor” (p. 1). The presence of corruption in
county government and its effects on today’s society create enormous pressures for an
honest government. Benson (1978) opined: “The loss of citizens’ confidence in a
government which citizens know is cheating has a profound effect on the democratic
process” (p. 51). Benson also postulated, “Corruption can cost a government, and its
taxpayers, large sums through both ‘honest’ graft, and the overburdening of the
government exchequer” (p. 208). Clearly, the presence of public corruption has a broad
effect on people and does little to eliminate their mistrust of government and the public
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officials who engage in corruption. In fact, Musgrave (1959) suggested public corruption
weakens the purpose and possibility of an effective government by undermining the
functions of macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation,
which are the three primary functions of public institutions today. Moreover, without a
thorough knowledge of the causes of public corruption, the American public’s distrust of
public officials and their ability to deliver key public services will continue to grow.
The literature review explored the importance of implementing stringent
anticorruption policies and ethics laws to determine their effectiveness in reducing public
corruption. Although little is known about the elements that contribute to public
corruption in the contemporary U.S., analyzing it with GST will add to the body of
knowledge in this area of inquiry. Additionally, exploring the relationship of GST to
local government and elected officials, and examining its effect on public corruption, are
both new ideas that should generate further interest.
Purpose of the Research Study
This research study has three objectives.
First, it will attempt to use GST to explain public corruption in local government by
county officials convicted in federal court. It will study whether GST is a plausible
model to explain corruption within the four domains of elected officials’ characteristics,
county government characteristics, governmental fiscal stability, and community
stability.
Second, this study will examine the decisions of two groups of county officials who
take divergent roads in their political careers to explain public corruption and predict
what factors could be used to stop officials from engaging in it.
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Third, this study will examine the 26 variables identified within the four domains
(Table 1-1) and identify those that best explain the behavior of county elected officials
indicted on and convicted of public corruption charges.
Table 1-1.
Elected Officials’
Characteristics
Outside employment

Public Corruption among County Officials: Four Domains
Government
Characteristics
Office of Inspector
General

Governmental
Fiscal Stability

Community
Characteristics

Per capita income

Poverty rate

Age

Ethics laws

Financial stability

Age of community 65
and older

Gender

Structure of government

Federal & state aid

Crime rate

Formal education

Open meeting laws

Auditors

Civic involvement

Religion

Employment growth

Community education
level

Marital status

Labor force

Race

Population growth
County population to
overall state population
Political party affiliation

Tenure

While there are studies that discuss public corruption in state, federal, and local
government, and the negative impacts it has on government performance, the goal of this
study is to examine federal public corruption cases in counties, utilizing GST to explain
the corruption of elected county officials.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the relationships and overlapping connections among the four
domains and their influences on public corruption.
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Decision to Engage in
Public Corruption
Corruption
No Corruption

Elected Officials
Characteristics

Government
Characteristics

Government
Fiscal Stability

Community
Characteristics

Figure 1-1. Modeling of Corruption.
Figure 1-1 also illustrates that corruption is influenced by various elements of
governmental, community, and individual dynamics. This model represents a possible
correlation between each of the four domains of public corruption, and it suggests that the
decisions of elected county officials are influenced by government fiscal performance,
fiscal stability, government characteristics, and community characteristics. This analysis
will be useful in determining and verifying whether there are actual relationships between
each of these four dynamic domains and public corruption.
Research Approach
This research study will examine and analyze quantitative data pertaining to county
governments and county elected officials convicted of federal public corruption to
determine what characteristics influenced their behavior. It will attempt to prove the
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applicability of GST as the theory best suited to examining public corruption. The
research will focus on former elected county officials indicted and convicted of federal
public corruption charges and their counterparts from the same counties who were not
indicted or convicted, using data and information from fiscal years 2000 to 2009. This
study will analyze the fiscal policies, oversight, and community characteristics of county
governments that had cases of public corruption, but the primary purpose of this study is
to determine the impact GST has on governments, communities, and elected county
officials.
Much of the data analyzed was gathered from public information sources. The study
is unique in that the public officials who are its subjects were federally indicted or
convicted; therefore, much of the data was obtained through the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records system, a database of federally adjudicated court cases.
Agnew (1992) suggested that strain does not need to be specifically tied to economic
status because it is considered a psychological reaction to any perceived negative aspects
of one’s social environment, or as Agnew further stated, “negative relationships with
others... in which the individual is not treated as he or she wants to be treated” (p. 48).
In summary, this research study postulates that GST will explain the corruption
offenses of public officials based on each official’s profile characteristics, community
characteristics, and the influences of county government.
The data analysis for this study consisted of a two-step process to test the
hypotheses. First, the analysis examined data pertaining to county governments with
convicted officials and county governments with no convicted officials. Second, a
comparative study was conducted of elected county officials from those counties with
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indicted and convicted public officials and those counties without officials indicted or
convicted of public corruption. The results of these analyses will be used in this paper to
identify the variables that explain why county officials do or do not elect to engage in
acts of public corruption.
Significance of the Study
Government is the cornerstone of a democracy; therefore, it has a responsibility to
maintain the highest level of integrity, free of political conflicts and public corruption.
The primary purpose of elected public officials is to serve and represent the interests of
the people who elected them, without regard to personal gain. If corruption invades our
system of government, how can citizens expect trustworthy and effective government?
As Benson (1978) stated, “Political corruption has become a serious liability to American
life” (p. 5). Whether it surfaces in federal, state, municipal, or county governments,
corruption deters the formation of honest and effective government.
Data from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section (2009) suggest
that there have been significant increases in corruption within all levels of government in
the past 20 years. Figure 1-2 displays the increases in corruption cases in local
government and in the number of local elected officials charged with corruption over the
past 10 years. The data show that local government convictions have increased by 71
percent and the number of local government officials charged with corruption has
increased by 78 percent over those same 10 years. It appears the federal government has
a successful record of prosecuting corruption cases and getting plea agreements from
defendants.
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Note: Local officials, fiscal years 2000 to 2009.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/).

Figure 1-2. Trends in Corruption Cases.
Public corruption within our system of government has been highlighted recently
because of highly publicized corruption cases involving high-profile county officials.
The presence and effects of public corruption have resulted in citizens becoming cynical
and more inclined to distrust their government (Maxwell 2004; Neckel 2005; Williams
2006; Warren 2007).
If the United States intends to maintain its dominance as a world power, the moral
character of our political system and public officials must be beyond reproach. The
achievement of such a government, free of corrupt activities, begins with the education of
young people, with a society that stresses the importance of values and ethical decisions,
and with the eradication of the notion of making political decisions for personal gain.
However, the ultimate goal of this research study is to explain public corruption, identify
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the indicators of corruption, and use that information to offer suggestions to reduce
corruption, thereby restoring public trust in government and in our public officials.
Limitations of the Study
This research study was designed to study cases of public corruption in county
government; however, a review of the literature showed that the number of federal
conviction cases for county officials from 2000 to 2009 was smaller than anticipated.
Therefore, this study focused on the indictments of county elected officials, including
many that ultimately became convictions. Further research revealed a smaller number of
corruption cases than originally anticipated from large urban counties. All in all, case
reviews identified approximately 65 federal conviction cases; 12 were excluded from the
study, however, because they occurred in small counties with populations of less than
300,000 or took place before 2000. The expectation was that data prior to 2000 would be
difficult to obtain from small to mid-sized counties, which indeed turned out to be the
case; not only was it difficult to collect data prior to 2000, it was difficult to verify its
accuracy. Such limitations may have a negative impact on the validity of the study.
Because of the limited number of public corruption cases, the research pool was
expanded to include cases in which there were both indictments and convictions, though
not all indictments ended in convictions. This study thus included four cases in which
there were only indictments.
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Structure of the Research Study
Chapter 1 includes the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, general
research questions, and a brief overview of the research approach.
Chapter 2 provides a review of current literature pertinent to the topic of corruption
and the research study, theoretical perspectives on public corruption, and a review of
literature from previous studies identifying the problems that public corruption creates.
This chapter also explains the variables thought to contribute to public corruption. It
provides the framework for the formulation of specific research study questions and for
the hypotheses to be tested.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the history, background, and origin of federal
public corruption charges, along with a discussion of various types of public corruption
cases and a survey of federal laws used to prosecute cases. It includes a definition of
corruption for the purposes of this study.
Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the theoretical model selected for the
study, the research design, the model and method of analysis, and specific research
questions (with related hypotheses) for the General Models. It also provides a description
of the research design (e.g., unit of analysis, target population, samples, issues regarding
validity) and discusses the research model, including data collection, data sources, and
coding procedures for the dependent variable and covariates.
Chapter 5 discusses the results of the analysis.
Chapter 6 discusses the study’s findings and its conclusion.

14

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption
As George Bernard Shaw, the British dramatist, wrote, “Power does not corrupt men;
fools, however, if they get into a position of power, corrupt power.” Americans accept
and even expect a culture of political corruption in the nations of the developing world;
we assume corruption is pervasive in the Philippines, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Bangladesh—the list goes on and on. We know these countries have long suffered the
negative effects corruption creates in the economic, social, and diplomatic well-being of
governments. We do not, however, expect public corruption in the United States. But a
review of the literature uncovers many cases here at home, and the body of evidence
reveals that public corruption, if not addressed, can threaten our society and destroy the
functionality of our government (Amundsen 1999; Collier 1999; Johnson 1996; Neckel
2005; Peter and Welch 1978; Wallis 2005; Warren 2004).
This chapter will identify a theory to explain the behavior of elected county officials,
as well as identify and define the four domains that will be used to explain public
corruption.
The criminal and behavioral theories reviewed in the following sections focus on
what motivates an individual to become involved in, and ultimately opt to engage in,
criminal behavior as an elected official. The principal assumptions and limitations of
these theories are how we can best explain public corruption in the U.S.
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Agency Theory
Wilson (1968) and Arrow (1971) first discussed agency theory as a risk-sharing
problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different attitudes towards risk.
Individually, each author believed that agency becomes a problem when “cooperating
parties have different goals and division of labor” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 58). In particular,
agency theory is directed at the relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates
work to another (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory attempts to explain
this relationship using the metaphor of a contract. In fact, it was initially developed for
private purposes, e.g., contractual parties such as owners and managers, and was only
later used to model bureaucracy and public institutions.
The theory purports to resolve two problems that can occur in the agent relationship.
Eisenhardt (1989) theorizes that the agency dilemma arises when (1) a conflict emerges
between the principal and the agent regarding the desire or the goals, or (2) verifying
agents’ work is difficult and/or becomes an expensive endeavor for the principal. In
essence, conflict is created when the principal is unable to verify the behavior of the
agent.
Another problem is created from the sharing risk that occurs when the principal and
agent have opposing approaches towards risk. When the principal and the agent have
different risk preferences, they prefer different actions that result in a conflict.
Eisenhardt (1989) states that the premise of agency theory is “determining efficiency
of contracts governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people
(e.g. self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion)” (p. 5). Rose-Ackerman (2001)
introduced the relationship between agency theory and corruption: “Corruption is
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dishonest behavior that violates the trust placed in a public official (the agent). It
involves the use of a public position for private gain” (p. 3).
Research shows that a number of economic studies on corruption have employed the
principal-agent model; in these cases, the principal is the central government and the
agent is the bureaucrat taking bribes from a private individual interested in some benefit
from the bureaucrat (Eisenhardt 1989; Hunt 2004; Jang and Johnson 2003; Johnson
1996). A possible example of this theory in the context of corruption is the Keating Five
case, in which five U.S. senators (the agents) used the power of their office to bail out
Charles Keating, a savings-and-loan financier (principal), for personal gain (reelection).
The principal, in this case, is considered the public. Thompson (1993) argued that this
form of corruption involved using one’s public office for private benefit, thereby
subverting the democratic process. Thompson also introduced a new form of corruption,
“mediated corruption,” which occurs when a public official’s act of corruption is filtered
through the political process, leading the official to view the corrupt act as legitimate and
within the function of political responsibility or duties. Mediated corruption becomes a
concern when a public official receives a gain, a private citizen receives a benefit, and the
connection between the gain and the benefit is criminal or improper.
Conventional and mediated corruption are substantially different. Thompson (1993)
states that mediated corruption arises when “(1) the gain that the politician receives is
political, not personal and is not illegitimate in itself, as in conventional corruption;
(2) how the public official provides the benefit is improper, not necessarily the benefit
itself, or the fact that the particular citizen receives the benefit; (3) the connection
between the gain and the benefit is improper because it damages the democratic process,
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not because the public official provides the benefit with corrupt motives” (p. 369). In
each of these instances, there is a link to the democratic process that is significantly
different from conventional corruption, such as bribery, conflict of interest, extortion, and
other forms of criminal behavior. In the Keating Five case, the senators attempted to use
their public office for personal gain, a private citizen received an advantage, and the
relationship between the two was generally viewed as improper. Both parties were more
concerned with their own self-interest than with the interest of the public. The personal
gain or self-interest in this case ties it to the principal-agent theory, which Thompson
points out is sometimes used to analyze corruption. 3
In the context of this theory, politicians act as the agent for their constituents.
Problems arise because the principals, i.e., the constituents, cannot control the agent’s
behavior—in other words, constituents cannot reliably monitor all of their elected
officials’ actions. If there are no other constraints, this so-called “slack” allows
politicians to act in their own interests even when those are contrary to the interests of
their constituents. “The model could help us see that corruption may be partly the result
of the structure of incentives in the system: agent-principal slack creates moral hazards
that permit corruption” (Thompson 1993, p. 372).
The principal-agent theory treats the difficulties between principal and agent
differently when difficulties arise between the alignment of interests and risk-sharing,
which generally occurs when a principal elects/hires an agent. In these cases, some of the
methods used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal include

3

A pioneering work that exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach is RoseAckerman (1978, p. 6-10).
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bonuses, promotions, re-election, or fear of firing. The principal-agent dilemma is found
in most employer-employee relationships, as when elected officials hire top executives.
Eisenhardt’s discussions on agency theory point out that the principal-agent literature
focuses on determining the optimal contract (behavior versus outcome) between the
principal and the agent. This model assumes conflict between principal and agent, an
easily measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk-reluctant than the principal.
When an agent’s concern is self-interest, then the agent may or may not behave as
agreed. According to Jensen (1994), “Agency theory postulates that because people are,
in the end, self-interested, they will have conflicts of interests over at least some issues
any time they attempt to engage in cooperative endeavors” (p. 12). Therefore, if selfinterest is reduced and common interest is amplified, agents will behave as desired.
However, the data collected for this research study does not provide enough information
for analysis.
Game Theory
Game theory is another theory used to analyze corruption of public officials. It is a
mathematical analysis of any situation where there may be a conflict of interest with the
intent of indicating the optimal choices that, under given conditions, will lead to a desired
outcome. Developed in 1944 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, the theory is now a
branch of applied mathematics, economics, and social science. It was intended to study
human behavior and the strategic decision-making process whereby players choose
different actions in an attempt to maximize their returns, in some instances at the expense
of others. Research indicates that game theory analyzes what decisions rational
individuals will make when the outcome (payoff) depends on both their own decisions
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and the choices of other players. More recently, game theory has been used to predict
and explain behavior, contributing to the development of theories of ethical behavior.
In recent publications, analysts have applied game theory to more serious conflictof-interest situations, including some in the field of political science. When members
of political parties band together to promote the interests of the party over those of their
constituencies, they are participating in game theory. One example comes from the
House Republicans of the 104th Congress, who united in support of the “Contract with
America,” backed by then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. In doing so, it could be
said that these members of the Republican Party were more interested in promoting their
own interests than those of their home districts.
Both Von Neumann and Morgenstern believed that game theory was based on the
premise that no matter what the game, and no matter what the circumstances, there is a
strategy that will enable the participants to succeed. To that end, Levine (1999)
introduced another element to game theory, one that “focuses on how groups of people
interact. There are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and non-cooperative
game theory. Cooperative game theory is concerned with games where there is
transferable utility and the characteristic function determines the payoff of each coalition.
Non-cooperative game theory deals largely with how intelligent individuals interact with
one another in an effort to achieve their own goals.”
Game theory, which is dominated by self-interest, is able to explain the decisionmaking process and self-interest of political officials. Literature shows that game theory
has been used in previous corruption analyses: for instance, Myerson (1993) developed
voting games to predict the relative effectiveness of different electoral rules in reducing
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the corruption of political parties. Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) analyzed games in
which the size of legislatures, quality of voter information, and nature of party
organization explained the frequency and size of bribes paid to legislators. Finally, Cadot
(1987) analyzed a game of bureaucratic corruption under different assumptions about the
information sets of the players (Manion 1996, p. 168). Although game theory has been
used to analyze the “game” of corruption and the effect that paying bribes has, it did not
prove useful for this research study. The data collected did not provide sufficient
information to analyze officials’ decision-making processes or their decisions to engage
in acts of corruption; as a result, the breadth of previous work concerning political
officials was not sufficient to test the effectiveness of game theory for this study.
Cognitive Moral Development Theory
Cognitive Moral Development Theory (CMD) has evolved over time and was
eventually used by political scientists, who embraced what some viewed as a more
complex psychological profile of corruption by government officials. CMD incorporates
moral integrity into analyses; the research focuses on “ethical decision-making and moral
development” (Menzel 2005, p. 148) and the ethical decisions of elected officials. In the
realm of government, the ethical and moral decision-making of public officials may
result in acts of public corruption. In this regard, CMD could explain the actions of
officials as they relate to public corruption. There have been a number of moral
judgment studies that considered how ethical sensitivity results in more ethical decisions,
or how workplace settings can play a principal role in ethical decisions.
Kohlberg first embarked on a philosophical inquiry into morality with the intent of
providing an interdisciplinary and comprehensive account of its nature and development.
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His theory attempted to trace the progression of moral development through various
levels, ultimately establishing six stages of moral reasoning. According to Nidich,
Nidich, and Alexander (2000), “Each higher stage of moral development, following
Piaget’s cognitive stage theory, is a more integrated, comprehensive, equilibrated and
thus qualitatively advanced stage of growth” (p. 219). According to CMD, progression is
marked via changes in socio-moral perspective Kohlberg himself believed that cognitive
moral development constitutes “[b]eginning from a self-interested egoistic social
perspective, leading to one that is consciously shared by other group members or society
as a whole, and culminating in a universal ethical principles orientation, that explicitly
defines universal principles of justice that all humanity should follow, irrespective of
time and place” (Kohlberg 1973a, p. 220 [Table I]). CMD, as presented in Table 2-1
below, is a comprehensive detailing of various stages in which individual behavior is
used to predict moral decision-making. The table outlines the stages a person goes
through according to CMD; these six stages, as presented by Kohlberg, delineate the
expected reactions, behaviors, and rationales that individuals use when presented with
various situations.
Simply stated, research shows that CMD supports the premise that the “development
of higher states of consciousness results in the actualization of all ‘levels of the mind,’
and provides us with the ability to think and act spontaneously in accord with all the laws
of nature, so that our thoughts and actions are fully life-supporting for society and
ourselves. At the highest level of consciousness, unity consciousness, cognitive
development becomes complete with the ultimate identity of human intelligence with
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nature’s intelligence, allowing life to be lived in its greatest fulfillment” (Nidich et al.
2000, p. 224).
Table 2-1. Kohlberg’s Theory of Cognitive Moral Development
Level A:
Pre-conventional
Stage 1: The Stage of
Punishment and Obedience.
This stage takes an egocentric
point of view. The individual
is purely concerned with self
and the consequence of
performing in an undesired
manner. There is no
recognition of the points of
view held by others.

Stage 2: The Stage of
Individual Instrumental
Purpose and Exchange. This
stage takes a concrete
individualistic perspective.
The major concern here is
“what’s in it for me?” A
person at this stage separates
his own interests and points of
view from those of authorities
and others.

Level B:
Conventional
Stage 3: The Stage of
Mutual Interpersonal
Expectations, Relationships, and
Conformity. Individuals are
receptive of approval or
disapproval from others
reflective of society's
concurrence with their position.
They try to be good boys/girls
and live up to these expectations. A person relates to point
of view by putting himself or
herself in another’s shoes.
Stage 4: The Stage of Social
System and Conscience
Maintenance. This stage
differentiates societal points of
view from interpersonal
agreement or motives. A person
at this stage takes the viewpoint
of the system, which defines
roles and rules. He or she
considers individual relations in
terms of place within the system.

Level C:
Post-Conventional & Principal
Stage 5: The Stage of Prior
Rights and Social Contract. This
stage takes a prior-to-society
perspective, i.e., that of a rational
individual aware of values and rights
prior to social attachments and
contracts. The person integrates
perspectives by formal agreement,
contract, object impartiality, and due
process.

Stage 6: The Stage of Universal
Ethical Principles.
This stage takes the perspective
that specific moral decisions are
guided by universal ethical principles
of justice: equality of human rights
and respect for the dignity of human
beings as individuals. A stage 6
person is guided by these principles,
which can be agreed upon by all
rational people and can guide the
choices of any person without
conflict or inconsistency.

While Kohlberg’s theory is a valid method of explaining the moral judgment of
officials, some researchers in the field believe it is only sufficient for studying a narrow
or single-focus issue, such as ethical decision-making. This study, however, is not
limited to the ethical decision-making of officials. Its intent is to examine factors that
lead elected public officials to make poor decisions and engage in acts of public
corruption. Additionally, Kohlberg’s theory does not place much weight on the
socioeconomic background of individuals; it is a psychological profile of individuals
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incorporating moral integrity. CMD is a moral judgment theory, and traces the
progression of moral development through various levels. It is more suited to evaluate
only the moral judgment and decisions of individuals, and would have required additional
information to analyze the decisions of elected officials if used in this research study.
General Theory of Crime
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory, which focused on the failure of self-control
as the primary cause of crime, eventually developed into the General Theory of Crime.
This theory identified six distinct elements of self-control. Research indicated that
individuals who lacked self-control would have a tendency to be “impulsive, insensitive,
physical, shortsighted, risk takers with low frustration tolerance” (Baron 2003, p. 403),
and would therefore tend to engage in criminal acts.
Researchers such as Wright (2000) maintained that this is one of the most widely
cited theories explaining deviant behavior. Much of the research on General Crime
Theory emphasizes a linkage between self-control and negative outcomes, but
uncertainty still exists regarding the impact of self-control on socially acceptable
behavior. Research has not been able to establish the extent to which lack of self-control
can explain various forms of deviant behavior.
The research of Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990) generally found that low self-control
is associated with various criminal and imprudent behaviors, and that this relationship
appears contingent on criminal opportunities. The General Theory of Crime focuses on
the concept that deviance occurs when there is a weak social bond; this weakness, or a
lack of connection with positive influences, leads to crime and deviant behavior. The
theory asserts that a lack of positive parental upbringing and positive influences results in
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improper socialization and, thus, criminal behavior. Many studies confirm that
Gottfredson and Hirchi's findings are valid and that social control can predict offending
behavior. In addition, researchers such as Titles et al. (2004), Nagin and Pogarsky
(2003), and Muraven et al. (2002) concluded that the theory’s prime focus on self-control
and the lack thereof produced results that were “robust predictors of crime as well as
analogous behaviors” (Jones and Quisenberry 2004, p. 402). These findings were
consistent with the findings of Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990), in which self-control
predicted criminal behavior.
The Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990) empirical study analysis revealed that the General
Theory of Crime is a predictor not only of crime, but also of deviant behavior. Other
researchers have confirmed there is a relationship between self-control, various forms of
antisocial behavior in academic settings, and academic dishonesty. Research conducted
by Evans et al. (1997), Grasmick et al. (1993), Paternoster and Brame (1998), and
LaGrange and Silverman (1999) confirmed that “individuals low in self-control engage in
a wide variety of criminal and antisocial deviant (i.e., analogous) behaviors.”
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) even speculate that crime may be the least important
consequence of low self-control: “The ‘cost’ of low self-control for the individual may
far exceed the costs of his criminal acts. In fact, it appears that crime is often among the
least serious consequences of a lack of self-control in terms of quality of life of those
lacking it” (p. 94).
While the General Theory of Crime may successfully identify criminal and deviant
behavior, previous research has raised a number of outstanding questions about the
relationship between self-control and specific acts of deviant behavior, as well as the
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overall scope of the theory. Although there is a rationale for linking self-control to deviant
acts in a generic approach, the theory cannot explain how, if at all, self-control is related to
specific acts of deviance (Jones and Quisenberry 2004). Gottfredson and Hirchi (1990)
suggest that individuals with low self-control are likely to engage in inappropriate
behavior, a speculation that has not been empirically confirmed.
Many researchers studying the General Theory of Crime have theorized that factors
such as low self-control, poor socialization, and poor parental guidance result in individual
criminal behavior, but there is no evidence that suggests these factors would persuade
elected public officials to engage in corruption. Little research has been done concerning
low self-control or the General Theory of Crime in the specific arena of county
government. Other studies have failed to explain how low self-control can predict acts of
crime and deviant behavior, or how this theory might relate to public corruption in county
government (Jones and Quisenberry 2004; Agnew 1985; Maxwell and Winters 2004;
Muraven, Collins, and Nienhaus 2002; Welch 1998). The General Theory of Crime is not
appropriate for examining public corruption because it fails to identify a connection
between low self-control, deviant behavior, and public corruption.
General Strain Theory
GST, initially developed by Merton (1938) and Sutherland (1940), has been used in a
number of empirical studies to explain deviant behavior. The two researchers’ views of
GST focused on two separate, distinct classes of individuals: Sutherland concentrated on
the socially elite and powerful, while Merton and other classical strain theorists (e.g.,
Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955) studied crime and its relationship to the lower
social classes. Years later, when Agnew (1992) developed a revised GST, he used it to
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explain personal experience, individual personal environment, the characteristics that
influence behavior, and the propensity towards violence and crime.
According to Agnew (1992), GST plays an important role in explaining delinquency
and crime in communities. His research on GST describes the characteristics of strain,
related events, and conditions that influence their correlation to crime. Agnew (1985a),
Bernard (1987), Elliott et al. (1979), and Greenberg (1977) suggest that GST has broader
applications to delinquency than originally proposed, and that previous models are
incomplete at best. Several researchers believe that GST may have broader applications
to such factors as stress, equity/justice, aggression, emotion, social environment, and
participation in the underclass.
The original, classic strain theory by Merton (1938), Cohen (1955), and Cloward and
Ohlin (1960) focused on only one element: negative relationships in which individuals
were not treated the way they would have preferred, which prevented them from
achieving their goals. Agnew (1992), on the other hand, argued that “adolescents are not
only concerned about the future goals of monetary success/middle-class status, but are
also concerned about the achievement of more immediate goals”(p. 50). Agnew (1985a)
suggested that an individual’s inability to avoid painful situations can in many cases be a
contributor to crime. In later research, Agnew concluded that strain is most likely to
result in crime when “[things] (1) are seen as unjust, (2) are seen as high in magnitude,
(3) are associated with low social control, and (4) may create some pressure or incentive
to engage in criminal activities as a coping mechanism” (Agnew 2001, p. 320).
Later, Agnew (1992, p. 48) reaffirmed a previous assumption of his that two main
elements of GST separate it from similar theories: “1) the type of social relationship that
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leads to delinquency and 2) the motivation for delinquency.” Reviewing the literature on
GST points up a focus on negative relationships with others, specifically the fact that the
actors in the relationship are not treated as they expect to be treated. Agnew (1992)
suggested that a revised strain theory should include a “relationship in which others
present the individual with noxious or negative stimuli” (p. 49). Agnew (1992), Kemper
(1978), and Morgan and Heise (1988) postulate that individuals are pressured into
deviant behavior by negative affective states, negative emotions like anger and
frustration, and/or negative relationships with others. These negatives create pressure for
corrective action, and crime is one possible response. Agnew (1992) postulated that in
GST, a negative relationship is a result of pressure.
A literature review also shows how Agnew (1984), Elliott and Voss (1974), Elliott et
al. (1985), Empey (1982), Greenberg (1977), and Quicker (1974) have applied strain
theory to various situations in an attempt to predict the likelihood that different types of
strains result in crime and which strains are likely to lead to criminal behavior. Agnew
(1992) stipulated that strain refers to “relationships in which others are not treating the
individual as he or she would like to be treated” (p. 48).
Agnew (2001) identified two different strains, “objective” and “subjective.” He
characterized “objective” strains as the events and conditions disliked by most members
of a given group and “subjective” strains as the events and conditions disliked by the
people who were experiencing or had experienced them. A person under objective
strain(s) is likely to feel pressure to behave in ways most consistent with the group or
culture. That pressure may even motivate the individual to behave in a manner

28

inconsistent with his or her own moral compass. Objective rather than subjective strain is
the focus in this research study.
According to the literature, one area of research attempted to examine individual and
group differences in exposure to external events and conditions likely to cause objective
strain and the subjective review of those events and conditions. Exploring the factors that
influence individual and group differences was vital to the formulation of GST, and is a
major factor in how GST attempts to explain differences in crime between individuals
under objective strain and groups under objective strain.
Agnew (2001) argued that whether subjective or objective strain resulted in criminal
activity was largely a function of the characteristics of the individual experiencing the
strain. He contended that strain is most likely to lead to crime when individuals lack the
skills and resources to cope with their strain in a legitimate manner; that such individuals
tend to have low conventional social support and low social control, and to blame their
strain on others; and, therefore, that such individuals are disposed to criminal behavior.
Supporting research and empirical analyses suggest that perceived or actual social
support from peers, family, and others can reduce negative behavior and assist
individuals in dealing with negative strain (Aneshensel 1992; Cullen 1994; Mirowsky
and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989).
Agnew (1992) stated that the key factors of GST are based on the actor’s negative
relationships with others. Following this premise, GST contains three types of strains:
(1) a negative relationship with others (individuals or groups) related to the lack of
achieving positively valued goals, (2) the removal (or threat of removal) of positive
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stimuli, and (3) the threat of being presented with negative stimuli (Langton and Piquero
2007; Agnew 1992).
GST is the theory best suited for this study because each strain suggested by Agnew
(1992) can increase the possibility that “individuals will experience one or more of a
range of negative emotions” (p. 59). Such emotions were critical in judging the behavior
and reactions of elected officials for this study: they include anger, disappointment,
depression, and fear, and according to Agnew (1992), “anger is the most critical
emotional reaction for the purpose of the General Strain Theory” (p. 59). In fact, Agnew
(1992) concluded, “Anger affects the individual in several ways that are conducive to
delinquency. Anger is distinct from many of the other types of negative effects in this
respect, and this is the reason that anger occupies a special place in the General Strain
Theory” (p. 60). Other theorists have supported the role anger plays in GST, and even
proposed that aggression in response to anger is justified (Averill 1982; Berkowitz 1982;
Kemper 1978; Kluegel and Heise 1986; Zillman 1979). Agnew (1992) hypothesized that
“anger results when individuals blame their adversity on others, and anger is a key
emotion because it increases the individual’s level of felt injury, creates a desire for
retaliation/revenge, energizes the individual for actions, and lowers inhibitions”(p. 60).
The literature suggests GST is an appropriate theory for testing the hypotheses of this
research study. For one thing, it offers a broad view of factors that can explain the
behavior of elected county officials who opt to engage in public corruption. These
factors can also identify officials who would desire political acceptance and be more
likely to engage in criminal behavior. According to GST, public officials who lack both
social and economic status may be more inclined to engage in criminal behavior because
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their lack of acceptance and legitimacy within an elite group can play a critical role in
their decision-making processes. Previous empirical analyses and studies, including
Agnew (1992), have shown that negative strain increases negative emotions, generating
not only anger but also other types of negative behaviors that lead to deviant coping
mechanisms and, possibly, crime. GST is the most appropriate theory to explain public
corruption because it concentrates on the most likely factors contributing to corruption
among elected county officials.
Subcultural Theory
As defined in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, subculture is “an ethnic,
regional, economic, or social group exhibiting characteristic patterns of behavior
sufficient to distinguish it from others within an embracing culture or society.” Though
subcultures are subordinate to the dominant culture of a society, they sometimes allow
individuals greater group identification; those who take part in particular sports, e.g.,
racing cyclists and professional football players, are sometimes referred to as a
subculture. With this understanding, it is appropriate to suggest that a group of political
representatives who submit to certain social or professional constructs constitutes a
subculture.
Cohen’s Subcultural Theory of deviant behavior emerged from his work on gangs at
the Chicago School, which he developed into a set of theories postulating that certain
groups (or subcultures) in society have preconceived values and feelings that are inclined
towards crime and violence. The theory is largely viewed as a companion to Merton’s
classic strain theory and Cohen himself explained it in similar terms, i.e., as a form of
rebellion. Cohen’s focus, however, was on juvenile delinquency. He and others believed
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that if the pattern of offenders could be understood and controlled, the cycle of ongoing
criminal behavior from teenage offender into habitual criminal could be broken.
Some researchers suggest that economic needs provoke criminal activity, while
others hypothesize a social-class rationale for deviance. When Cohen (1955) first used
Subcultural Theory to explain deviant behavior, his work concentrated on delinquency
subculture rather than career criminals. Cohen hypothesized that youth delinquents
develop a distinctive culture in response to a perceived lack of economic success and
social opportunity, and that this “status frustration,” as he labeled it, motivated them
toward a life of crime (Cohen 1958). He postulated that the U.S. educational system
instilled a belief in students that they should strive for social status through academic
achievement. If that goal was not attainable for the youth of working-class families,
educational failure would lead to social failure, causing status frustration. Cohen opined
that since working-class youth could not always attain middle-class status, they might
retaliate towards a system that had failed or let them down.
Fischer (1955) concluded that delinquency was not a result of concern for “money
success,” but instead a result of the pressures of all dominant values. Cohen (1958)
suggested that as working-class male adolescents in the inner city fail in school, they
begin to feel they cannot achieve in society by legitimate means and consequently
experience a social status frustration. He argued they form a subculture that “takes its
norms from the larger culture but turns them upside down” (p. 27).
Cohen’s studies validated the hypothesis that lower-class parents instill a different
(from middle-class) value system in their children, with the most important issues being
ones of the moment: food, shelter, and so on. Parents of middle-class youth had
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significantly different value systems that stressed independence, success, academic
achievement, control of aggression, and respect for property. Cohen (1955) proved that
lower-class youths (and their families) were also more group-oriented and more inclined
to depend on others who shared their value system; their mentality included a feeling of
“watching each other’s back.” The definition of subculture in Fischer (1955)—“a large
set of people who share a defining trait, associate with one another, are members of
institutions associated with their defining trait, adhere to a distinct set of values, share a
set of cultural tools and take part in a common way of life” (p. 544)—best explains
Cohen’s work on Subcultural Theory.
Political figures can exhibit behaviors similar to adolescents; for example, both
groups tend to congregate around individuals who have positions of grandeur. It is not
uncommon for political leaders to engage in social or professional relationships with
wealthy citizens, industry chiefs, celebrities, and other notable figures. Using a
combination of GST and Subcultural Theory, this research study intends to show that
political leaders often feel pressure to live at a standard consistent with the elite groups
that, because of their political position, are now their social peers. When an elected
official’s socioeconomic background and/or current economic conditions cannot support
such a living standard, the official may be tempted to act in ways inconsistent with ethical
expectations as a result of status frustration (negative strain).
When a political leader is found guilty of criminal behavior, the offending act is most
often related to some kind of financial gain. Achieving financial success can provide the
means for a politician to gain legitimacy and permanency within the elite group, whereas
the failure to achieve financial success may result in self-loathing or internal anger. This
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anger may make the officials who fail more likely to resort to criminal activities, such as
bribery and extortion, as a means of generating additional income to improve their
economic status and acceptance within the elite group. Huntington (1968) and Johnston
(1982) both concur, “corruption is caused by poverty and lack of upward mobility
through legal and socially accepted channels” (Nice 1983, p. 508).
This research study will seek to determine the appropriateness of analyzing
corruption data using the Subcultural Theory, and whether there is a correlation between
GST and Subcultural Theory. The two theories share characteristics germane to
understanding how background, environment, and the desire for social acceptance may
influence elected officials to commit acts of public corruption. The literature review
showed that some researchers assume everyone in a society is initially and consensually
driven towards economic success, wanting to achieve wealth and financial independence.
They propose that this desire for economic success drives some political actors to dismiss
their moral compass, succumb to temptation, and engage in corrupt activities. However,
this research study aims to apply components of GST and Subcultural Theory to the
behavior of elected officials and identify the factors that can induce criminal behavior in
them. Subcultural Theory is associated with a group theory in which people are more
inclined to depend on others who share their value system; while it shares similarities
with GST (e.g., negative strains), it is not as broad as GST and was not a plausible theory
for this research study.
Public Sector Corruption
A review of federal data revealed a continuous annual growth pattern in government
corruption, and insufficient information within the body of literature to explain the
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increase. In the past 20 years, federal, state, and local officials, as well as private
individuals, have been convicted of government corruption in the United States at an
alarming rate. Public records show that the number of convictions between 1986 and
1995 was 11,888; in the following decade that number nearly doubled, to more than
20,419 convictions. Two likely factors in this increase were the additional staff and the
resources the U.S. Department of Justice brought to bear on the fight against public
corruption in the 1990s.
One case that received widespread attention in 1994 was United States of America v.
McDonough, in which the chairman of the Rensselaer County Democratic Committee
was convicted of receiving more than $500,000 in kickbacks on insurance commissions.
With cases like this in the news, it became imperative for the federal government to
allocate the resources necessary to successfully fight corruption. As authorities realized
the damage corruption could create throughout America, the Justice Department “made it
a priority to target state and local officials for acts of public corruption” (Dreyer 2007, p.
1). More recently, law enforcement officials have focused on developing strict federal
and state laws to fight public corruption. Empirical research, however, suggests that
more stringent laws have done little to reduce the number of officials who violate the
public trust (Maletz 2002; Menzel and Benton 1991).
A review of the literature suggested that one facet of government corruption stems
from the desire of bureaucrats and elected officials for greater social and political
influence, not just more money; however, research has shown that in some corruption
cases, low wages paid to public officials were in fact a motive for corruption. Gould and
Amaro-Reyes (1983), for example, provided evidence that one of the prime causes of
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corruption is inadequate wages. Another study supporting the notion that low wages may
be an impetus for public corruption was that of Besley and McLaren (1993), who found
that the incentive to accept bribes increased when individuals’ living standards were
squeezed. Given this research, one might conclude that higher salaries would be costeffective for government and reduce the potential for public corruption. One function of
this study will be to examine the collected data to determine if low wages in government
jobs can indeed make individuals more prone to corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder
2001).
Banerjee (1997) suggested that government has the authority to make it illegal for
bureaucrats to make money using their public position outside of their elected authority.
In fact, governments often try to thwart corruption by creating laws to ensure the public
trust is not violated. Ironically, these laws often create opportunities for corruption by
imposing convoluted regulations on the public. Such rules can complicate the ability to
conduct business quickly and efficiently, and may motivate powerful individuals to
engage in corrupt behavior. Research has shown that corruption often occurs when
elected officials inequitably facilitate the ability to bypass red tape, creating a conflict of
interest (Banerjee 1997).
Overall, the literature review suggested that officials’ corrupt behavior negatively
affects government operations and undermines government functionality. The operating
cost of government is substantially increased and the efficient operation of government is
weakened. According to Transparency International (2005), large bidding and
procurement contracts provide many opportunities to steal money without the public
knowing, and elected officials generally get involved in corrupt activities to enrich
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themselves or their families and friends. In her book Corruption and Government
Causes, Consequences and Reform, Rose-Ackerman (1999) explored the thesis that there
are conflicts between self-seeking behavior and the public values of public officials. She
argues that self-seeking behavior on the part of government officials compromises their
responsibilities, jeopardizes the integrity of their office, and betrays the very citizens who
elect them.
According to other research studies, “corruption in the public sector results in
inefficiencies in the delivery of public services” (Warren 2004, p. 328). Similar
sentiments are expressed in della Porta and Vannucci (1999, p. 257) and Rose-Ackerman
(1999, p. 9). Corruption provides an unequal playing field to firms who pay bribes to
receive contracts or licenses, preventing officials from selecting the most qualified and
capable bidder. Instead, the firm that offers the highest bribe stands to benefit the most.
The awarding of contracts to unqualified firms because they offer higher bribes, gifts, or
incentives can weaken the stabilization role of government (Tanzi 1998a).
The adverse effects of such activities are not limited to the economics of
government, but can also affect the public services provided to citizens and the financial
strength and stability of government operations. This study will determine the effect
public corruption has on county government, community, the fiscal stability of county
government, and the decisions of public officials. The literature review found that
government corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government; weakens
procedures, rules, and regulations; and siphons off resources that would otherwise be
used for public services. Worst of all, it undermines the legitimacy of government and
erodes public trust. The damage it creates is the main reason the Department of Justice
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and other law enforcement agencies are concerned about corruption in government, a
view shared by the citizenry. In late 1998, approximately 90 percent of people polled by
the Gallup International Millennium Survey viewed their government as corrupt and
unresponsive to their needs. A government that cannot respond to the needs of its
citizens is weakened to the point of being incapable of governing.
In another research study, Wilson (1960) suggested there might be greater scrutiny of
local officials as the size of local government shrinks and the population becomes more
homogeneous. He argues, “Local voters closely monitor local politicians, because local
politicians’ actions directly affect local tax rates. Further, the display of selfaggrandizing benefits of local corruption may be obvious to local citizens” (p. 4).
Where corruption among local officials is widespread and institutionalized, local law
enforcement agencies are less likely to fight it. This lack of enforcement amplifies the
environment of corruption (Cabelkova and Hanousek 2004). In a different scenario, if
citizens have adequate proof their officials are engaged in corrupt activities, those
officials’ reelection prospects are likely to be negatively impacted, and the possibility of
losing an election or being removed from office then becomes the justification for
officials to act inappropriately—to seize the opportunity and take advantage of their
office before losing or being removed from it.
The literature suggests that public corruption at the state level, i.e., in the legislative
process, is more likely and occurs more frequently than at the local level. The difference
comes from the differing nature of officials’ political authority and the relationship of the
rules governing the legislature and legislators’ behavior. The state legislative process
“generates incentives for corrupt legislative transactions” (Ackerman 1978, p. 15).
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Legislators may sell their votes to special interests and lobbyists in exchange for
campaign contributions or other special favors. These favors are often illegal and, as
stated earlier, corrode the public’s faith in political institutions (Lanza 2004). Corruption
at the state level is more common because conflict-of-interest rules are not imposed;
ethics requirements are broad and provide legislators a range of flexibility. Other factors
may include the physical location of the legislature and its accessibility (or lack thereof)
to citizens, a lack of openness and transparency in legislative actions, the access of
lobbyists and special interest groups to legislators, the legislative committee process, and
a legislature that fails to impose restrictions, thereby providing greater opportunities for
corruption.
Corruption at the state level has a history of occurring regardless of how
knowledgeable a constituency is. An increased number of corruption cases over the years
have provided a historical perspective that shows states failing to impose constraints and
these failures creating greater opportunities for a system of corruption at the state level
(Rose-Ackerman 1978). Wilson (1960) argues that state government is more vulnerable
to public corruption than local or federal governments: “States may be more uniquely
prone to corruption: State officials may be subject to less voter scrutiny because each
voter is more poorly informed about the actions of state officials. Further, many state
capitals are located at some geographic distance from the states’ larger metropolitan
areas, which further attenuates press coverage of misdeeds” (p. 3).
Lederman et al. (2004) suggested that political institutions play an important role in
determining the magnitude of the impact of public corruption on government, services,
and the financial stability of government operations. Other researchers have proven that
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corruption patterns are endogenous to political systems. If laws are not enforced and
rules are not imposed, then corruption persists; but a system of government that is
democratic, open, and transparent is less likely to experience public corruption (Charap
and Harm 1999). Such findings led to the Justice Department’s allocation of the staff and
resources necessary to fight the damage public corruption can create at all levels of
government—federal, state, and local.
Previous researchers have examined a number of factors that contribute to
corruption; however, none of these studies specifically addressed county government.
While other researchers have studied the effects of corruption in areas such as income
distribution, per capita growth, government size, economic stability, discretionary
powers, fair wages, and strength of government, this study seeks to examine the state of
public corruption, the factors contributing to public corruption, and the impact of public
corruption on elected county officials and county government. It will examine whether
government instability, ineffective fiscal management and economic performance,
community characteristics, and the moral characteristics of elected officials contribute to
public corruption within county government. These, along with other factors, deserve
consideration of the impact they have on the decisions of elected county officials to
engage in public corruption.
Elected Officials’ Characteristics and Public Corruption
The literature review suggested that corruption in U.S. politics relates to a
connection between the characteristics of politicians and the elements of corruption. An
analysis of the characteristics of officials and the impact those characteristics have on
corruption was documented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and

40

attracted the interest of political scientists in later years. Della Porta (1996) said that to
“understand the emergence and diffusion of corruption it is necessary to look at the
characteristics of the administrators who become involved in corrupt activities” (p. 350).
Other literature surmises that deviant behavior is a byproduct of someone’s environment,
attitude, and social background (Merton 1938; Suther-land 1940; Cloward and Ohlin
1960; Cohen 1955; Piquero and Sealock 2000; Agnew and White 1992; Aseltine et al.
2000; Broidy 2001). GST also suggests that environment, attitude, and social
background can influence behavior and result in an official's decision to engage in
corruption. On the other hand, Agnew (2001a) suggested that conventional success goals
cannot be achieved through criminal activities and do not result in negative strains and
criminal behavior, but this claim is unsubstantiated and does not take into consideration
other important factors related to the demands and failures individuals face.
Some studies suggest that in order to gain a better understanding of the reasons
public officials engage in corrupt behavior, consideration should be given to the
motivation behind their decisions. Money, power, and personal gain are the most
common factors contributing to an official’s decision to engage in corruption, and to
achieve and keep these material benefits, reelection or maintaining the position becomes
the ultimate goal. In essence, a public official's behavior can be motivated by private and
material self-interest.
Previous research has suggested that under GST, an individual's inability to
legitimately achieve success (including monetary success) can result in negative strain
and a decision to engage in illegal activities. Agnew (2001a) points out that there are
different types of strain that may result in criminal activities, and that individuals may
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attempt “to achieve core goals that are not the results of conventional socialization and
that are easily achieved through crime. Such goals include money, particularly the desire
for much money in a short period of time” (p. 343). The research indicates that offenders
are generally preoccupied with the need for more money. When money becomes the
primary goal of officials, it can create an extreme desire; if money then becomes the core
goal, it forms negative strain and results in deviant behavior.
Further research suggests that another reason public officials engage in corrupt
activities is a perception that the potential benefit may exceed the potential cost (RoseAckerman 1978). In these situations, the perceived benefits and costs of corrupt
activities relate to the values of the official and the expected outcome—and, most
importantly, the probabilities that the outcome is attainable and being caught is unlikely.
Klitgaard (1988) stated it best: “Officials will opt to become corrupt if the benefit of
being corrupt minus the probability of being caught times the penalties for being caught
is greater than the benefit of not being caught”(p. 70). These factors are important
elements associated with the characteristics of elected officials, and weigh in any
decision on whether to engage in corruption.
In another research study, Rogow and Lasswell (1963) proposed that the quest for
power does not necessarily result in public corruption; they hypothesized that
characteristics, upbringing, and environment influence the decisions and behavior of
officials who engage in corruption or acts of personal gain. Wines and Napier (1992)
suggested that cultural values are related to the characteristics of individuals and play
some role in the behavior of individuals engaging in corrupt behavior.
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Rogow and Lasswell conducted an analysis of 30 officials and bosses in the United
States to determine if power-seeking is an influence on corruption. Their study suggested
that a back-ground of deprivation in early life results in a negative strain that affects
behavior and decisions. For example, deprivation was a key factor in the background of
corrupt bosses. Their analysis concluded that environment, social background, and
behavior shape value systems and integrity, producing two types of politicians with
opposite characteristics: the “game politician” and the “gain politician” (Rogow and
Lasswell 1963, p. 51). The analysis also suggested that corruption relates to a number of
variables in the personality system, as listed in Tables 2-2 and 2-3. The deprivation
factors listed in these tables can be viewed as strains and related to GST results regarding
the negative behavior of officials.
Table 2-2. Game Politician Personality System
Deprivation
Parental acceptance
Parental recognition

Demand
Power
Respect
Rectitude

Parental approval
Source: Rogow and Lasswell 1963, p. 52.

Indulgence
Office, bossism
Votes, election
Self-righteousness
Moral superiority

Table 2-3. Gain Politician Personality System
Deprivation
Comfort
Income
Opportunity

Demand
Well-being
Wealth
Skill

Indulgence
“Rich” living
Payoff, graft, “commission”
Deals, manipulations

Source: Rogow and Lasswell 1963, p. 52.

According to Rogow and Lasswell, the game politician’s characteristics come from
an upper-class background and the development of skills learned early on. These
characteristics include a strong sense of family (though not necessarily an immediate
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closeness), along with civic involvement, discipline, moral virtue and leadership, active
participation in party politics, a college education, and political ambition. They are also
actively involved in the anointment of other political officials. The game politician is a
“man of independent means, who did not exploit politics for personal gain, although the
game politician was privy to innumerable deals which involved the buying and selling of
political favors” (Rogow and Lasswell 1963). He receives glory from building political
kingdoms, controlling power, and influencing his peers. He enjoys the game. The game
politician maintains acquaintances but shares few personal friendships, and receives great
satisfaction from political victories. The game politician has high moral standards.
Game politicians have no interest in corrupt activities for themselves, and do not
compromise their moral standards and ethical rectitude for personal benefit. However,
the game politician has one negative characteristic: he “regarded the uses and abuses of
money in politics as legitimate and he was always willing to arrange matters if at all
possible to promote the financial interest of friends” (Rogow and Lasswell 1963, p. 47).
Rogow and Lasswell characterized the “gain politician” as vastly different from the
“game politician.” The gain politician comes from a poor family background and often
worked as a teenager to help support the family, which was his primary responsibility.
As a young man, he conferred with his mother on important decisions, including political
ones. If an immigrant, he strongly supports the neighborhood political machine. He
develops many friendships within the neighborhood, including some with political bosses
and officials. He gains trust within the organization, and later may create his own
political machine. According to Meier and Holbrook (1992), the prime use of political
machines in urban environments is to benefit the people who support them.
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The gain politician uses his skills and political acumen for political favors to benefit
his own financial interest; as Rogow and Lasswell (1963) observed, “the [gain politician]
had become the most powerful political boss in the city’s history” and “had also become
one of the wealthiest. The gain politician’s opponents believed—and correctly—that in
the city no contract was let, no tax collected, no post filled, and no facility established
without his extracting a commission” (p. 49). According to Rogow and Lasswell (1963),
the gain politician sees political corruption as a means to compensate for a deprived
upbringing. His primary purpose is personal gain, and politics provides an opportunity to
improve the lifestyle of his family. The personal characteristics of the gain politician
include loyalty to friends and family, generosity, and ambition. The gain politician lacks
high ethical standards and is willing to engage in corruption. The gain politician is less
educated, is not always honest, and lacks moral standards.
Based on a review of the literature, it appears that influence, political control, and
power are the focus for the game politician. This politician appears to be the subject of
“cultural-flaw,” in which lower-class individuals and immigrants maintain enormous
influence through government (Magleby 1984, p. 24). Because of these factors, Rogow
and Lasswell (1963) concluded that the characteristics of elected officials suggest that
corruption is a result of the weakness of individuals (game politician) or a pattern of
politics in which corruption is an acceptable behavior (gain politician).
In a different study, Rivlin (2003) stated that certain characteristics of officials in
both the public and private sectors could pressure them to make inappropriate decisions:
“Successful leaders in both sectors have similar personality traits. They must be
optimistic, competitive, willing to take risks, and able to communicate complex issues
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understandably” (p. 348). Rivlin goes on to say that the “pressure of complex decisions
in the face of limited information, on the other hand, creates similar ethical dilemmas” (p.
348) and, as a result, individuals can develop “the temptation to shade the truth” (p. 348).
If this happens to public officials, “citizens lose faith in the integrity of public officials,
and democracy becomes at risk” (p. 348). In fact, Rivlin’s analysis focused on the
leadership traits of officials and the general ethical problems they face in controlling the
politics of greed and selfishness.
Meier and Holbrook (1992) proposed that there are historical and cultural
explanations for corruption. They concluded that culture, background, and a lack of
educational attainment can contribute to the behavior of officials, including their
likelihood to engage in corrupt behavior. They also pointed out that corruption in urban
political machines facilitated the rise to power of immigrant groups in the United States
(Greenstein 1964), an element consistent with the characteristics of the gain politician.
Meier and Holbrook (1992) acknowledged that “urban environment[s], in particular,
loosen the social control of family and religion and at the same time concentrate
government programs and resources. In short, urbanism fosters conditions conducive to
corruption” (p. 138).
Researchers have posited that in certain environments, political machines were used
to benefit individuals who supported the machine and were, therefore, considered “part of
the team.” Corruption was the vehicle used to compensate these supporters. Wilson
(1966) supported Meier and Holbrook (1992), saying, “There is a particular political
ethos or style which attaches a relatively low value to probity and impersonal efficiency
and relatively high value to favor, personal loyalty, and private gain” (p. 20). Meier and
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Holbrook, as well as Wilson, held that the characteristics of elected officials influence
their decisions, and those with certain characteristics would, if given the opportunity,
engage in corruption.
A review of the literature found that “corruption is behavior which deviates from the
formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private
clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of
private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967, p. 419). The possibility exists that certain
characteristics influence the behavior of officials who opt to engage in corruption.
Government Characteristics and Public Corruption
Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Bardhan (1997), Theobald (1990), Leys (1965), and
Anechiario and Jacobs (1996) all suggest that corruption can have a positive impact on
government by improving efficiency and helping growth. In fact, a common byproduct
of corruption in certain governments is a reduction of burdensome red tape; in such cases,
corruption may be seen as an efficiency measure used by government (Wilson 1989). In
these situations, and in certain countries, corruption is used to bypass burdensome
regulations that slow governmental progress and hamper the function of government, and
to speed up the delivery of services. Corruption through bribery is sometimes called
“speed money” (Azfar et al. 2001, p. 47) because it is viewed as a means of reducing
government inefficiency and speeding up the implementation of policies and regulations.
The literature review suggested various motives to explain the presence of corruption
in the United States. Amundsen (1999) suggested that public corruption exists when
officials systematically abuse laws and regulations and sidestep, ignore, or even tailor
laws to fit their own interests. Johnson (1982) and de Leon (1993) both suggested that
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public officials with the power to make laws have incentives for corrupt exclusion: they
use the rules and regulations they control to create delays and bottlenecks, and thus are
able to increase the price of their services to bribers. Warren (2004) postulated that the
power elite have no hesitation in using their power and influence to penetrate government
for their personal gain, access government contracts, and influence competition to their
benefit, and in these situations public corruption is likely to occur.
In an environment in which government is inefficient, corrupt bureaucrats are often
provided with “grease money” (Bardhan 1997, p. 1337; Amundsen 1999, p. 11), which
Bardhan considered a benefit to government: “Corruption is the much-needed grease for
the squeaking wheel of a rigid administration” (Bardhan 1997, p. 1322). In many foreign
countries, where government is inefficient and oppressive, bribery is a means to remove
governmental impediments (i.e., red tape) and increase government efficiency (Leff
1964). Indeed, corruption in government was tolerated in many parts of the world until
very recently; in some places, it was even considered the norm. And although Americans
reject corruption, there are countries where public corruption is common practice (e.g.,
South Korea) and does not negatively affect the economy. In many developing nations,
corruption was (and still is) a tolerated practice used to bypass administrative delays.
However, public corruption is not tolerated in the U.S.
Some researchers have argued that corruption may be a good alternative for
improving burdensome and overregulated bureaucratic systems. In these instances,
corruption is viewed as an alternative to an overregulated government and immoderate
resources; however, in the end, corruption harms not only government, but also business
profitability (Amundsen 1999).
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The U.S. tolerance of corruption virtually ended in the mid-1990s as state and federal
prosecutors made the fight against it a high priority, devoting considerable resources to it.
Although some may view corruption in the developing world as a positive alternative to
overregulated governments, U.S. prosecutors wanted to ensure that corrupt activities did
not become a widespread problem in their nation. 4
As government grows, so do the potential rewards of corruption. According to
Johnson (1982), the overall size of a government relates to the possibilities for official
corruption: the larger the government, the greater its spending to support programs and
services. A direct relationship exists between an increase in population and the demands
of citizens for more services, and more money in the system can translate into more
opportunities for corruption.
Another possible factor in corruption is a lack of government accountability.
Without accountability, bureaucrats and elected officials can seize opportunities to
engage in corrupt activities without audits, reviews, or oversight. Stringent accounting
and auditing controls can reduce the potential for corrupt activities as governments use
policies and procedures to ensure that no public officials have overwhelming control or
monopolies over resources. Such accountability measures are an important factor in
fighting corruption within government. Gardiner and Lyman (1978), Rose-Ackerman
(1999), and Transparency International (2000) all suggest governments should provide
assurances that officials will function within specific rules, regulations, and policies that
minimize room for discretionary judgment.

4

Much attention to the cause of corruption gained it prominence among researchers, political
scientists, government officials, economists, and law enforcement officials during this period.
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Implementing strong ethics laws and pursuing federal prosecutions are powerful
methods for fighting, reducing, or eliminating political corruption within governments.
Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggested that politics can be used to fight corruption if political
actions increase the cost of corruption by increasing the probability that a corrupt
individual will be punished. In addition, officials who are likely to engage in corrupt
activity may become less likely to commit corrupt acts if the threat of being caught is
high (Wilson 1966). In these cases, punishment or removal from office becomes a
concern for officials and affects their decision to engage in corruption.
The review of literature concluded that over the past several years, American politics
and government have seen significant changes that resulted in more opportunities for
graft. According to Williams (1981, p. 29), the “twentieth-century explosion in
government licensing, zoning, regulation, employment and subsidy has provided
unparalleled scope for patronage and graft.” This study will determine the influence of
different variables and the impact they have on the decisions of officials; for instance,
whether a changing society and government structure create varied opportunities for
corruption. The size of government, political uncertainty, a lack of governmental
accountability, increases in government revenues, a lack of public participation,
ineffective ethics, and a lack of law enforcement policies are identified as some of the
potential reasons officials opt to engage in corrupt activities. This study has identified a
number of factors that are influenced by GST and impact the decisions of officials, such
as the tenure of elected officials and salary differentials—two additional variables that
can be related to GST and can influence elected officials’ tendency toward public
corruption. This study will evaluate these factors and determine if there is a correlation
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between them and public corruption. The study suggests that a correlation exists, but a
definitive decision will be made as this study progresses.
Research suggests that the level of corruption falls when the level of democracy
rises. The more a government provides a legitimate system of governance and functions
within the rule of law, the less likely elected officials are to be involved in corrupt
activities (Amundsen 1999).
Government Economic Performance and Public Corruption
In his book The Effect of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government
Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis, Mauro (1997) provided evidence that corruption
can have considerable adverse impacts on economic performance and delivery of public
services. He further concluded that corruption negatively affects the accountability of
government; therefore, government has a responsibility to address the impact of official
corruption.
One perceived deterrent to corruption in American politics is the development and
stabilization of a robust, economically stable government. The literature review
suggested that as governments and countries grow richer, corruption decreases
(Amundsen 1999); it is reasonable to suggest these same elements apply to county
government. Empirical studies from the World Bank show a strong relationship between
levels of income and corruption, i.e., the higher the income, the lower the level of
corruption (Amundsen 1999; Azfar and Swanmy 2001; Banerjee 1997; Glaeser and Saks
2004; Hunt 2005; Maxwell and Winters 2003; Meier and Holbrook 1992; Williams
2006).
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Economic distress coupled with growing populations can create pressures on
government. Governments faced with economic uncertainty may become unable to
provide the services and goods needed to keep the community functioning, such as a
good transportation system, public housing, jails, funds for economic development, and
social services. As the population of communities grows, so does the need for
government to provide additional goods and services. The competitive process used to
acquire these goods and services opens the door to corruption, particularly if a
government lacks the resources to monitor the actions of officials in a decision-making
position.
Research further concluded that the system of contracts for goods and services
within government can offer opportunities for corruption. Many of these contracts
provide lucrative opportunities that tempt public officials to engage in corrupt behavior.
Mauro (1997) found that the allocation of public procurement contracts through a corrupt
system led to inferior public infrastructure and services. Corruption in the procurement
process can be very costly for government because it drains funding and reduces
competition; the efficiency of public expenditures decreases as a government is exposed
to corruption.
The research also suggested that corruption is perhaps the most problematic
impediment to a thriving, financially secure government because when “corruption
becomes endemic, it can threaten the basic rule of law, property rights, and enforcement
of contracts” (Azfar et al. 2001, p. 46). Furthermore, corruption is regressive, which
means low-income households bear most of the burden of its costs. Azfar et al. (2001)

52

further states: “This regressive nature of the corruption burden appears to be due to
pervasive corruption in basic public services, education and health” (p. 48).
One of the most harmful consequences of corruption, according to researchers, is the
ambiguity and unpredictability it introduces into business transactions. Mauro (1995)
provided empirical evidence that corruption lowers investment and economic growth;
other researchers found it impedes development by distorting public expenditure
priorities. According to Mauro (1998), it can also lead to the underfunding of critical
services and programs. The premise is that financial stability and sound government may
prevent corruption, which, if not addressed, can destroy county government.
According to Klitgaard (1998), “Corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion” (p.
46). Does a rapid growth in revenues, expenditures, and populations generate more
opportunities for corruption among public officials? Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggested
that it does, and that lax fiscal oversight in a government can prompt officials to engage
in corrupt behavior, particularly if the officials have unlimited flexibility and
discretionary authority to make decisions. Officials who are not governed by a higher
authority, or who have no checks and balances, are likely to engage in corrupt behavior,
and the benefits of doing so become an incentive to only issue contracts to those who pay
the highest bribes.
Officials who oversee the implementation of government regulations, standards, and
programs benefit when standards are vague and unspecific. Such situations provide
prime opportunities for corruption, and can affect the economics of government agencies
by redirecting revenues. In her book Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, RoseAckerman (1978) provides numerous examples of vague guidelines, policies, and
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regulations, and demonstrates how these elements become factors in corruption
opportunities. Additional elements germane to public corruption are the size of a
government's fiscal responsibilities and a government’s authority and ability to enforce
prudent fiscal policies that protect the financial interests of the public.
The literature review showed that much work is needed for a government to
eliminate corruption and achieve positive economic performance. When this does not
occur, the public often becomes concerned about the negative effect corruption has on
economic performance. Corrupt behavior by public officials for personal benefit destroys
the success of government and its ability to function on behalf of the public. In fact,
according to a survey by Kaufmann (1997), “Elites from across the developing world and
transition economies view public sector corruption as a serious obstacle to economic
development” (p. 125). Corruption, if allowed to persist with limited or no checks and
balances, will divert government funds from needed programs, projects, and community
services to benefit corrupt public officials (Kaufmann 1997).
Community Characteristics and Public Corruption
This study will identify specific factors and pinpoint which indicators from a list of
community characteristics might explain public corruption. Eight indicators of public
corruption will be used: crime rate, population growth, education level of the community,
age of population, civic involvement, poverty, unemployment rate, ratio of county
population to state population, and majority political party of the commission. Which, if
any, of these indicators influence an official to behave corruptly? A series of studies
completed by Johnson (1983), Nice (1983), and Peters and Welch (1980) analyze a
number of factors that help to explain public corruption.
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Community characteristics, officials’ environment, and social class are not new ideas
for explaining deviant behavior. Theorists such as Agnew, Merton, Cohen, and Cloward
and Ohlin have all studied characteristics they thought could lead to identifying possible
causes of delinquent behavior. These studies appear to be applicable to this research
study, and may aid in identifying what characteristics influence corrupt officials. Do
such factors as social class and community environment influence an official’s behavior
and the propensity to engage in corrupt activities?
The primary discussion for this section of the study will focus on the following
questions: Do social and physical environment influence the behavior and decisions of
public officials? How would the moral character of officials influence their decision to
engage in corruption? Do certain community characteristics play a role in an official’s
corruption? If so, what specific factors actually contribute to officials’ behavior? Which
of these factors, such as social control of family, religion, urbanism, and/or education,
influence a person’s behavior?
Banfield and Wilson (1967) suggested that social class is a factor in the behavior of
officials; middle-class individuals see local politics as a service to the community in
which honesty, efficiency, and impartiality are important factors. They proposed that
social class would more than likely deter middle-class officials from engaging in acts of
public corruption. They also suggested that lower-class individuals would welcome a life
in politics, but would be more likely to engage in public corruption if given the
opportunity. Meier and Holbrook (1992) stated: “Corruption exists because public
service offers individuals a way to become rich that is not available to private citizens”
(p. 146).
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The literature review suggested that weakness in individuals, if not countered by
strength in the community, can be a factor in an official’s willingness to engage in
corruption. The article “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em” (Riordon 1963)
succinctly points out that, if given an opportunity, officials will often engage in
corruption, particularly if there are no costs associated with being caught—or if the
benefits of corruption outweigh the cost of punishment.
In the book Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, Rogow and Lasswell (1963)
discussed community characteristics, the environment of public officials, and their social
class, then analyzed how these factors relate to game and gain politicians. The
characteristics of both types are based on environment and social class, the elements of
their background that influenced the decision whether to engage in corrupt behavior. It is
fair to suggest that the characteristics outlined in Rogow and Lasswell (1963) can be
considered an explanation of public corruption, so this section of the research study will
review data to determine the influence community characteristics play in a public
official's decision to engage in public corruption.
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CHAPTER 3
PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN AMERICA
Historical Framework of Public Corruption
Public corruption has existed in the U.S. since the beginning of the republic, but the
issue attained a new prominence in March 1976 when the Justice Department’s Criminal
Division began a nationwide coordination of federal efforts against corruption at all
levels of government. At the same time, the department created the Public Integrity
Section in the Criminal Division to oversee the prosecution of criminal abuses of the
public trust. The responsibilities of the Public Integrity Section are broad, and include
coordinating the enforcement of all federal statutes related to public corruption.
Congress later passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which requires the U.S.
Attorney General to report annually to Congress on the activities and operations of the
Public Integrity Section. The Act also gave the Attorney General’s Office the
responsibility of consolidating and coordinating the nationwide fight against public
corruption at all levels, including state and local government.
The details of the report provided to Congress each year center on public corruption
cases involving abuses of the public trust by public officials for personal gain. Table 3-1
identifies corruption rankings by state over the past decade, and Table 3-2 lists the top 10
most corrupt states. This data was tabulated by adding total convictions in each state from
2000 to 2009, then identifying the 2009 population for each state to calculate a corruption
rate for each. The corruption rate is defined as the total number of public corruption
convictions from 2000 to 2009 per 100,000 residents. This data involves only federal
public corruption convictions pertaining to federal, state, and local government.
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Interestingly, a review of the data revealed that five of the ten most corrupt states are cited
in this research study.
Table 3-1. Corruption Rate by State
Public Corruption
Convictions 2000-2009

2009 Population
Estimate

Corruption rate
(convictions per 100,000
residents)

Alabama

270

4,708,708

5.73*

Alaska

55

698,473

7.87

Arizona

167

6,595,778

2.53

Arkansas

78

2,889,450

2.69

California

709

36,961,664

1.91

Colorado

92

5,024,748

1.83

Connecticut

104

3,518,288

2.95

46

885,122

5.19*

342

599,657

57.03

Florida

729

18,537,969

3.93

Georgia

191

9,829,211

1.94

Hawaii

46

1,295,178

3.55

Idaho

28

1,545,801

1.81

Illinois

489

12,910,409

3.78

Indiana

169

6,423,113

2.63

Iowa

42

3,007,858

1.39

Kansas

38

2,818,747

1.34

Kentucky

272

4,314,113

0.63

Louisiana

352

4,492,076

7.83*

Maine

38

1,318,301

2.88

Maryland

207

5,699,478

3.63

Massachusetts

187

6,593,587

2.83

Michigan

226

9,969,727

2.26

Minnesota

64

5,266,214

1.21

Mississippi

177

2,951,996

5.99

Missouri

171

5,987,580

2.85

Montana

65

974,989

6.66

State

Delaware
District of Columbia

1
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Public Corruption
Convictions 2000-2009

2009 Population
Estimate

Corruption rate
(convictions per 100,000
residents)

Nebraska

22

1,796,619

1.22

Nevada

37

2,643,085

1.39

New Hampshire

17

1,324,575

1.28

New Jersey

410

8,707,739

0.47

New Mexico

45

2,009,671

2.23

New York

633

19,545,453

3.23

North Carolina

175

9,380,884

1.86

North Dakota

51

646,844

7.88

Ohio

486

11,542,645

4.21

Oklahoma

128

3,687,050

3.47

Oregon

40

3,825,657

1.04

Pennsylvania

539

12,604,767

4.27*

Rhode Island

25

1,053,209

2.37

South Carolina

64

4,561,242

0.14

South Dakota

52

812,383

0.64

Tennessee

248

6,296,254

3.93

Texas

670

24,782,302

0.27

Utah

39

2,784,572

0.14

Vermont

15

621,760

2.41

Virginia

380

7,882,590

4.82

Washington

93

6,664,195

1.39

West Virginia

69

1,819,777

3.79

Wisconsin

122

5,654,774

2.15

Wyoming

16

544,270

2.93

State

1

The District of Columbia is the seat of the federal government and there were more criminal prosecutions
there for public corruption..
* States listed among the top ten most corrupt states
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Table 3-2. Top 10 Most Corrupt States
State

Corruption Rate

North Dakota

7.88

Alaska

7.87

Louisiana

7.83

Montana

6.66

Mississippi

5.99

Alabama

5.73

Delaware

5.19

Virginia

4.82

Pennsylvania

4.27

Ohio

4.21

Tennessee

3.98

District of Columbia

57.03 5

The Public Integrity Section shares its scope and responsibilities with the U.S.
Attorney's offices, which prosecute local corruption cases against officials who abuse the
public trust. U.S. Attorneys concentrate on specific violations of criminal laws under the
Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951), the federal mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. 1341), and the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statutes (18 U.S.C. 19611968). The 93 U.S. Attorney's offices successfully prosecuted more than 20,420 6 cases
between 2000 and 2009; they convicted federal, state, and local officials, as well as
private individuals engaged in corrupt activities. Twenty-one percent were local
officials. These federal corruption cases involved bribery, money laundering, extortion,

5

The District of Columbia is the seat of the federal government, so there were more federal criminal
corruption prosecutions there.
6
Report from the Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice, 2000-2008.
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conspiracy, tax evasion, mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, perjury, and
depriving the public of honest services.
Federal Criminal Laws Used in Public Corruption Cases
This study reviewed data from specific cases where elected officials engaged in acts of
public corruption for personal gain. It analyzed the profiles of public officials who
engaged in various corrupt activities, including bribery, money laundering, extortion,
conspiracy, tax evasion, intent to deprive the public of honest service, mail and wire fraud,
obstruction of justice, embezzlement, and perjury. This chapter provides an overview of
the laws used by federal prosecutors to indict and convict those elected officials of public
corruption. Many of the definitions used can be found in federal criminal statues and in
other publications, e.g., Malone (2007, p. 1-5), Kobrin (2006, p.779-795), and Dreyer
(2007).
It has been more than forty years since the federal government designated public
corruption as a priority and targeted state and local officials who engaged in it. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Justice
Department, and the Attorney General’s Office were all at some point responsible for
investigating and prosecuting charges of public corruption. The federal statutes used to
prosecute many corruption cases were broad and comprehensive. Over the years, some of
the most effective laws used to fight public corruption have been those prohibiting false
statements, perjury, mail fraud, and wire fraud, as well as RICO and the Hobbs Act (i.e.,
extortion).
The false statement and perjury statutes are used when public officials make false
sworn and/or unsworn statements during the course of an investigation. Federal
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prosecutors have also been extremely successful using the “honest services” provision of
the mail and wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. § 1346), which stipulates that it is illegal to
deprive citizens, employers, and others, including the public, of their “right to honest
services.” This provision gave prosecutors a great deal of flexibility when charging public
officials; its vagueness opened the door to a wide range of interpretations, and prosecutors
were eager to use the law to charge officials who violated the public trust by accepting and
engaging in deceptive and criminal behavior. According to reporter Nixon (2006),
Assistant U.S. Attorney Harrigan said it best: “The essence of public corruption is that
public officials deprive people in the community of their honest efforts to represent them.
That’s theft of honest services, and that’s what the statute covers”
Although federal statutes do not explicitly criminalize the theft of honest services, the
mail fraud statute refers to this as a scheme designed to swindle people out of money and
property. Honest services crimes occur where officials owe a duty of honest service to the
victim, typically the public. In these cases, public officials are seen as having a fiduciary
responsibility to the public that they breach.
Federal prosecutors have used the mail and wire fraud statutes in public corruption
cases because they are so comprehensive that they include the devising of any scheme to
defraud, as well as schemes to obtain money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses.
To convict a defendent, prosecutors must only prove a single use of the U.S. mail or of
wires (fax, telephone, mail, or e-mail) to “scheme to defraud” another of the intangible
right to honest services. The charges usually involve the failure to disclose a benefit of the
scheme to a public official—for instance, the failure to disclose a payment.
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In cases like these, prosecutors are not required to prove that a victim was defrauded,
only that the “schemer ponders the harm.” The honest services provision can apply to
any scheme to deprive the public of certain intangible property rights, including control
over one’s own money or the responsibility to conduct the business of the public
honestly, impartially, and free from corruption (Kobrin 2006; Maass 1987; Nixon 2006).
The statute has been an invaluable tool for the federal government in fighting public
corruption cases.
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO as a tool to fight public corruption. RICO charges
apply where at least two acts of illegal schemes to make a profit are involved; these acts
include mail and wire fraud, bribery, money laundering, extortion, obstruction of justice,
and/or state penal law violations. Mail and wire fraud charges are substantive acts for
RICO; when more than two of these charges are involved, the federal government will
charge a public official with a RICO violation (Maass 1987). The RICO statute makes it
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce to conduct such enterprises through a pattern of illegal and criminal
activity, so prosecutors must show a pattern of illegal activity to invoke the statute.
The Hobbs Act is the federal statute pertaining to extortion. This act makes it a crime
to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery or extortion. Extortion is a common
violation in cases of public corruption: officials expect financial compensation for their
decisions, and a contract, decision, or change in regulation does not happen until payment
is received, which is illegal. An additional element of the Hobbs Act is that payment to an
official constitutes extortion if it is accompanied by fear of economic loss.
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The federal government’s use of the extortion statute “under color of official right”
occurs when a public official or private person who has political power receives money
from a third party as a result of the exercise of that power. To qualify as corruption, both
the official and the third party must know or perceive that the official exerted such power
and that the payments were a result of the exercise of official power. Charges against
public officials under the Hobbs Act for obtaining money or property to which they are not
entitled, knowing that a payment was made in return for official acts, are comparable to the
bribery statute.
In fact, the most common violation of public corruption is bribery. A review of
corruption cases indicates that bribery appears to have the highest rate of prosecution of
any form of corruption. It is the classic form of public corruption: individuals or
organizations pay government officials who grant contracts on behalf of a governmental
institution or make decisions on using public funds in order to influence the officials’
decisions on particular contracts or tasks. There are several methods of payments that
constitute a bribe, including kickbacks, payoffs, grease money, and gratuities. Bribery in
corruption cases involves officials who abuse the power entrusted to them by the public
for monetary benefits.
Defining Public Corruption
Government corruption has significant consequences if not reduced or eliminated. To
better explore the topic, this research study must first develop a working definition of it.
Most definitions of public corruption center on the abuse of public office for personal
benefit; this common definition covers the overall behavior of officials using their public
office as a means for personal benefit, and is broad enough to include acts of nepotism and
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graft. Although the concept of corruption is broad, researchers agree that it generally
refers to acts in which the power of a public office is used for personal gain. Moodie
(1980) said, “Corruption now refers to specific actions by specific individuals—those
holding public positions, elected or appointed, and those who seek to influence them.
Defining corruption becomes a process of spelling out classifications of behavior” (p. 209).
Many researchers have tried to define public corruption; however, the body of
research has yet to produce a consensus on the subject. Klitgaard (1988) says, “[A corrupt
official] deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against
the exercise of certain private-regarding behavior” (p. 23). Ackerman (2001) defines
public corruption as the abuse of one’s public office for personal gain. According to
Georges Bernanos, a French novelist and political writer, “The first sign of corruption in a
society that is still alive is that the end justifies the means”. Another commonly used
definition is that of Nye (1967), who, like Klitgaard, used a definition popular among
political scientists: “[C]orruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a
public role because of private-regarding personal, close family, private clique pecuniary
status-gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence” (p. 417). Some economists use a definition from the World Bank (1977): “An
abuse of public office power for private gains.” All these definitions share one common
theme: the misuse of public power for private gain (Senturia 1935, p. 449; Heidenheimer
1989a, p. 9; Key 1936, p. 388; Johnson 1996, p. 331; Benson 1978, xiii; Williams 2006, p.
127).
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Friedrich (1966) emphasized that a “pattern of corruption can be said to exist
whenever a power holder who is in charge of doing certain things (i.e., who is a
responsible functionary or officeholder) is by monetary or other rewards not legally
provided for, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the rewards and
thereby does damage to the public and its interest” (p. 74). Amundsen (1999) suggested
that political actors engage in corrupt activities to receive private benefits for themselves,
family, and friends. Bardhan (1997) provides a succinct definition: “Corruption refers to
the use of public office for private gains, where an official (an agent) entrusted with
carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for
private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal” (p. 1321).
Huntington (1968) defines corruption as the “behavior of public officials which
deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends” (p. 59). Rogow and Lasswell
(1993) refer to corruption as “behavior in office that is motivated by a desire for personal
material gain” (p. 2). The final definition considered in this research study is offered by
Hutchorft (1996), in which corruption is viewed as a means of payment of bribes by firms
to public officials who, in turn, “expedite a decision without changing it” or “change the
decision and contravene formal government policy” (p. 14).
Each one of these definitions was incorporated into the research, since each relates
corruption to the abuse of public power for personal benefit. Together they contribute to
an overall definition that is broad enough to encompass the overall behavior of officials
involved in corruption, and is thus appropriate for theory building.
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The final definition comes from Merriam-Webster:
a: impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle: depravity
b: decay, decomposition c: inducement to wrong by improper or
unlawful means (as bribery) d: a departure from the original or
from what is pure or correct.
How researchers define corruption determines what data they use to model and
measure it. 7 After considering various definitions from the literature, as well as those
offered by previous studies, this research study will use the following definition, slightly
different from the Merriam-Webster one: “The impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral
principle concluding with an inducement to do wrong by improper or unlawful means
relating to governing, a government, or the conduct of government.” With this working
definition of public corruption, this study will delineate two different types: “grand
corruption” and “petty corruption” (Jain 2002, p. 73-75). Grand corruption occurs at the
highest level of government and involves major government programs and projects
(Moody-Stewart 1997). Grand corruption also refers to the acts of political officials who
abuse their position of power to make economic policies for personal use and/or to
preserve their power and wealth (Jain 2001; Amundsen 1999). 8

7

One sign of the difficulty of defining corruption is that almost everyone who writes about it uses a
different definition. For a brief summary of various definitions, see Jain (1998c, 13-19). For a discussion
of the importance of the definition of corruption, see Johnston (2000a), Lancaster and Montinola (1997),
and Philil (1997). Collier (1999, p. 4) attributes the absence of a theory of corruption partly to the lack of an
agreed-upon definition of corruption. For an earlier attempt to define various types of corruption, see
Johnson (1986). Johnson (1996) differentiates between “behavior-classifying” and “principal-agent-client”
definitions of corruption.
8
“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations of promises, … for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, [uses the mail or causes them to be
used], shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both” (18 U.S.C.
§1341).
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Petty corruption occurs at the bureaucratic level, where administrators and appointed
bureaucrats are bribed to fast-track bureaucratic procedures or extort payments while
carrying out tasks assigned to them (Jain 2001; Amundsen 1999). It is most often used to
supplement the income of underpaid bureaucrats. This research focus is grand
corruption.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS
Research Design
The design was a vital component of the overall plan used to explore and analyze
data. The main purpose of a research design is to identify and establish a connection
linking the research questions and the collected data, but another important function is to
provide a road map outlining any prospective links between the researcher’s theoretical
model and the collection and analysis of empirical data.
This research study design is a single-method design that will use a quantitative
research approach to determine if there is a correlation, or cause and effect, between
certain characteristics of elected county officials and their decision to engage in acts of
public corruption. The ladder section of this chapter outlines the research questions and
research hypotheses used to explain the decisions of elected officials.
Design Summary
Model Approach: The research design used a quantitative research approach to
develop and analyze its General Models of Public Corruption.
Model Base: The research design developed assumptions about cause-and-effect
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. The research will seek to
predict and explain relationships between these variables.
Driving Theory: GST was the impetus for the selection of the variables and the
methods of analysis.
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Description: The research design will describe the data in the study and determine
whether they show a relationship between particular attributes of elected county officials
and public corruption.
Explanatory Aspect: The research study attempts to explain public corruption among
elected county officials who were federally indicted and convicted, as opposed to elected
county officials who opted not to engage in acts of public corruption, using the variables
in the study model. In addition, the study will review data from both areas: those where
there were convictions and those where there were no convictions.
Data Analysis
The analysis will examine data pertaining to county governments with federally
convicted elected officials and county governments with no convicted elected officials.
The analysis will involve a two-stage process. The first stage will be to explain public
corruption in county government. This process includes analyzing 18 variables within
three domains: government characteristics, governmental fiscal characteristics, and
community characteristics. The second stage will be to identify which of the eight
factors within the domain of elected officials' characteristics can best explain the behavior
of elected county officials who engaged in public corruption.
Quantitative Design
Hopkins (1998) states that quantitative research determines how one thing (an
independent variable) affects another (dependent variable) in a population, i.e., it is about
quantifying the relationships between variables. However, the quantitative research
approach is limited in ways that could have some bearing on this research study.
Researchers generally use this approach to ensure that valid statistical methods are
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applied in the review of data. According to Massey (2003), quantitative design takes no
account of an individual’s lifetime experiences, feelings, and observations. Quantitative
research design is “constructed around a theory, and the theory acts as a systematizing
model for the development of the research questions, hypotheses, data collection
procedure and analyses” (Tekniepe 2007, p. 129). In essence, using a quantitative
research approach is deductive, not only when designing the overall study, but also when
testing the hypotheses and interpreting the results. A quantitative research approach
rejects any opportunity for individual subjectivity, since the results rely on objective
interpretation of data and observations. Therefore, despite its limitations, a quantitative
research approach is the approach best suited for this research study because it removes
any limitations that would affect the outcome of the research analysis.
Unit of Analysis
County commissioners from large urban counties are the focus of this research study.
The unit of analysis was elected county commissioners: those indicted and convicted, and
those not convicted or serving in counties with no incidence of public corruption, in large
urban counties. This unit of analysis is the most appropriate for examining the specific
research questions and hypotheses identified in this study.
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show that, between 2000 and 2009, 27.74 percent of the
respondents had been indicted or convicted of public corruption in federal court. This
information was used to establish the targeted population.
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Table 4-1. Summary of Large Urban Counties with a Population of 300,000 or
More
Summary of Responses

Number

Percentage

Did not respond to questionnaire

56

26.54

Responded to questionnaire; no convictions

91

53.08

Responded to questionnaire; convictions & indictments

26*

20.38

173

100.0

Total Questionnaire Respondents
*8 counties had multiple cases of public corruption.

Table 4-2. Summary of County Officials from Large Urban Counties
with a Population of 300,000 or More
Summary of Responses

Number

Percentage

Did not respond to questionnaire

25

Responded to questionnaire; no convictions or indictments

112

72.26

Responded to questionnaire; convictions & Indictments

43

27.74

155

100.0

Total Questionnaire Respondents

Overall, responses were received from 67.63 percent of the target population, which
are the ones included in the research study. Some counties in which officials had been
federally convicted were excluded from the research study because the criminal activities
occurred outside the study period, the counties were not large urban counties, or the
convictions were not related to public corruption and the official’s responsibilities. The
resulting population covers 117 large urban counties that have convicted and nonconvicted county commissioners.
The target population for this research study comprised 11 states with 26 urban
counties that have populations of 300,000 or greater; it included federally indicted or
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convicted elected county officials and those not convicted. The preliminary analysis
found 173 counties with populations of 300,000 or greater, 91 of which had no incidence
of public corruption. The review found nine states had no counties with populations of
300,000 or greater: Alaska, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming (National Association of Counties 2006). These
states were excluded from the research study. In fact, the literature revealed that less than
six percent of the 3,066 counties in the U.S. had populations of 300,000 and greater
(National Association of Counties 2006).
Data Sample
The data and quantitative research observations (sampling) for this research study
were restricted to 117 large urban counties where elected county officials had and had not
been federally indicted and/or convicted of public corruption (based on U.S. District
Court criminal records) between 2000 and 2009. During the data collection process, it
was discovered that 2000–2009 was the period with the most reliable information; earlier
data were sparse, inaccurate, and often unverifiable.
Appendix II lists the large urban counties with public corruption convictions that
were examined for this study, and Appendix III lists the large urban counties with no
cases of public corruption considered. Appendix IV contains the questionnaire used to
obtain information from county governments.
Research Model
Building the model was vital to this study’s overall success. The focus of the study
is the assessment and measurement of the cause-and-effect (predictability) relationship
between the General Models and the domains of elected officials’ characteristics,
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government characteristics, fiscal stability characteristics, and community characteristics
to determine which attribute(s) induced public corruption among elected county officials.
The research was conducted on elected county officials and county governments because
of the availability of historical statistical information.
The dependent variable in the General Model is a dichotomous variable that
indicates whether an elected official committed a crime of public corruption. The domain
and theory were used to accurately analyze and measure results to determine the reasons
associated with the behavior of county officials who engaged in public corruption. The
measures analyzed included government characteristics, county government fiscal
characteristics, community characteristics, and the characteristics of elected officials.
These will be used to measure the domain attributes identified in the study.
Table 4-3. Overview of Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent Variable
Corruption
Committed Corruption = 1
Did Not Commit Corruption = 0
Independent Variables
Characteristics of
Elected Officials
Gender

Government
Characteristics
Office of Inspector
General

Fiscal Stability

Community Characteristics

Per capita income

Poverty rate

Age

Ethic laws

Fiscal stability

Age of the community
65 & older

Race

Structure of government

Federal & state aid

Crime rate

Religious belief

Open meeting laws

Auditor

Civic involvement

Education

Employment growth

Community education level

Marital status

Labor force

Tenure

Population growth

Outside employment

County population to overall state
population
Political party affiliation
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Data Sampling Process
The independent variables set for individual-level data included eight covariates for
the domain “profile characteristics of elected officials.” Several important factors
associated with this data set are relevant to study analyses. The first is that 43 elected
county officials are included in the research study from 26 large urban counties. The
study identified only those elected officials indicted or convicted on federal charges of
public corruption between 2000 and 2009 who used their elected position for personal
gain; this designation is the main factor for inclusion in the research study. The study
also incorporated 112 elected county officials who were not indicted or convicted of
public corruption charges, but were the counterparts to officials who were corrupt. They
served as members of the county commission during the same period as the county
officials who were indicted and/or convicted, and responded to requests for information.
The process for gathering data from groups of elected county officials—those convicted
or indicted, and their counterparts not involved in acts of corruption—involved mailing
or e-mailing a two-page questionnaire (Appendix IV) and, in some cases, conducting
telephone interviews.
Much of the information for both groups of officials was obtained with the help of
current county commissioners and county staff, state election and ethics department staff,
Justice Department press releases, and the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
service. Collecting data about persons in prison included accessing records through
public information requests at the federal, state, and local government level. Additional
information was gathered from newspaper articles and discussions with news reporters
and staff.
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A number of former county commissioners no longer on elected boards were located
with the help of county staff and other commissioners. Some officials were still members
of the board, or held another elected position, and responded to the request for
information. In other cases, information was available through county Web sites or
gathered from public record documents. Of the 219 elected county officials who served
as county commissioners during the research period, 180 requests for information were
mailed out to those officials who were located and not deceased. Of the 180 mailed
questionnaires, 155 were completed, returned, and included in the study. The response
rate, over 86 percent, required considerable time and effort in locating accurate
information about the 43 officials indicted or convicted of public corruption, as well as
information pertaining to those officials not convicted. In a few instances, interviews
were conducted with former commissioners convicted of public corruption.
Relational Measures, Data Collection and Sources, and Coding Procedures
This section of the research study describes the functions and specific procedures
used to identify data. It outlines how the research study will address each attribute of the
four domains and how to adequately measure each variable. Exhibit III contains a
concise description of the coding procedures and direction on the types of data gathered
for the dependent and covariates used in the research study. Data was collected from
various sources, both primary and secondary, during a 21-month period that began in
March 2008 and ended in December 2009. Exhibit I provides a summary of the data
sources used for each variable during the data collection process.
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Quantitative Procedures
Quantitative research is a systematic and objective process that quantifies the
relationship between variables, with the overall purpose of generalizing the information
about the subjects to the overall population. This section will provide an outline of the
methods used in the research study model and a framework for the collection of data.
The study itself incorporates descriptive statistics to summarize the samples and their
measures that describe what the data show and analyze both the dependent variable and
the covariates to determine the relationship between the two variables.
To analyze the cause-and-effect relationship of the independent variables on the
dependent variable, this research study used a logit regression model. The logit
procedure is appropriate because the dependent variable is bivariate with only two
possible outcomes, committed corruption or did not commit corruption, coded
respectively as 1 and 0.
According to Miles and Huberman (2002), the main purpose of regression analysis is
to perform three important functions: (1) prediction, (2) explanation, and (3) control.
Firstly, the regression analysis is used to predict if (and how) the various covariates are
related to the dependent variable—in this case, corruption. Secondly, the logit regression
model is used to explain why certain events happen based on that relationship, and
finally, a regression analysis is used to control for other variables.
The use of a logit regression model in this study allowed testing of the outcomes
from a set of variables that could be dichotomous, discrete, continuous, or a mixture of
any of the three. In the General Models, the dependent variable is dichotomous, while
the independent variables include a mixture. This study will attempt to determine what
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relationships exist between the dependent and independent variables, if any, and explain
why some elected county officials opted to engage in public corruption and others did
not. It is posited that logit regression analysis is the method best suited to accomplish the
desired task for this research study and will adequately address statistical issues that may
confront this study.
Analytical Considerations
When developing research studies, serious analytical consideration ensures that the
testing of hypotheses is appropriately addressed. In this study, the analytical
considerations for hypothesis testing included the treatment of missing data, research
study limitations, and testing for multicollinearity. The following sections specifically
address these key issues.
Treatment of Missing Data
Of the total number of county officials contacted for this research study, 23 current
county officials did not respond to a request for information and 15 former county
officials could not be located. Overall, 18 counties failed to respond to the request for
information. Each one of these groups was therefore excluded from the research study.
Key to the research process was obtaining accurate and reliable results of the tests
associated with logit regression procedures. During the data collection process, two
values were unobtainable for five counties: per capita income for three counties for a oneyear period and crime rate for two counties for a one-year period. Given that the majority
of the information was available and the missing values were limited, the researcher
extrapolated for the values of per capita income and crime rate. In total, the research
study was unable to gather information for the following counties.
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Table 4-4. Counties with Missing Data
Financial Stability

Political Party Affiliation

Employment Growth

Lee County

Baltimore County

Jefferson Parish, Louisiana

Bristol County

Onondaga County

Plymouth County

Snohomish County

Monroe County
Tulsa County
Lee County

Efforts to gather information were time-consuming and required repeated requests,
but overall proved successful. Data in this study was obtained from several sources,
including county staff, current and former county officials, and public information reports
released annually by counties. The success of the data collection process culminated with
responses from, and personal conversations with, several former county officials
convicted of public corruption. In the end, the data collection process was mostly
successful, and missing data was not a significant issue.
Multicollinearity
Researchers who utilize regression analysis are concerned with a number of factors,
including the analytical considerations of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity becomes a
problem when the research has difficulty predicting one explanatory variable from one or
more of the remaining explanatory variables (King, Keohane, and Sidney 1994).
Specifically, the problem occurs when one independent variable cannot be distinguished
from another and the two independent variables become highly correlated. When
researchers utilize regression analysis and the research cannot determine which of the two
independent variables account for the variance in the dependent variable, collinearity
becomes a problematic factor within the research design, creating multicollinearity.
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It is expected that some degree of multicollinearity may occur between covariates,
but how the research resolves the problem speaks to the research design and how well the
research adjusts for issues within the study. After a careful review of covariates, it was
concluded that multicollinearity did not pose a problem in this research.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The literature review provided a general overview of the impact of public corruption
committed by elected officials, and a possible explanation of their decision to engage in
corrupt activities. Previous research has shown that the activities of officials who engage
in criminal behavior have a negative effect on both private and public institutions; the
literature even emphasizes the profound effects public corruption has had. This is one
reason political scientists and others continue to search for explanations of public
corruption and its negative impact on government operations. As part of that continuing
effort, this study searched for evidence to explain public corruption among county
officials within the past ten years; however, the research suggests that local, federal, and
state governments have experienced explosive growth in corruption cases (United States
Justice Department 2009) which warrants a review of the data.
This study undertakes the task of explaining public corruption committed by elected
county officials, but more importantly, it attempts to shed light on public corruption
Empirical studies by Lederman et al. (2004) imply that political institutions (i.e.,
government) are important in determining the pervasiveness of corruption. Thus, county
characteristics are a vital factor in this research study, and the study will attempt to
explain the impact, if any, that county characteristics have on public corruption. The
study will also attempt to determine if GST or any negative attributes are factors in the
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behavior of public officials and their decisions to engage in criminal behavior and, if so,
to what degree.
The cause and nature of public corruption among elected officials, particularly
county officials, in contemporary America may be traced to a variety of factors; however,
previous research in this area was unsuccessful in identifying a specific connection to one
or more variables that would explain corruption among elected county officials. The
GST may provide that explanation.
Elected Officials’ Profile Domain
As early as 1963, Rogow and Lasswell noted that an elected official’s profile
characteristics were a determining factor in public corruption. In their book Power,
Corruption, and Rectitude, they identified “game” and “gain” politicians, and it is
through this work that a connection to GST becomes applicable. Rogow and Lasswell
(1963) acknowledged that the personality system in Tables 2-2 and 2-3 delineates three
factors proposed to influence the behavior of elected officials and their decision whether
to engage in corrupt behavior: (1) deprivation, (2) demands, and (3) indulgence. These
three factors, they postulated, can influence elected officials’ decisions and behavior,
shape their ideology and moral character to become corrupt or not. Their study of 30
political officials provided the supporting information used to develop measurable
factors, specific research questions, and hypotheses for the General Models.
To gain a better understanding of the impact of corruption, this research study
examines the characteristics of elected officials and seeks to determine which ones
influence their behavior and decisions. As noted in the literature review, studies by
Langton and Piquero (2007) and other research criminologists, such as Coleman (1995),
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Croall (2001), and Wheeler (1992), revealed several explanations for white-collar crimes,
including economic pressure, unjust treatment, and personality traits. Their research gave
the confirmation needed to investigate the characteristics of county officials. The goal
was to determine which specific characteristics influenced the decisions of county
officials, and whether the decisions of county officials were made on behalf of citizens or
for personal rewards (della Porta 1996). Mastropaolo (1990) stated, “Career politicians
view politics as a means for achieving upward social mobility” (p. 58-59), leading to this
question: Are the decisions of elected officials reflective of the sentiment of all officials,
and if so, what specific character traits affect behavior?
The decisions of elected officials can be attributed to their upbringing, environment,
failures, and successes. Since GST may provide some explanation of their behavior, it is
an appropriate theory for this study. GST theorizes that behavior and decisions might be
related to three aspects of an official’s environment and upbringing: “1) Their failure to
achieve positively valued goals, 2) removal of positively valued stimuli, or 3) presents of
negative stimuli. Each of these factors, according to research, can influence the decisions
of individuals, and in the case of this research study, is a factor in the behavior of elected
county officials” (Agnew 1992, p. 50). These three factors are measured through (a)
outside employment, (b) age, (c) gender, (d) education, (e) religion, (f) marital status, (g)
race, and (h) tenure. The objective is to determine which of these profile characteristics
are viewed as negative stimuli, which are associated with an official's environment and
background, and whether any of these characteristics are factors in the behavior and
decisions of elected officials. The following subsections present the specific research

82

questions and related hypotheses for the domain of elected officials’ profile
characteristics.
Outside Employment
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between outside employment of
county commissioners and public corruption?
Hypothesis 1: The more opportunities for outside employment that are available, the
more likely it is that county commissioners will engage in public corruption.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between outside income (measured as
outside employment) and an elected official’s decision to accept bribes or engage in other
forms of corruption. Outside employment for elected officials includes income or
consulting fees beyond their county commission salaries, i.e., supplemental income.
It is thought that outside employment of county commissioners creates opportunities
in which conflict of interest may occur. Additionally, various types of employment
opportunities can create more chances for a potential conflict of interest and a higher
propensity for public corruption. Therefore, outside employment—specifically, certain
industries or employment opportunities—opens the door to potential problems that
include conflict of interest for elected county officials.
Outside employment is an alternative for improving the financial security of elected
officials, but it is through this avenue that conflict can become an issue. Because county
governments are local in scope, those officials have a greater influence on many aspects
of their communities, including businesses, contracts, zoning, and policies. All of these
elements can directly influence the lives of citizens as well as the business community, so
elected officials of large urban counties generally wield significant power and influence.
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Consideration should be given to lack of money as one of the fundamental reasons
outside employment is viewed as a precursor to public corruption. A lack of personal
wealth prior to achieving elected office can influence the behavior of county officials,
and once elected, some officials take advantage of any opportunity to engage in corrupt
behavior. A lack of money and power, along with a desire for personal gain, is
hypothesized to be the principal reason to seek outside employment opportunities that
may ultimately lead to political corruption. According to Berg, Hahn, and Schmidhauser
(1976), “Money talks and those who desperately need money are prepared to listen” (p.
41). Their assessment is that lack of money, economic poverty, or a decline in financial
status is a contributing factor of public corruption and a negative strain of GST; the
results of the analysis show these officials perceive a lack of money as a failure to
achieve a positively valued goal. Robert J. Williams’ (2006) assessment of Berg's
analysis is valid: “Despite all the demographic, economic and political changes in this
century, money remains, with apologies to Bagehot, the hyphen which joins, the buckle
which fastens the disparate elements of the American political system” (p. 129).
County government officials are typically compensated, but salaries differ from state
to state and are often inadequate for some officials to maintain a particular lifestyle.
Elected county commissioners who engage in political corruption often have a desire to
maintain a standard of living equal to their peers or business associates within their social
circle, and developing alternative options for generating money becomes important.
Outside employment facilitates the opportunity for officials to engage in corrupt
activities. This study will determine if a relationship exists between those two factors.
GST postulates that outside employment is the venue to resolve the issue of a lack of
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money, but presents a problem with a conflict of interest and creates situations in which
financial failures stress public officials and result in public corruption. The desire to
generate additional income becomes a factor that can affect decisions (policy and nonpolicy), resulting in officials’ decisions that serve to benefit themselves.
According to other studies, there is a relationship between level of income and
corruption. Corruption is low when income levels are high (Amundsen 1999; Van
Rijckeghem and Weder 1997; Swamy et al. 1999; Treisman 1999a; Lipset 1960). GST
postulates that a lack of financial security results in negative strain, and is viewed as a
failure financially and socially. Outside employment opportunities, including
opportunities that create a conflict of interest, provide the vehicle to secure financial
resources and financial security, but have the propensity to result in public corruption.
Age
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between the age of county
commissioners and public corruption?
Hypothesis 2: The more advanced the age of county commissioners, the more likely
they are to participate in public corruption.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between county officials’ age
(measured as the age of county officials) and public corruption. The literature review
found empirical studies that examined the relationship between age and public
corruption. The research determined that age is a factor in corruption and can affect the
behavior and decisions of officials. According to previous research, younger officials are
trustworthy and less likely to engage in acts of corruption. In a recent study, Mocan
(2004) showed a correlation between age and corruption. Mocan’s data indicated that
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younger persons (aged 18 to 20) are less likely to participate in a corrupt act, whereas
individuals between the ages of 20 and 54 are more likely to solicit a bribe. Another
study that suggests an age effect in criminal behavior is Torgler and Valev (2006), which
demonstrated that age influences the criminal behavior of individuals and the decisions
individuals make. This study will examine the ages of officials and seek to determine at
what age elected officials will become involved in corrupt activities, the relationship of
age to corruption, and whether public corruption is associated with an age effect. Under
GST, one might hypothesize that younger public officials desire instant financial success
and are not willing to devote the time to achieve financial and career advancement. This
study will determine if older public officials are typically more financially stable than
younger officials, and if so, whether younger officials would be more likely to develop
financial stress that results in acts of public corruption.
Gender
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s
gender and public corruption?
Hypothesis 3: Male county commissioners are more likely than female county
commissioners to engage in public corruption.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between the gender of county officials
(measured as the gender of officials) and public corruption. The literature review
discovered studies that examined public corruption and gender (e.g., Azfar et al. 2001).
Where there is a propensity to engage in corruption, the literature showed that acts by
women were less severe (Swamy et al. 1999; Dollar et al. 1999). The hypothesis,
therefore, is that men have a higher propensity to be involved in acts of corruption than
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women. Men are more likely to serve as elected officials, but even when women are
elected, their priorities are issue-based. In most cases, women seem more concerned with
solving problems than obtaining power or money.
The literature review found that several countries used an unusual gender-related
policy to confront corruption and reduce corrupt behavior in government: women were
put in leadership and management positions as an anticorruption method (Moore 1999;
McDermott 1999). Studies have found that women and men approach corruption
differently, and evidence suggests that women commit lower levels of criminal activities
than men (Torgler and Vale 2007). There is also evidence of gender differences on
ethical decision-making (Ford et al. 1994; Glover et al. 1997; Reiss & Mitra 1998):
studies suggest there are higher degrees of ethical standards governing women’s behavior
than men’s, and that “in the short run, a greater presence of women in public life will
reduce corruption” (Azfar et al. 2001, p. 53).
This research study will examine the data to determine if a valid explanation exists
that can explain why more incidents of public corruption are committed by men than by
women.
Education
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between the education of county
commissioners and public corruption?
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of education among county commissioners, the
less likely it is a commissioner will engage in public corruption.
It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between county officials’
educational achievement (measured as county officials’ level of education) and public
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corruption. A review of the literature found no specific studies that have examined the
relationship between the level of formal education and public corruption; however, it is
hypothesized that elected county officials who have advanced degrees are less likely to
participate in corrupt activities than their counterparts who do not. According to Torgler
and Dong (2008), one study prepared by Mocan (2004) suggested that “higher levels of
education can lead to a higher probability of being targeted for bribes, stressing also that
a more educated population is expected to be less tolerant of corruption” (p. 14).
Although elected officials with a high level of education may be targets for those
behaving illegally, it is posited that elected officials will be less apt to participate in such
behavior if they have advanced degrees. This research study will examine education and
public corruption to determine if a correlation exists between public officials’ level of
education and their willingness to engage in corrupt activities.
GST postulates that “educational attainment is referred to as a mark of social status
and thus believed to indicate a greater stake in conformity; poor academic performance
was likely to result in greater stress for a white-collar offender than for the common
criminal” (Langton and Piquero 2007, p. 5). It is theorized that county officials who
failed to achieve educational success may view public corruption as an opportunity to
advance to the status level of their peers. This assessment would lead one to believe that
a large number of highly educated elected officials would result in a lower level of
corruption in government.
Race
Research Question 5: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s
ethnicity and public corruption?
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Hypothesis 5: White county commissioners are less likely to engage in public
corruption than other commissioners.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between non-white commissioners
(measured as the race of county officials) and public corruption. The literature review
found several studies that investigated the relationship between corruption and ethnic
heterogeneity; in literature broadly concerned with ethnicity and corruption research,
studies revealed a possible relationship between corruption and ethnic diversity (Mauro
1995; Alesina, Bagir, and Williams 2002; La Porta et al. 1999). In fact, according to one
study by Mauro (1995), “The presence of many different ethnolinguistic groups is also
significantly associated with worse corruption, as bureaucrats may favor members of
their same group” (p . 693).
It is hypothesized that a county official’s race is a relevant factor in the discussion of
public corruption in county government, and that race can influence an official’s behavior
and decision-making ability. Race is a negative element that creates social rejection for
officials. According to Jang and Johnson (2003), Hagan and Peterson (1995), Mirowsky
and Ross (1989), Ross and Van Willingen (1996), and Schulz et al. (2000), race is a
negative strain and could cause non-white officials “psychological distress due to their
more frequent experiences of racism and economic disadvantage” (p. 83). Empirical
evidence confirms that GST can apply to people of color, particularly AfricanAmericans, who have experienced a greater level of strain due to racism, economic
disadvantage, prejudice, and unfair treatment. The literature review suggested that
African-Americans may externalize adversity, which could be related to years of harsh
treatment and in the end result in the development of racial consciousness (Neighbor et
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al. 1996). 9 This research study will examine race to determine if levels of corruption are
greater among minorities. GST will be used to analyze data to determine if a correlation
exists between the race of county officials and corrupt behavior.
A review of Meier and Holbrook (1992) showed that a larger number of minority
elected officials were investigated for corruption and targeted for prosecution, but there is
a lack of supporting evidence for the conclusion that minorities engage in political
corruption at a higher rate than non-minorities. This study will examine the data to
determine if corruption is greater among minorities. It is also thought that the impact of
corruption is affected by the race of officials because “ethnic fragmentation impacts
corruption by reducing the popular will to oppose politicians. If an area is torn apart by
ethnic divisions, leaders tend to allocate resources towards backers of their own ethnicity,
then members of one ethnic group might continue to support a leader of their own ethnic
group, even if he is known to be corrupt” (Glaeser and Saks 2004, p. 5-6).
Religion
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between the religion of county
commissioners and public corruption?
Hypothesis 6: County commissioners with religious beliefs are less likely to engage
in public corruption.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between the degree of devotion to a
religion among county commissioners (measured as county officials’ public display of
faith) and public corruption. According to Lambsdorff (1999), “A strong association
between religion and corruption is obtained by Treisman [1999a]” (p. 11). Additionally,
9

Neighbor et al. defined racial consciousness as “a set of beliefs about relative position of African-Americans in society.
Specifically, consciousness is a collective interpretation of personal experience that includes power grievances about a group's relative
disadvantaged status, which influences blacks to keep stress external rather than allowing it to become internalized” (171).
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La Porta et al. (1997), Treisman (1999a), and Paldam (1999b) theorize that the role of
religion in an official’s life contributes to the level of corruption. The research conducted
by La Porta et al. found “that such hierarchical form of religion is detrimental to civic
engagement, a factor which should help reduce corruption” (Lambsdorff 1999, p. 11).
Torgler (2006) suggests that engagement in illegal activities might be affected by
people’s religious involvement, and that there may be a relationship between religion and
the behavior of elected officials. Other research suggests that religion has a positive
effect on GST, and that religion is a social connection and strength for families and
individuals. According to Piquero and Sealock (2000) and Jang and Johnson (2003),
spiritual or religious factors may shield the effects of negative emotions, reduce deviant
coping, and decrease the effect of strain. This study will review religion as a factor and
determine its influence on corruption.
Marital Status
Research Question 7: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s
marital status and public corruption?
Hypothesis 7: County commissioners who are not married are more likely to engage
in public corruption.
It is thought that a positive correlation exists between the marital status of county
commissioners (measured as the marital status of county officials) and public corruption.
A review of the literature found some information indicating that marriage could have an
effect on elected officials’ behavior. Swamy et al. (2001) held that marriage can alter
public behavior, while a criminal study by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) theorized the
opposite—that marital status has no influence on the likelihood of crime. GST postulates
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that elected officials who are divorced can experience negative emotions, including
anger, which reflect their social status and can influence their public life, i.e., failure in
marriage can create a perception of failure in other aspects of public life. A divorce
while in public office can negatively reflect on the performance and abilities of public
officials, and stressful tension in public life may affect the decisions of individuals. This
research study will explore the relationship to determine if a correlation exists between
the marital status of county officials and public corruption.
Tenure
Research Question 8: What is the relationship between a county commissioner’s
tenure in public office and public corruption?
Hypothesis 8: County commissioners with fewer years on the county commission are
more likely to engage in public corruption.
It is theorized that a positive relationship exists between a lengthy tenure of elected
office (measured as the number of years in office as a county official) and public
corruption. The literature review found no studies that addressed a relationship between
public corruption and tenure, and it is generally believed that tenure has no influence on
the behavior and actions of public officials. However, this study will review data to
determine if there is a relationship between the length of time in public office and the
decision of public officials to engage in corruption.
The length of time an official remains in office speaks to that official’s stability. It is
hypothesized that the tenure of elected officials can affect their ability to make sound
decisions and value judgments. It seems likely that county officials who seek to climb
the political ladder rapidly would be more inclined to take every opportunity for political
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advantage, including illicit ones. It is posited that elected county officials may be
inclined to grant special treatment to generous political donors who request favors and
support the officials' eagerness to advance politically. However, a long tenure can
produce positive results and strengthen an official’s desire to remain in office, thereby
discouraging corrupt behavior.
While GST may not apply to an official’s tenure, it is thought that tenure may
influence the behavior and actions of elected county officials. This study will test data to
examine if a correlation exists between tenure and public corruption.
Table 4-5.

General Model: Elected Officials’ Profile Characteristics Domain

Specific Research Question

Related Hypothesis

Q1: What is the relationship between the outside
employment of county commissioners and public
corruption?

H1: (+) A positive relationship exists between
commissioners with outside employment and public
corruption.

Q2: What is the relationship between the age of county
commissioners and public corruption?

H2: (+) A positive relationship exists between the age of
commissioners and public corruption.

Q3: What is the relationship between a county
commissioner’s gender and public corruption?

H3: (+) A positive relationship exists between male
commissioners and public corruption.

Q4: What is the relationship between a county
H4: (-) A negative relationship exists between a
commissioner’s formal education and public corruption? commissioner’s formal education and public corruption.
Q5: What is the relationship between a county
commissioner’s ethnicity and public corruption?

H5: (-) A positive relationship exists between non-white
commissioners and public corruption.

Q6: What is the relationship between a county
commissioner’s religion and public corruption?

H6: (-) A negative relationship exists between
commissioners with a limited degree of devotion to a
religion and public corruption.

Q7: What is the relationship between a county
commissioner’s marital status and public corruption?

H7: (+) A positive relationship exists between a
commissioner’s marital status and public corruption.

Q8: What is the relationship between a county
commissioner’s tenure in office and public corruption?

H8: (+) A positive relationship exists between a
commissioner’s tenure and public corruption.
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Community Characteristics Domain
Community characteristics are another set of factors thought to affect public
corruption among elected officials. It is posited that the demographics and environment
of a community can influence county officials’ behavior. Several research studies
indicate that the characteristics of a community and the community’s environment for
politicians could have a great deal to do with an official’s conduct, decisions, and
behavior (della Porta 1996; Hunt 2004; Maxwell and Winters 2003; Meier and Holbrook
1992; Menzel and Benton 1991). In addition, an official's peers, community, friendships,
teachers, religious influences, and families are all nurturing elements that can become
factors in both actions and conduct.
This study analyzes community characteristics as an important determinant of the
corruption of county officials. It considers the relationship between a number of
community factors, including poverty rate, level of college education, percentage of the
community aged 65 years or older, level of civic involvement, and population of the
county. The study examines how community characteristics affect a politician’s
decisions, as well as how they shape that person’s social class, values, moral character,
and beliefs, and what influence these may have on a decision to engage in public
corruption.
This research study will investigate whether community environment influences the
decision-making processes of officials. Do the negative attributes of a community
influence the behavior of officials, and are these factors enough to result in negative
strains on an official? It has already been theorized, and previous research suggests, that
individuals experiencing negative emotions, displeasures, stress, and a lack of social
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acceptance/status may more readily engage in corrupt activities (Jang and Johnson 2003;
Langton and Piquero 2007; Nas, Price, and Weber 1986; Warren 2004). The
corresponding question for this domain is: Can the negative attributes of a community
also result in an official’s decision to engage in public corruption?
A review of the literature suggests that there is a relationship between community
environment and the corruption of elected officials. GST is a possible explanation of,
and could be a contributing factor to, the behavior of elected officials who engage in
corrupt activities. In recent years, many citizens have become concerned about the
negative influence of corruption on communities. Since there is little research explaining
why corruption exists and, more importantly, why it is more prevalent in some
communities than others, this research study will examine possible differences in
corruption based on the community and whether one’s social class may influence the
decision to engage in public corruption. The objective is to determine the circumstances
in which community characteristics influence public corruption. The study will try to
determine if factors such as crime, poverty rate, and general age of the community in
larger urban counties provide greater opportunities for corruption.
The research study sets forth eight attributes to measure the domain of community
characteristics: (a) poverty rate, (b) crime rate, (c) civic involvement, (d) secondary
education level, (e) labor force, (f) age of the community, (g) county population growth,
(h) ratio of county population to overall state population, and (i) political party affiliation.
The objective is to identify community characteristics that might influence negative
behavior and the decisions of elected officials to engage in acts of public corruption.
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Poverty Rate
Research Question 9: What is the relationship between the poverty rate of
communities and public corruption?
Hypothesis 9: Impoverished communities are more likely to experience public
corruption.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between high poverty rates
(measured as poverty rate for the county) and public corruption. It is thought that a
community with a high poverty rate indicates that citizens are not likely to scrutinize the
decisions and behavior of elected officials because they lack the time and attention to
serve as government watchdogs. In some cases, these citizens also lack the education and
sophistication to monitor and understand the mechanics and workings of government.
Hunt (2004) suggests that poor citizens are less likely to engage in giving bribes and are
more likely to be harmed and excluded from public services, while “the rich pay the most
in bribes” (p. 3) and have a better understanding of the mechanics of government. It is
thus posited that the poverty rate can provide an indication of public corruption.
Additionally, poverty rates among communities are a negative strain and are related to
GST. Public officials who have experienced, or reside in, an environment of poverty are
more likely to experience negative strains, and many experience other failures throughout
their lives. The influence of poverty on communities can ultimately affect the behavior
of officials; if officials reside in a community with a high rate of poverty, strains are
likely to exist. Two possible negative factors come from high poverty rates and GST:
inadequate financial status and poor living conditions. Both in this case are negative
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strains. The study seeks to determine if negative strains create an environment for
corruption.
Crime Rate
Research Question 10: What is the relationship between communities’ crime rate
and public corruption?
Hypothesis 10: Communities with high crime rates will see more cases of public
corruption.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between the crime rate (measured
as violent crime per 100,000 inhabitants in the county in any one-year period) and public
corruption. Nice (1983) suggests that “political corruption is merely the extension of
private behavior in the public realm and that the crime rate should be a good surrogate for
tolerance of corruption” (p. 509). Further research suggested that crime creates a lack of
trust, and lack of trust opens the door to an environment of criminal behavior by
government officials (Hunt 2004, p. 22). Meier et al. (1992) and Hunt (2004) suggest that
a high crime rate is an indicator of the political system’s inability to address the issue of
crime, and that communities with high crime rates do little to reduce crime or implement
policies and penalties stringent enough to deter crimes such as public corruption.
Schlesinger and Meier (2002) found that public corruption and the crime rate within
communities are linked, and “it is expected that corruption would be lower in states
where a larger proportion of the population feels it is important to obey the law because
of moral principles. In addition to being an ethical issue, corruption is also considered a
crime” (Morris 1991, p. 11). Researchers, however, suggest that high crime rates in
communities are an indication that the political system is unable to address the issue of
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crime, implement effective law enforcement policies and penalties, and/or develop
effective policies to reduce public corruption (Meier and Holbrook 1992). Research also
revealed that larger communities have more oversight by law enforcement agencies and
more effective policies to address corruption in local government. Larger communities
also tend to have more resources to combat crime.
Civic Involvement
Research Question 11: What is the relationship between the civic involvement of
communities and public corruption?
Hypothesis 11: Communities with less civic involvement will have more cases of
public corruption.
It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between civic involvement (measured
as voter turnout) and public corruption. It is thought that citizens who show high levels
of civic involvement in the political process by participating in elections are more
engaged in the activities and decisions of government officials, and are more willing to
attend meetings and demand transparency from government. The research also suggests
that the more citizens are politically involved, the less likely they are to tolerate the
presence of corruption. Hence, the decisions of officials become more judicious.
Community Post-Secondary Education Level
Research Question 12: What is the relationship between a higher education level
of the community and public corruption?
Hypothesis 12: The greater the post-secondary education level of a community, the
fewer the opportunities for public corruption.
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It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between higher education (measured
as the post-secondary education of the community) and the reduction of public
corruption. It is thought that citizens with higher levels of post-secondary education are
less tolerant of public corruption by elected officials. The more educated the citizenry is,
the more likely it is that citizens are informed and will question the decisions of county
officials. While it may be argued that elected officials with advanced educational degrees
are less corrupt, Lipset (1960) suggests that communities with higher levels of education
are also less corrupt, a factor this research study proposes to explore. It is thought that
citizens with higher levels of education are more likely to analyze and review information
before final acceptance of decisions by elected officials.
Labor Force
Research Question 13: What is the relationship between the unemployment rates
of communities and public corruption?
Hypothesis 13: The greater the unemployment rate is, more likely there is public
corruption.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between labor force (measured as
the percentage of the unemployment rate in the county) and public corruption. High
unemployment rates in communities suggest that citizens are more concerned with
seeking employment opportunities and providing for their families than with monitoring
the activities of county officials. It is thought that a high rate of unemployment results in
an unstable community and a higher degree of transience. Individuals may be more
inclined to relocate to communities where employment opportunities are greater.
Additionally, a high unemployment rate could be an indicator for high levels of crime in
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communities. It is posited that high unemployment in communities would result in
public corruption. Poor communities with a high degree of crime suggest citizens who
are focused on survival, with limited time to watch the activities of government and
elected officials. This would likely result in more opportunities for public corruption.
Age of Community (65 years and older)
Research Question 14: What is the relationship between the age of community
populations and public corruption?
Hypothesis 14: Communities with a higher level of older people are less likely to
experience public corruption.
It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between the age of the community
population (measured as the percentage of the county’s population 65 years and older)
and public corruption. It is thought that citizens who are retired have more leisure time,
and thus opportunity, to monitor government activities through the behaviors and
decisions of their elected officials. In their study of corruption, Menzel and Benton
(1991) theorized that retirees have more wisdom and moral maturation and demand a
higher standard of ethics from officials, while Hunt (2004) found that older people are
less likely to engage in illegal activities and acts of corruption. The moral-development
theory presented by Kohlberg (1976) may apply to older citizens, in that they have a
different perspective and are more concerned with the ethical outlook of elected officials
than younger and middle-age citizens. Indeed, Menzel and Benton (1991) suggested that
senior citizens are more inclined to stop public corruption and wrongdoing by tracking
the actions of elected officials, the behavior of officials, and government spending
patterns. It is posited that, in communities with large populations of older citizens, there
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is a greater chance that corruption in county government does not occur or occurs to a
lesser degree.
Population Growth
Research Question 15: What is the relationship between a county’s population
growth and public corruption?
Hypothesis 15: The greater the county’s population growth rate, the more likely it
is public corruption will occur.
It is posited that a positive correlation exists between population growth (measured
as one-year change in total population) and public corruption. An increase in population
generates more revenues for county budgets, which results in more expenditures (e.g., for
grants and contracts), hence more opportunities for misappropriation of funds. No
previous research studies have explored the relationship between the level of population
growth and public corruption. It is thought, however, that the more flexibility officials
have to spend newly generated revenues from growth, the greater the opportunity for
misappropriation of funds and, therefore, for elected county officials to engage in corrupt
activities.
Ratio of County Population to State Population
Research Question 16: What is the relationship between the ratio of the county
population to the state population and public corruption?
Hypothesis 16: The greater the ratio of the population of the county to that of the
state, the more likely public corruption is to occur within the county.
It is thought that a positive correlation exists between counties where the majority of
the state’s population resides (measured as the percentage of the county population
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compared to the state population) and public corruption. While no previous studies have
examined the relationship between the ratio of the county population to the state
population and public corruption, it is thought that corruption is more likely to occur in
large urban counties because they tend to generate the majority of revenues for the state.
Elected officials in large urban counties have greater responsibilities, power, and sense of
privilege or entitlement, which present opportunities to violate the law or engage in acts
of public corruption.
Per Capita Income
Research Question 17: What is the relationship between per capita income and
public corruption?
Hypothesis 17: A high rate of per capita income results in less public corruption.
It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between a county’s per capita income
(measured as the annual per capita income for the county population) and public
corruption. The overall wealth of a community is an indicator of whether it will tolerate
public corruption. Alam (1995) and Jain (2001) point out that income inequality or lowlevel per capita income can promote higher levels of corruption.
It is thought that the higher the levels of wealth within a county’s population, the
fewer the opportunities for officials to engage in undetected corrupt behavior. It is
theorized that citizens of communities with a higher level of income are more inclined to
monitor the actions, behaviors, and political decision-making of elected officials. The
income of a community can also have a negative effect on the behavior of individuals,
however, because they may feel a financial isolation that results in negative behavior, as
outlined in GST.
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Political Party Affiliation
Research Question 18: What is the relationship between the political party of
commissioners and public corruption?
Hypothesis 18: Democratic county officials will more likely generate an increase
in public corruption.
It is thought that a positive correlation exists between a Democratic commission
(measured as the number of counties with a Democratic majority on the county
commission) and public corruption. A few studies (Amundsen 1999; Meier and
Holbrook 1992) have examined the relationship between party affiliation and public
corruption, while others have analyzed whether one party is often the target of political
corruption investigations by the governing majority. It is thought that when corruption
becomes the focus of voters’ attention, political games are used to create the perception
of corruption in the opposing party, which then becomes the focus in many corruption
cases or situations. Research in this area has found no concrete evidence that party
affiliation creates a greater degree of public corruption, but it is presumed that when a
majority of county commissioners are affiliated with one party, public corruption among
elected officials is more likely to happen. There is no concrete evidence to support this
factor, but this research study will analyze data to determine if such a relationship exists.
This study proposes to evaluate the possibility that party affiliation is a contributing
factor to the likelihood of public corruption in county government.
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Table 4-6.

General Model: Community Characteristics Domain

Specific Research Question

Related Hypothesis

Q9: What is the relationship between poverty rate and H9: (+) A positive relationship exists between more
public corruption?
impoverished communities and public corruption.
Q10: What is the relationship between communities’
crime rate and public corruption?

H10: (+) A positive relationship exists between high
crime rates in communities and public corruption.

Q11: What is the relationship between the civic
involvement of communities and public corruption?

H11: (-) A negative relationship exists between
communities with high social capital/civic involvement
and public corruption.

Q12: What is the relationship between secondary
education in a community and public corruption?

H12: : (-) A negative relationship exists between the
educational level of the community and public
corruption.

H13: (+) A positive relationship exists between
Q13: What is the relationship between unemployment
communities with a high unemployment rate and public
and public corruption?
corruption.
Q14: What is the relationship between the age of
community populations and public corruption?

H14. (-) A negative relationship exists between
communities with a younger population and public
corruption.

Q15: What is the relationship between a county’s
population growth and public corruption?

H15: (+) A positive relationship exists between county
population growth and public corruption.

Q16: What is the relationship between the ratio of a
county’s population to the state population and public
corruption?

H16: (+) A positive relationship exists between the ratio
of the county’s population to the state population and
public corruption.

Q17: What is the relationship between the per capita
income in a community and public corruption?

H17: (-) A negative relationship exists between per capita
income in a community and public corruption.

Q18: What is the relationship between political party
affiliation and public corruption?

H18: (+) A positive relationship exists between political
party affiliation and public corruption.

Government Characteristics Domain
This section of the research study seeks to examine various governmental
characteristics that may prevent corruption—an inspector general, ethics laws,
management structure, transparency/open meeting laws—to determine if any have a
correlation to public corruption. It is thought that these factors contribute to the
sustainability of good government.
It is theorized that government characteristics may have an influence on the
decisions of elected county officials to engage in corrupt activities. If this premise is
proven valid, corruption most likely would be an unacceptable obstacle to a good
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government, one which citizens believe in and trust. Philp (1987) describes “a just
society which preserves the liberty and security of each citizen,” a society in which
citizens “under a wise system of laws and institutions, good customs and proper mores…
are capable of identifying their own good and the common good.” (p. 7). Banfield (1958)
says, “Corruption on the other hand can lead to a breakdown in shared concerns and
results in factional pursuit of special interests and a reliance on coercion over consensus.
In these situations, coercion indicates a corrupt or corrupted state, perverted and rotten,
where every person is on guard against everyone else in a society of amoral familism” (p.
9).
It is through government that officials exercise influence over decisions, and often
they are able to operate with a high degree of discretion. Governments sometimes
provide an environment wherein officials are able to conceal their behavior and use
power and authority for self-benefit. Elected officials face great temptations in a corrupt
government environment, and enormous pressure to bend to special interests can
supersede good judgment (Caiden 1988).
To explore the role of government characteristics, this study will use five factors
thought to measure this domain: (1) ethics laws, (2) management structure, (3) an
inspector general’s office, (4) transparency and open meeting laws, and (5) employment
growth in the county. These five factors will measure the nature of government in local
communities.
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Ethics Laws
Research Question 19: What is the relationship between ethics laws and public
corruption?
Hypothesis 19: The more stringent the ethics laws, the less likely public
corruption is to occur.
It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between ethics laws (measured as
highly effective or less effective ethics laws, based on penalties for violations) and public
corruption. The primary purpose of ethics legislation is the reduction of the influence of
money, special interests, and private-sector businesses on public officials. Over the
years, studies have confirmed a possible link between the effectiveness of stringent ethics
laws and the discouragement of unethical behavior by elected officials, but there is little
research to link ethical decision-making by county officials to public corruption (Caiden
1988; Tanzi 1998). This study seeks to add to that body of knowledge and determine if
ethic laws can influence an official’s decision to engage in unethical behavior.
Ethics measures are generally popular with constituents, particularly if the laws are
effective in cleaning up government and reducing the influence of special interests
(Mayer 2001). The literature review supported the notion that ethics laws are effective
and can reduce corruption within government. The literature also suggested that public
support for ethics laws, or any good-government legislation, comes mainly from wealthy
and urban constituents (McFarland 1984; Skowronek 1982).
However, there are some contradictions on the effectiveness of ethic laws in
reducing public corruption. According to Menzel and Benton (1991), “There is scant
evidence to suggest that the adoption of ethics codes by city and counties or even by
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professional associations has made any real difference in the number of ethical
transgressions committed by appointed and elected officials” (p. 419). This contradiction
is the justification for the study review.
Management Structure of Government
Research Question 20: What is the relationship between the management
structure of government and public corruption?
Hypothesis 20: Under a county manager form of government, there is less public
corruption.
It is posited that a negative correlation exists between government structures
(measured as the percentage of corruption cases identified under a county manager form
of government) and public corruption. In the past, various structural reforms in
American politics have been viewed as influencing public corruption; some were even
thought to deter corruption. Wilson (1966) suggests that a fragmented political system,
with no central manager, opens doors for politicians and others to manipulate government
for their own gain and is a stimulus to corruption. Meier et al. (1992) found “fragmented
political systems make public officials less visible and thus reduce the perceived
probability that corrupt actions will be discovered” (p. 143). However, it is thought that
political systems under a county manager form of government can result in fewer
opportunities for public corruption. Under this type of system, the county manager
controls expenditures, budget, contracts, and staff, while elected officials make policy.
The National Association of Counties identifies four active structures of government
used today: (a) Commission-Administrator (county manager), (b) Commission,
(c) Commission-County Executive, and (d) parishes and consolidated governments. The
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various forms of government employed by the study sample were included in the
research study to determine if a correlation exists between a particular form of county
government and public corruption.
Under a county manager form of government, the administrative staff oversees
management, day-to-day operations, and the implementation of policies, contracts, and
services as directed by the elected board. It is believed that under this system of
government, there is less opportunity for public corruption among elected officials
(Wilson 1966). Rose-Ackerman (1999) writes that “legislatures frequently delegate
implementation to the executive; I have already argued that this is a desirable way to
limit political corruption” (p. 146).
Office of Inspector General
Research Question 21: What is the relationship between county governments that
employ an inspector general to monitor the ethical behavior of officials and
public corruption?
Hypothesis 21: County governments with an inspector general have fewer
opportunities for public corruption.
It is posited that a negative correlation exists between having an inspector general
(measured as county governments with an Office of the Inspector General) and public
corruption. Corruption can destroy a government system and damage the public’s trust.
According to Ketti (2006), “it may be impossible to eliminate corruption in the United
States. Regulations against corrupt practices and legislation to increase government
transparency have reduced corruption by examining government closely to weed out
waste, fraud, and abuse.”
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However, it is thought that using an inspector general as a method of reducing
corruption can benefit local governments, since the primary goal of an inspector general
is to restore public trust in government by enforcing honesty and integrity in business
practices. Research suggests that Congress enacted the Inspector General’s Act in the
late 1970s to help restore public trust and eliminate government waste. No supporting
empirical studies have been found that determine what significance an inspector general’s
office may play in reducing corruption in county government, but creation of such an
office could reduce the level of public corruption in large urban counties. It is theorized
that an inspector general will reduce corruption and restore public trust.
Open Meeting Laws / Transparency
Research Question 22: What is the relationship between county governments with
open meeting law provisions and public corruption?
Hypothesis 22: County governments with strict open meeting laws provide
transparency and are less likely to result in public corruption.
It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between open meeting laws
(measured as the level of transparency within the county government) and public
corruption. Integrity in governance can largely be associated with a great degree of
transparency (Menzel 2005). Governments whose policies stress openness, and which
value open meeting laws, are less likely to encounter public corruption among elected
officials. Conversely, governments and elected officials that are less concerned about
providing open government and conducting business transparently can create an
environment prone to corruption. Tanzi (1998) suggests, “The lack of transparency in
rules, laws, and processes creates a fertile ground for corruption. Rules are often
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confusing; the documents specifying them are not publicly available; and, at times, the
rules are changed without properly publicized announcements” (p. 575).
It is thought that an environment supporting open meeting law provisions can
provide positive opportunities for elected officials and the political decision-making
process. An open government creates an environment for citizens to become more
involved, closer to their government and its officials, so it reduces corrupt activities
(Maxwell and Winters 2004). It is believed that transparency within a government’s
management structure allows citizens the opportunity to observe the decisions of elected
officials. Support of an open government from public officials suggests that their
decisions, behavior, and transactions are open to review by citizens, the media, and
watchdog groups. The integrity of governance can be associated with its degree of
transparency (Menzel 2005).
Employment Growth
Research Question 23: What is the relationship between county government
employment growth and public corruption?
Hypothesis 23: The greater the employment growth of county government, the
more likely public corruption is to exist in county government.
It is postulated that a positive correlation exists between employment growth in
county government (measured as a one-year change in employment growth) and public
corruption. An increase in the number of employees indicates an increase in government
revenue and a high rate of activity, both of which offer more opportunities for
disbursement of funds and may, therefore, increase the rate of corruption. Presumably, a
healthier financial environment and positive economic conditions for county government
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provide more opportunities for corruption to occur among county officials. Although no
studies have examined the relationship between the level of employment growth and
public corruption, it is thought that governments experience more spending flexibility
with higher levels of employment growth, resulting in greater opportunities for
corruption.
Table 4-7.

General Model: Government Characteristics Domain

Specific Research Question

Related Hypothesis

H19: (-) A negative relationship exists between a
Q19: What is the relationship between ethics laws and
county government with stringent ethics laws and
public corruption?
public corruption.
Q 20: What is the relationship between the structure/
charter of county government and public corruption?

H20: (-) A negative relationship exists between a
county manager form of government and public
corruption.

Q21: What is the relationship between an inspector
general’s office and public corruption?

H21: (-) A negative relationship exists between a
county government with an inspector general and
public corruption.

Q22: What is the relationship between a county
government with open meeting law provisions and
public corruption?

H22: (-) A negative relationship exists between
governments with weak open meeting law provisions
and public corruption.

Q23: What is the relationship between employment
growth in county government and public corruption?

H23: (+) A positive relationship exists between
employment growth in county government and public
corruption.

Fiscal Stability of Government Domain
The explanatory factor of government fiscal stability in public corruption is not a
new phenomenon, but merits a review of the research to determine if the fiscal stability of
county government has an impact on elected county officials’ decisions to engage in
public corruption and, if it does, what elements contribute to the decisions of elected
officials one way or the other.
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Early on, scholars began to recognize that corruption has enormous economic and
political consequences on government, creating economic inefficiencies. 10 The literature
suggests a correlation between the level of economic prosperity and corruption: “As a
country grows richer the level of corruption decreases” (Amundsen 1999, p. 15).
Determining the impact of fiscal stability on local governments and public corruption
thus becomes pertinent to explaining the presence of corruption within local county
governments. For instance, one can plausibly argue that the fiscal stability of
government has the potential to reduce opportunities for corruption; the effectiveness of
fiscal policies, stringent government oversight and regulations, and revenue growth are
all positive factors that benefit governments and reduce the temptations of public
corruption.
Researchers have suggested that government audits, oversight procedures and
committees, and effective financial policies can deter corruption (Wilson 1966; Walsh
1978; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Fuchs 1986; Klitgaard 1988). This study proposes to
examine the effect that county government financial stability and financial policies have
on public corruption.
To understand the influence of government financial stability on public corruption,
three attributes were proposed for inclusion in this study: (1) financial stability,
(2) federal and state aid, and (3) audit capacity. These factors provided an opportunity to
measure key components of the fiscal characteristics of county government and were
used to develop research questions and hypotheses. The following subsections present

10

Early works that recognized the adverse political and economic consequences of corruption include
Rose-Ackerman (1978 and 1999), Huntington (1968), and Heidenheimer et al. (1989).
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the specific research questions and related hypotheses for the domain of government
fiscal characteristics.
Financial Stability
Research Question 24: What is the relationship between the financial stability of
county government and public corruption?
Hypothesis 24: The greater the financial stability of county government, the more
likely public corruption is to occur.
It is thought that a positive correlation exists between the financial stability of county
government (measured as the county’s bond rating and annual expenditures) and public
corruption. The bond rating (Exhibit II) of a county government indicates its financial
stability: the higher the rating is, the more financially stable the county is and the more
likely it is that funds are available. It is believed that in financially healthier counties,
more funds are available to finance and fund capital projects, creating more chances for
public corruption to occur. It is also thought that fiscal stability in government represents
security, confidence, and consistent productivity. Bond rating is a good indicator of
fiscal stability.
The literature review showed that many scholars have concluded that when large
sums of money are available for funding projects, including special projects, then access
to government funds opens the door to temptation for corruption (Berg et al. 1976;
Wilson 1966; Maxwell 2004). Goel and Nelson (1998) believed that public spending by
a local government with an excessive availability of funds and little oversight is an
indicator for political rent-seeking and, hence, corruption; more available funds produce
more opportunities for corruption. This study examines these conclusions.

113

Conversely, other researchers believe that a decrease in expenditures can lower
opportunities for disbursing funds, but still open the door to public corruption (Tanzi
1998). Fewer funds bring about more competition for grants and contracts, and people
are willing to pay bribes to receive a share of the limited contracts available. However,
this study theorizes that sound financial policies and procedures can be a preventative
measure for illicit behavior by politicians and bureaucrats. It is hypothesized that “for the
governmental policies to be effective, however, the bureaucracies must actually
implement them. Hence it becomes crucial that officials not be influenced, through graft,
to deviate from their appointed task” (Leff 1964).
Ackerman (1999) suggested that economic distress and unexpected population
growth could increase the demand for government services, create situations of instability
within a government, and lead to opportunities for corruption. It is evident that the factor
of financial stability produces two lines of opinion: more funds available can open the
door to corruption, but a lack of dollars can also provide opportunities for corruption.
Federal and State Aid
Research Question 25: What is the relationship between federal and state aid and
public corruption?
Hypothesis 25: Counties receiving greater federal and state aid are more likely to
experience public corruption.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between federal and state aid
(measured as the amount of federal and state aid provided to the county during the year of
conviction and as the amount of federal and state aid in proportion to the total
expenditures of the county) and public corruption.
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Federal law enforcement agencies monitor local governments’ activities when
substantial sums of aid are appropriated from the federal government. It is thought that
high levels of federal and state aid may result in public corruption because they afford
county officials more flexibility in the spending of tax dollars, often with little direct
oversight. Federal officials usually conduct audits long after grants have been awarded
and projects closed out. These opportunities encourage county officials to grant contracts
and allocate dollars to friends and political supporters, increasing the opportunity for
personal gain. Researchers have also suggested that the size of a government budget may
be related to the level of corruption (La Palombara 1994). As noted above, Goel and
Nelson (1998) believed that public spending of local government is an indicator for rentseeking activities and corruption.
Auditors
Research Question 26: What is the relationship between the audit capacity of
county government and public corruption?
Hypothesis 26: Counties with an independent internal auditing capacity are less
likely to experience public corruption.
It is theorized that a negative correlation exists between independent auditing
(measured as independent government audits) and public corruption. Independent audits
are a valuable tool in fighting public corruption; they can provide checks and balances in
government to ensure that expenditures of public funds are appropriate and proper.
Audits provide greater assurance that corruption can be limited, and can even deter its
spread; matched with prudent financial policies and procedures, audits can be a powerful
preventative measure against illicit political behavior. Rose-Ackerman (1999) states, “In
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a government with strong checks and balances, no public institution is all-powerful” (p.
144). The monitoring and enforcement functions of an independent audit can serve as
effective anticorruption strategies and useful tools in the oversight of government budgets
and expenditures, ensuring that government funds are properly appropriated and used for
government projects.
Independent audit functions are more effective in the county manager form of
government, where they are not under the control of elected officials. An autonomous
independent auditor can remove political influence and the pressures that can be created
if the function is managed by elected county officials. To ensure the effectiveness of an
independent audit function, audits and financial reports should be published and made
available for public review. Openness and accountability are positive measures for
elected officials and provide the public with a level of confidence and trust.
The literature review showed that “a great use of audits to enable legislatures to deter
corruption is advocated by many researchers” (Wilson 1966, p. 31; Walsh 1978; RoseAckerman 1978, p. 216; Fuchs 1986, p. 113; and Klitgaard 1988, p. 53). It is thought that
audits will likely detect corrupt actions and can therefore deter corruption (Gardiner and
Lyman 1990).
Prudent fiscal policies established under audit guidelines are positive alternatives to
protect the expenditures of government funds and possibly reduce corruption
opportunities. This study reviews the impact of independent audits to determine if
prudent fiscal management through independent auditors has a relationship to public
corruption.
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Table 4-8.

General Model: Government Fiscal Oversight Domain

Specific Research Question

Related Hypothesis

Q24: What is the relationship between the financial
stability of a county government and public
corruption?

H24: (+) A positive relationship exists between the
financial stability of a county government and public
corruption.

Q25: What is the relationship between federal and
state aid to county government and public
corruption?

H25: (+) A positive relationship exists between a
county government receiving federal and state aid
and public corruption.

Q26: What is the relationship between the audit
capacity of county government and public
corruption?

H26: (-) A negative relationship exists between a
county government with internal audit provisions and
public corruption.

General Model of Public Corruption
As previously discussed, the purpose of this research study is to examine and explain
the factors believed to contribute to the public corruption of elected county officials.
Figure 4-1 depicts the General Model of public corruption. The top row symbolizes the
general theme of public corruption; the second row indicates the four broad domains
thought to influence it. Listed below each domain are the corresponding covariates
examined to determine if a relationship exists between the 26 covariates and public
corruption.
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Public Corruption among County Officials

Elected Official
Characteristics

Government
Characteristics

(+) Outside
Employment

(-) Ethics
Laws

(+) Age

(-) Structure of
Government

(+) Gender
(+) Formal
Education

Governmental
Fiscal
Oversight

(+) Poverty
Rate
(+) Financial
Stability
(+) Federal &
State Aid

(-) Office of
Inspector
General

(-) Auditors

(-) Age of
Community
(65 years and
older)
(+) Crime
Rate
(-) Civic
Involvement

(-) Open
Meeting Laws

(+) Labor
Force

(+) Race
(-) Religion

Community
Characteristics

(+)
Employment
Growth

(-)
Community
Education

(+) Marital
Status

(+) Population
Growth
(+) Ratio of
County
Population to
Overall State
Population

(+)Tenure

(-) Per Capita
Income
(-) Political
Party
Affiliation
Figure 4-1. General Model of Public Corruption.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
County-Level Characteristics
This chapter of the research study presents the analyses, findings, and testing of the
hypotheses for the General Models for both county-level and individual-level
characteristics. As explained in Chapter 1, there were four purposes of this research
study:
1. To explain what variables are likely to predict public corruption among elected
county officials.
2. To examine the predictive variables in which two groups of county officials took
divergent roads in their political career, one group opting to engage in corrupt
behavior and the other opting not to engage in corrupt behavior.
3. To provide a plausible model that could explain the behavior of elected county
officials who chose to engage in public corruption.
4. To identify the characteristics that influence public corruption.
The initial process used in developing the General Models for this study included an
outline of characteristics thought to be predictors or factors that influence the behavior of
county officials and result in the negative behavior of public corruption. As previously
discussed, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether an
elected official did or did not commit public corruption. The independent variables
related to county-level data included 18 covariates for three domains: government
characteristics, financial characteristics, and community characteristics (Chapter 4
discusses these covariates in detail). Data for these variables were gathered from
counties with populations of 300,000 or more.
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These 18 variables are thought to influence the behavior of elected officials.
Throughout the research effort, it was theorized that GST was a factor influencing an
elected official's behavior. Including all variables within the domains allowed a broad
explanatory power for the General Model and enhanced the outcome of this study.
Appendix V provides a detailed list of negative strains that influence behavior. GST was
incorporated when interpreting the results of the analysis and is a contributing factor that
influences behavior.
The original data set included two data set categories, county level and individual
level, and incorporated a two-step process that involved county-level data and individuallevel data. The county-level data set consisted of 173 counties over 10 years, though the
final analysis only incorporated 117 counties; as previously stated, 56 counties did not
respond to the request for information.
The individual-level data set consisted of 180 elected officials within 26 counties
over a 10-year span. The analysis for the individual-level data set incorporated only 155
individuals; 25 individuals were excluded from the study because they could not be
located or were deceased.
General Model: Corruption and County-Level Characteristics
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure coded “1” for committing
corruption and “0” for not committing corruption. There are 18 independent variables for
county-level predictors. The variables for government characteristics were an inspector
general’s office, ethics laws, structure of government, open meeting laws, and
employment growth. The variables for county financial characteristics were per capita
income, financial stability, federal and state aid, and outside auditors. The variables for

120

community characteristics were poverty, percentage of the community 65 years or older,
crime rate, civic involvement, labor force, education level of the community, population
growth, ratio of the county population to the overall state population, and party
affiliation. All these variables aimed to assess the effect county characteristics have on
the decisions of elected officials to commit public corruption or not.
Descriptive Data Analysis
Descriptive data analysis, which is a preliminary review of the results, is an
important element of any research study. Bivariate descriptive statistics provide a
framework to describe and examine the characteristics of the dependent variables and
covariates. The information from bivariate data analysis provides a simple summary of
the sample and the measures used. Bivariate descriptive analysis also provides a
powerful summary of data, e.g., measurements of central tendency, distribution, and
dispersion. It describes what is, or what the data in the research study shows, and it
reduces data into simple summaries.
Table 5-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all county-level dependent
variables. In general, the preliminary analyses using the bivariate statistics concluded
that 4 of the 18 predictors—auditors, community education, Democratic commission, and
federal and state aid—were significant indicators. Statistics showed that 71.8 percent of
counties utilized auditors; in 54.7 percent of counties, fewer than 30 percent of residents
had a college education; 46.2 percent of counties had majority Democratic boards; and
ethics laws were not stringent enough to reduce corruption in 52.9 percent of counties.
County government structures indicated that 59.8 percent did not have a professional
manager overseeing the day-to-day operations of the county.
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Table 5-1.

County-Level Characteristics
Bivariate Statistics
Total

Variable

Freq

%

Auditor***
No Auditor (0)
Auditor (1)
Total

33
84
117

28.21
71.79
100

Inspector General
No Inspector General (0)

108

92.31

Inspector General (1)
Total

9
117

7.69
100

Ed. Community***
Less than 30% college (0)
More than 30% college (1)

64
53

54.70
45.30

Total

117

100

Open Meeting Law
Not effective (0)
Effective (1)
Total

69
48
117

58.97
41.03
100

Ethics Laws
Not Stringent (0)
Stringent (1)
Total

62
55
117

52.99
47.01
100

No Commiss./Manager (0)
Commission (1)
Total

70
47
117

59.83
40.17
100

Democratic Commission***
No Democratic Commissioners (0)
Democratic Commissioners (1)

63
54

53.85
46.15

Total

117

100

Structure of Govt.

122

Table 5-2 presents descriptive statistics for those cases of the dependent variables that
represented "no corruption." While 76.9 percent of counties in which there was no
corruption used auditors, the community education variable showed that in 49.4 percent
of these counties, fewer than 30 percent of residents had a college education. Counties
with majority Democratic boards and no corruption came in at 38.4 percent and, at 53.8
percent, the ethics laws variable indicated that such laws were stringent in counties with
cases of no public corruption. County government structures indicated that 63.7 percent
did not have a professional manager overseeing day-to-day operations of the county
where there were no cases of corruption.
Table 5-2.

County-Level Characteristics

Bivariate Statistics
County-level data (chi squared)
No Corruption (0)
Freq
%

Variable
Auditor***
No Auditor (0)

21

23.08

Auditor (1)
Total

70
91

76.92
100

Inspector General
No Inspector General (0)
Inspector General (1)

86
5

94.51
5.49

Total

91

100

Ed. Community***
Less than 30% college (0)
More than 30% college (1)
Total

45
46
91

49.45
50.55
100

Open Meeting Law
Not effective (0)
Effective (1)
Total

55
36
91

60.44
39.56
100
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No Corruption (0)
Freq
%

Variable
Ethics Laws
Not Stringent (0)

42

46.15

Stringent (1)
Total

49
91

53.85
100

Structure of Govt.
No Commiss./Manager (0)
Commission (1)

58
33

63.74
36.26

Total

91

100

Democratic Commission***
No Democratic Commissioners (0)
Democratic Commissioners (1)
Total

56
35
91

61.54
38.46
100

Table 5-3 presents descriptive statistics for those cases of the dependent variables
that represented "corruption." Interestingly, 53.8 percent of counties in which there was
corruption used auditors. Fewer than 30 percent of residents had a college education in
73.0 percent of the counties. The party affiliation variable showed that 73.0 percent of
counties with corruption had majority Democratic boards, and ethics laws were equally
distributed (50%) between stringent and not stringent for counties with cases of public
corruption. County government structures indicated that 53.8 percent of counties with
public corruption had a professional manager overseeing the day-to-day operations of
county government.
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Table 5-3.

County-Level Characteristics

Bivariate Statistics
County-level data (chi squared)
Corruption (1)
Freq
%

Variable
Auditor***
No Auditor (0)
Auditor (1)
Total

12
14
26

46.15
53.85
100

Inspector General
No Inspector General (0)

22

84.63

Inspector General (1)
Total

4
26

15.38
100

Ed. Community***
Less than 30% college (0)
More than 30% college (1)
Total

19
7
26

73.08
26.92
100

Open Meeting Law
Not effective (0)
Effective (1)
Total

14
12
26

53.85
46.15
100

Ethics Laws
Not Stringent (0)
Stringent (1)
Total

13
13
26

50
50
100

No Commiss./Manager (0)
Commission (1)
Total

12
14
26

46.15
53.85
100

Democratic Commission***
No Democratic Commissioners (0)
Democratic Commissioners (1)

7
19

26.92
73.08

Total

26

100

Structure of Govt.
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Table 5-4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the remaining covariates in the
county-level characteristics category of the General Model. The variables are listed in
order by domain: county government characteristics, government fiscal performance
characteristics, and community characteristics.
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Table 5-4.

Descriptive Statistics for General Model: County-Level Characteristics

No Corruption

Variable Name

Corruption

Total

Description

Mean

Std

N=

Mean

Std

N=

Mean

Std

N=

Employment Growth

6.78

(18.11)

90

7.74

(18.48)

26

6.99

(18.12)

116

Ratio of county government growth in
employment in a given year

Financial Stability

2.244

(1.775)

86

4.038

(2.599)

26

2.660

(2.124)

112

General obligation bond rating : 1 = Aa1
through 17 = Caa1

Federal & State
Aid***

20.329

(0.6759)

91

14.846

(1.971)

26

19.111

(.7117)

117

Ratio of federal, state, and
intergovernmental transfer to total
revenues in a given year

Poverty

10.210

(3.811)

91

15.357

(6.699)

26

11.354

(5.056)

117

Annualized total households living below
the federal poverty level in any given year

Age of Community
65+

11.362

(3.426)

91

12.069

(4.622)

26

11.519

(3.714)

117

Annualized percentage of population 65
and older to the total population

Crime Rate

528.50

(212.50)

91

595.61

(233.66)

26

543.42

(218.14)

117

Annualized average federal crime rate in
any given year

Civic Involvement

51.94

(9.277)

91

46.46

(17.716)

26

50.72

(11.817)

117

Annualized percentage of voter
participation during a general election in
any given year

Population Growth

7.099

(6.082)

91

6.554

(7.379)

26

6.978

(6.363)

117

One-year percentage change in total
population

% County Pop. vs.
State Pop.

9.903

(9.544)

91

16.038

(19.414)

26

11.266

(12.588)

117

Ratio of total county population to total
state population

Labor Force

7.201

(1.757)

91

8.649

(2.688)

26

7.522

(2.078)

117

Annualized unemployment rate in any
given year

25926.2

(4927.8
3)

91

25883.7
3

(10737.
82)

26

25916.7
6

(6609.8
6)

117

Annual average per capita income level of
the total population in any given year

Per Capita Income

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Logit Regression Analysis - Corruption and County-Level Characteristics
The objective of this research is to identify county-level characteristics likely to
predict the maximum probability of elected county officials committing public
corruption. A logit regression analysis will assist in identifying the predictors and can
determine if any of the variables are related to negative strains that may also influence the
behavior of public officials. The analysis will identify variables that may be related to
GST and provide a theoretical explanation of county-level characteristics likely to
influence elected officials' decisions to commit acts of criminal public corruption.
The General Model category for county-level data included 18 independent variables
used to predict the potential for public corruption. Table 5-5 presents the results of the
logit analysis for the general model. The results of the analysis suggest that the
likelihood ratio chi-square of 66.27 tells us the model as a whole fits and that the
inclusion of the independent variable significantly improved the model’s explanatory
power. A review of the coefficients provide support for the role of five variables
(Auditor, Per Capita Income, Financial Stability, Poverty and County Population) in
explaining the likelihood of county government experiencing corruption. Two other
variables, Inspector General and Community Education, had coefficients in the
hypothesized direction but fell short of statistical significance. The remaining eleven
variable were neither significant nor in the predicted direction. The coefficients are
important and the standard measure in conducting a logit analysis. However, it is much
easier to explain the results if coefficient which are the log odds converted into odds ratio
and this has been done in Table 5-5.
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It should be noted that in interpreting odds ratio that a value of 1.00 indicated that the
odds of a county experiencing corruption by their county officials is even: neither more
nor less likely. A value below 1.00 indicates that the event is less likely to occur while a
value above 1.00 would indicate a greater proponent for the event to happen.
Table 5-5.

Logistic Regression for Public Official Corruption Using
County Level Predictors
General Model

Independent Variable
Constant
Inspector General

Coefficient
Estimate
-23.40
-3.45

Std. Err.

z

p

6.71
1.99

-3.49
-1.73

0.00
.083

Odds Ratio

Auditor
Employment Growth

-2.09
.039

.969
.030

-2.16
1.29

.031
.198

.164

Per Capita Income
Financial Stability
Federal & State Aid

.0005
.715
-.038

.0001
.284
.028

3.05
2.52
-1.32

.002
.012
.186

1.0004
1.728

Poverty
Age of the Community

.586
.175

.190
.117

3.08
1.49

.002
.135

1.7507

Crime Rate
Civic Involvement
Community Education
Labor Force
Population Growth

-.0004
-.040
-1.89
.145
.010

.001
.034
1.14
.267
.059

-0.27
-1.16
-1.65
0.54
0.18

.790
.247
.098
.587
.856

.074

.031

2.34

.019

-.852

.861

-0.99

.322

-.342

.899

-0.38

.704

.519

.898

0.58

.563

.295

.787

0.37

.708

County Population VS
State Population
Open Meeting Laws
Ethic Laws with no
Penalties
Commission Control Govt.
Democrat Commission

Number of observations: 111
LR chi-squared: X2(17) =66.27, p<0.1
Log likelihood: -27.28
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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1.064

The results indicate that the model's statistically significant variables produced
strong substantive effects: when measured against corruption, these five predictors were
statistically significant. The model fits sufficiently well, based on the results of the log
likelihood test comparing the general model with the null constant only test.
The data for the variable auditor is statistically significant at p-value=.031. The odds
ratio is .1237and suggests that counties with auditors are less likely to experience public
corruption. In fact, one can say that they are 12% less likely to experience corruption
than counties with no auditors. As hypothesized, results indicate that auditors can reduce
public corruption, could be a valuable tool to limit public corruption in government.
The results for the predictor per capita income were statistically significant at p-value
= .002 and suggest that counties with a higher per capita income are slightly more likely
to experience corruption among their public officials. While, the performance of this
variable suggests that counties with lower per capita income are less likely to experience
public corruption than counties with high per capita income, it should be noted that the
odds ratio is very close to 1.0 indicating only a marginal impact. Per capita income
within communities appears to influence the behavior of public officials. It was theorized
that the overall wealth of a community is a indicator of its tolerance for corruption.
Initially it was hypothesized that wealthy communities would be less tolerant of public
corruption; however, the data does not support this. In addition, there was a presumption
with this variable that GST is applicable. With the belief, Agnew (2001) suggests,
“create some pressure or incentive to engage in criminal activities as a coping
mechanism” (p. 320).
However, this was not occurring in the corruption of county elected officials.
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The predicted probability for financial stability suggests that the greater the financial
stability of county government, the more likely public corruption is to occur. Financial
stability was statistically significant at p-value= .012. This result suggest that counties
with a high bond rating are more likely to have public officials engage in acts of public
corruption because the higher the bond rating, the greater the county's financial strength.
In fact, the odds of corruption occurring is two times more likely for every unit increase
in the bond rating. The results of the analysis are consistent with the stated hypothesis,
which held that public corruption was more likely to occur in counties with greater fiscal
stability. It turned out that higher bond ratings result in lower interest rates to borrow
funds that can be used for capital projects, which can lead to corruption.
The predicted probability for poverty rate suggests that poverty influences the behavior
of public officials. This finding is consistent with the stated hypothesis, in which
impoverished communities are more likely to have public officials who engage in
corruption. The coefficient measuring poverty is statistically significant at p-value= .002.
The odd ratio is 1.80 indicates that a one unit increase in poverty will increase the
likelihood of corruption by 80%. The poverty variable is indicative of negative strains,
and the probability exists of a relationship between poverty and GST. This value
increases because as poverty grows, corruption tends to increase. Communities with a
high rate of poverty would suggest a high rate of corruption. Interesting there seems to
be a contradiction in the results. But the per capita income variable indicates that higher
per capita income results in slightly more corruption. It might be that large cities do
indeed have two economic factors at play. High poverty might create an environment

131

where corruption is tolerated and there are opportunities because communities have the
resources to spend on government. Those resources create an opportunity for corruption.
Finally, the predicted probability for percent of county population compared to state
population is statistically significant at p-value = .019. The finding shows that serving in
counties whose population is a majority of the state’s population can influence the
behavior of public officials. The results suggest that as the population of such counties
increases, corruption is likely to increase as well. In fact, public officials serving in
counties with a larger percentage of the state population are more likely to be corrupt.
The results suggest that for every one unit change in the county population compared to
the state population there is an 8% change in the probability of public corruption.
Conversely, the results also suggest that public officials in counties with a lower
percentage of the state’s population are less likely to engage in acts of corruption.
In sum, a majority of the hypothesis were not significant. However, five variables
were significant and were found to increase our understanding of when corruption might
occur in county government.
Chapter 6 presents final comments and conclusions regarding the General Model
analyses.
Individual-Level Characteristics
General Model: Corruption and Individual-Level Characteristics
Thus far the analysis has focused on explaining the characteristics of the counties
where corrupted has occurred. It should be obvious that even through some counties are
more likely to experience corruption; it is highly unlikely that in every one of those
counties all of the elected officials were guilty of participating in corruption. The
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research now turns to understanding if there are some characteristics of elected officials
that might make them more likely to engage in corruption than other officials. The data
for this research are all those officials elected in a county where at least one county
official was found to commit a corrupt act as we have defined corruption. The dependent
variable in this phase of analysis was a dichotomous measure coded "1" for any elected
official found to engage in corruption and "0" for those not involved. The information
presented includes the eight predictors used in assessing which profile characteristics are
likely to result in elected officials committing public corruption or not. The independent
variables for individual-level predictors were gender, marital status, age race, education,
religious belief, tenure and outside employment. Age was broken out into a series of
dummy variables
Descriptive Data Analysis
The initial analysis proceeds in two phases. First, six of the eight variables lend
themselves to analysis using simple 2x2 categorical analyses and that analysis is provided
in Table 5-6. Two other variables, level of formal education and tenure in office are
continuous data and the analysis is presented in Table 5-7 as difference of means. Table
5-6 provides the bivariate analysis of six variables with the dependent variable
corruption. Some very interesting results appear in the table. Three of the four dummy
variables for age were relatively similar with anywhere from 20% to 28% of the age
group participating in corruption. However, elected officials in the 50 to 59--age range
were more likely to participate in some corruption. It would also appear that Race and
Gender variables operated as hypothesized. Non-white were more likely to engage in
corruption than their white counterparts. Males were more likely, by a significant
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percentage (34% to 16%), to have participated in a corruptible act than females elected
officials. The data in Table 5-6 provides evidence that elected officials who did not see
themselves as religious were more likely to engage in an illegal act 42% of the nonreligious officials compared to only 18% of those categorized as religious. Interestingly
married officials were more prone to engage in illegal acts.

134

Table 5-6. Elected Officials Participation in an Act of Corruption
by Individual Characteristics
Age 30- 39

Age 40- 49

Age 50- 59

Age 60- 69

Corrupt
Age Group

Other

Age Group

Other

Age Group

Other

Age Group

Other

No

80%

71%

72%

72%

63%

77%

74%

72%

Yes

20%

29%

28%

28%

37%

23%

26%

28%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

15

140

43

112

52

103

27

128

N=

Religious

Marital Status

Outside Employment

Race

Corrupt

Gender

Religious

NonReligious

Married

Not
Married

Employed

Not
Employed

White

NonWhite

Male

Female

No

82%

58%

69%

83%

75%

70%

76%

67%

66%

85%

Yes

18%

42%

31%

18%

25%

30%

24%

33%

34%

15%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

93

62

115

40

76

79

91

64

104

51

N=
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The data in Table 5-6 that initially appears to not have any real explanatory powers
was the variable measuring elected officials proclivity to hold another job beyond their
elected position.
Table 5-7 we provide the results of the difference of means tests and it would appear
that both variables appear to operate as expected. Specifically, the longer one serves in
office the more likely one was to have committed a corruptible act. Education appears to
play a mitigating role with increased education reducing the potential to find an elected
official guilty.
Table 5-7.

Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level Data
Descriptive Statistics
Individual-Level Data (T-Test)

Variable
Name

No Corruption
Mean

Std.

Corruption

N = Mean

Total

Std. N = Mean

Std.

Formal
Education 16.26 (2.27) 112 14.84 (2.50) 43
***

15.86 (2.41)

Tenure

7.56

6.87 (6.03) 112

9.34

(6.34) 43

(6.19)

Description
N=
Level of formal education:
155 12=High school through
20=Doctorate degree
Length of time in office, or tenure,
155
expressed as the number of years

Logit Regression Analysis - Corruption and Individual-Level Characteristics
While the initial analysis presented in Table 5-6 and 5-7 provide some support for
the original analysis, a multivariate analysis needs to be employed to parse out the role
each variable plays, holding other variables constant, in explaining which elected
officials engaged in illegal activities. A logit regression analysis will assist in identifying
the predictors likely to result in public officials committing corruption, and can determine
if any of the variables are negative strains that may influence their behavior.
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Additionally, a review of the results will determine if GST provides a theoretical
explanation of elected officials' decisions to commit acts of criminal public corruption.
The Logit Model category for individual-level data included eight independent
variables used to predict the likelihood an official would engage in public corruption.
Following are the results of the analysis for the model using logit regression analysis.
The general model incorporates the eight covariates in this research study. However, the
variable age has been modified for the analysis in order to more clearly examine the
hypothesis with regard to age. Thus, there are now four dummy variables for four
different age categories. Elected officials over 70 serve the response group. As a result,
the analysis now discusses the results in the context of eleven variables. As explained
previously; logit regression analysis can aid in determining the probability of elected
public officials committing public corruption. The logit model presented in Table 5-8
was statistically significant at the .001 level. This level of chi-square significance
indicates that the general model fit well compared to null constant only model. In fact,
the variables produced strong substantive effects. The logit regression analysis, which
incorporates eleven covariates with six shown to have statistically significant effects on
corruption: (3 of the 4) age, faith, education and tenure.
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Table 5-8.

Logistic Regression for Individual Characteristics Used to Identify
Public Corruption Predictors
General Model

Independent
Variable
Constant

Coefficient
Estimate
.365

Std. Err.

z

p

2.03

0.18

.857

Gender

-.991

.585

-1.69

.090

Age 30-39 (dummy variable)
Age 40-49 (dummy variable)
Age 50-59 (dummy variable)
Age 60-69 (dummy variable)
Race
Faith
Marital Status

1.90
2.53
2.27
1.61
.783
.923
.714

1.02
.840
.748
.826
.455
.468
.561

1.86
3.02
3.04
1.96
1.72
1.97
1.27

.063
.003
.002
.051
.085
.049
.204

Education
Tenure
Outside employment

-.322
.107
-.467

.101
.036
.480

-3.17
2.92
-0.97

.002
.003
.331

Odds Ratio

12.5535
9.6794
5.0028
2.5169
.7247
1.129

Number of observations: 155
Wald chi-squared: X2(11) = 53.66, p<.001
Log likelihood: -69.895
Note: There is a robust standard error to clustering to counties for individual-level data
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.010.

The model predicts 78% of the corruption cases using individual level predictors. A
review of the coefficients suggest that six of the eleven variables in Table 5-8 aid in
understanding when individual elected officials specifically, three of the dummy
variables associated with age, the faith variable, education and tenure in office were
statistically significant. Two variables, outside employment and marital status, must be
rejected. Two other variables, Gender and Race, did not meet the stringent criteria of
significance, these results were in the hypothesized direction, but they were not
significant at a p-value < 0.05. Thus, while the sign for gender suggest that female
officials were less likely than male officials to commit public corruption, the results were
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not significant. While two studies, Mauro (1993 and LaPorta et al. (1999) found a
relationship between race and public corruption, we were not able to confirm this.
The data for faith (or religious belief) are also consistent with the earlier bivariate
analysis and suggest that public officials who do not demonstrate a religious faith are 2.5
times more likely to commit public corruption than officials who do proclaim some
strong religious belief system (p-value=.049).
The study's intent was to determine is an empirical connection exists between
religion and corruption and it appears to exist. Some researchers link religion to social
environment, including trust and ethics: "Religion provides a language of ethics and,
often an actual 'list of rules to live by'" (Marquette 2010, p.3). Others suggest that public
servants derive their ethical framework in part from their religious beliefs.
The results for the various age predictors compare four different categories of elected
officials to the referent group of elected public officials 70 years and older. Officials who
are 40–49 years of age are 12.5 times more likely to commit an act of corruption than
others (significant at p-value=.003). Public officials who are 50–59 years of age were
slightly less likely to be involved in criminal activities than the 40-49 years of age group,
but were still more than 9 times more likely than the general populations of elected
officials especially are plus 70 age group. This downward trend continued for the next
age category 60-69. This last age group is significant (at the p<.051 level) and more than
5 times more likely to be found guilty that the reference group. All of the evidence
would seem to suggest that as elected officials get older they become less likely to
engage in corruption. These results are contrary to the original hypothesis. It might well
be that younger officials are more likely to engage in acts of corruption as they try to

139

make their mark while older officials are established and financially secure (they may
perhaps even be retired) and do not see the necessity to engage in risky criminal acts.
The information for formal education is supportive of the original hypothesis that the
higher ones education level the lower the probability of engaging in corruption. The odds
ratio is .7247 and indicate that a one unit change in education decrease the probability of
being involved in an act of corruption by 73%. It was theorized that officials with a high
school education or less would feel the pressure to engage in public corruption to
improve their social and economic status. Since education is viewed as a mark of social
status and an indicator of economic achievement, it was believed that a person with a
college degree would not have as much pressure to engage in public corruption. The lack
of education is viewed as a negative strain and should be a negative factor for officials
without a college education, resulting in a greater likelihood of their committing the
crime of public corruption; however, the findings did not support this theory.
These results for tenure suggest that officials who have more years in public office
are slightly more likely to participate in criminal acts than officials with fewer years in
office. The results for the predictor tenure were statistically significant at p-value=.003
and suggest that for a one unit increase in the years of service the odds of committing
public corruption increases by .11%. In sum, the findings for the results for tenure
suggest that it influences the behavior of elected officials and is a predictor of corruption.
Finally, it appears GST influenced only one of the eight predictors chosen to
measure individual profile characteristics of public officials. The results suggest that the
predictor age can influence the decisions of public officials in cases where there are
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indictments or convictions of public corruption. The predictor age was the only variable
that produced significant results of GST.
Age is also a negative strain it can be viewed in the context of older officials with
failing health, or in the context of young officials who lack social and financial security.
Either would result in negative strain. The determination that one of the individual
variables within the model for individual-level characteristics was a negative strain and
suggest that GST is a factor in the decisions of officials who commit public corruption
when age is a consideration.
Although the results of the eight individual profile characteristics and there
connection to GST did not produce substantial results it does however suggest age is a
possible factor for elected officials who opt to commit illegal acts of corruption.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion and Summary of Results
This research study is intended to add to the body of knowledge about, and improve
our understanding of, public corruption in county government and among elected county
officials. It seeks to explain those factors identified as predictors of public corruption and
develop recommendations to improve further research on the topic. To accomplish this
task, two models were explored and developed: the first General Model, which examined
county-level characteristics, and the second General Model, which examined the profile
characteristics of public officials, along with the influence these characteristics play in
the behavior of county officials who commit public corruption. Consistent with the
theoretical model, it was found that age, religious faith, education, tenure, auditor, per
capita income, financial stability, poverty, and the percentage of county population
compared to state population were all highly relevant to the likelihood of elected officials
engaging in criminal activities.
Secondly, the study sought to determine the influence GST played in the behavior
and decisions of public officials.
General Model: County-Level Characteristics
The General Model of county-level characteristics contained in this study proposed
18 hypotheses within the three domains of interest, and statistical significance was found
for five of the covariates (p-values < 0.05): auditor, per capita income, financial stability,
poverty, and percentage of county population compared to state population. No
statistically significant evidence of a relationship to public corruption was found for the
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remaining 13 covariates: inspector general, ethics laws, county government structure,
open meeting laws, employment growth, federal and state aid, age of the community,
crime rate, civic involvement, community education, unemployment rate, population
growth, and political party affiliation. However, the results of this study suggest GST
produced a cause-and-effect influence on two covariates: per capita income, and poverty.
First, this research examined the effect the auditor variable has on committing
corruption. The study determined that county governments with audit functions results in
less corruption consistent with the literature. The literature review (Wilson 1966, p. 31;
Walsh 1978; Rose-Ackerman 1978, p. 216; Fuchs 1986, p. 113; Klitgaard 1988, p. 53)
discovered that auditors in government deter public corruption and consequently decrease
its incidence. The research results validate the hypothesis that public corruption can be
reduced when county governments use internal auditors and implement policies to
monitor the spending of public funds. Some governments that want to reduce public
corruption have established internal audit divisions that are independent of elected
officials’ influence. The effectiveness of auditors depends on their ability to remain
independent with no barriers, and their ability to report waste and fraud. The independent
nature of this function can influence the outcome; for example, this study found that
county governments with independent auditors are less likely to experience corruption.
Two possible explanations of the effectiveness of this covariate are (1) the fear of being
caught, and (2) the effectiveness of an independent office free to report fraud and waste.
Second, research results showed the covariate per capita income appears to influence
public corruption. The logit model examined this factor and determined there was a
significant, but small indication that the wealth of a community can determine its
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tolerance (or lack thereof) for public corruption. The results show that the greater the
wealth of a community, the more likely it is to find corruption. Authors such as
Amundsen (1999) and Maxwell and Winters (2004) suggest that citizens residing in
communities with high per capita incomes, or civic-minded citizens, are more
knowledgeable about the activities of their elected officials and more inclined to monitor
those activities, and as a result, corruption decreases. The results of the study suggest the
opposite; communities with high per capita income, corruption is more likely to exist.
The result of the analysis was inconsistent with the hypothesis.
Third, this research examined the relationship between the financial stability of
county government and the likelihood of officials committing public corruption. The
analysis discovered that a relationship does exist: when county governments have
substantial funding or other financial resources available to award contracts and fund
projects, corruption is more likely to occur. The variable is statistically significant, and
the results suggest a strong relationship; the fiscal performance of counties appears to
influence officials to engage in criminal activity. The results are consistent with the
proposed hypothesis. This factor’s contribution to the likelihood of corruption may be
due to the ability of a county government with an excellent bond rating to generate
financing and funds for capital improvement projects, which in turn makes it possible to
award projects and contracts using government dollars. Previous research that explored
the financial stability of government suggests that governments flush with money are
more likely to experience corruption.
Fourth, the findings in this study show that poverty rate has a direct relationship on
the decision of officials to commit public corruption. This variable provided positive
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statistical results, indicating that the hypothesis was consistent with the findings. The
results suggest that a high rate of poverty indicates citizens who are preoccupied with
their personal obligations and lack the time to monitor the decisions and behavior of
elected officials. The analysis shows that impoverished communities are the least likely
to monitor the behavior of public officials, and therefore experience a greater degree of
public corruption. The results also suggest that large urban counties with a high rate of
poverty have more incidents of public corruption, and as the poverty rate increases,
corruption is likely to increase. Lastly, the research study suggests that citizens in poor
communities are less likely to demand accountability; they are also generally less
educated, lack the time to monitor the actions of public officials, and lack an
understanding of the mechanics of government.
Lastly, the results of the covariate county population compared to state population
appear to be a positive predictor of public corruption. The logit analysis that examined
this factor found that counties with populations that make up the majority of the state
population provide positive results, which is consistent with the hypothesis. Some
potential explanations are that large urban counties generally experience more crime,
have a high rate of poverty, have the financial resources to fund capital projects, wield
power and influence, and are often the economic engine that supports the state
financially. These counties are also large government institutions with multiple agencies,
and are usually involved in various aspects of government functions and responsibilities.
The counties manage and control various aspects of government. The elected officials
governing these counties wield considerable power and influence, and often control huge
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budgets. The power and influence of these officials can open the door to public
corruption.
General Model: Individual-Level Characteristics
The results of the General Model that examined the profile characteristics of elected
public officials revealed that of the eight covariates used, four were statistically
significant (p-values < 0.05): age, religious faith, education, and tenure. Of these four
covariates, GST may have been a factor in and influenced one: education. There was,
however, no statistically significant evidence or cause-and-effect found for four
covariates associated with profile characteristics, marital status, age (30-39), race and
outside employment.
The results of the logit analysis examining the factor of age and its effect on the
decision to commit corruption. The results suggest that age influences the criminal
behavior of public officials: as officials get older, they are less likely to engage in
corruption. One possible explanation is the “age effect,” in which older individuals are
more mature, financially stable, and secure, so they do not look to politics as a means to
justify an end. Their judgment, values, and interest are not self-focused. Some literature
suggests that younger politicians may be more concerned with social status and power, so
they look for opportunities to improve their social and financial status. They seek
opportunities to enrich themselves, engage in acts of self-gratification, and are often
blinded by greed (Nas et al. 1986, p. 107-119) and power; some take every opportunity to
engage in quid pro quo while overlooking what is ethical. All this, research suggests,
makes younger public officials more inclined to engage in criminal behavior than older
ones. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that an “age effect” influences the
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decision of officials. The logit analysis suggest officials between the ages of 40 to 69
years of age were more incline to engage in corruption but as officials got older the level
of corruption declines.
Second, the logit model examined the factor of religious faith and its effect on the
decision to commit corruption. This study found that religious faith is a negative
predictor of committing public corruption. La Porta et al. (1997) suggested that the
religion is a contributing factor to public corruption, and this study shows that individuals
without religious beliefs are more corrupt than individuals with religious beliefs, which is
consistent with the hypothesis. A possible explanation is that individuals with religious
faith have a greater concern with ethics than individuals without religious beliefs. One
reason may be that religion is linked to values and social environment, factors that are
fundamental to the decisions of individuals. Ethical standards are often rooted in
religious beliefs, and ethical standards are often strongly upheld by individuals of
religious faith. Although the data produced statistically significant results, it is not clear
why nonreligious officials are more inclined to engage in corruption. One reason for this
finding may be that religious officials desire to uphold ethical values and support civic
involvement because of their religious teachings and a conscious desire to uphold the rule
of law.
Third, this research examined the cause-and-effect relationship between public
officials’ level of education and their likelihood to commit public corruption. The
analysis found that a relationship exists. This variable is statistically significant: public
officials with a college education are less likely to engage in public corruption. Previous
empirical studies provided supporting documentation that education could influence

147

corruption. In fact, Maxwell and Winters (2004) stated: “Well-educated citizens, we
believe, are less tolerant of corruption” (p. 12). Moreover, if elected officials view
educational attainment as a positive stimulus, then it results in positive behavior and less
corruption. One possible explanation is that college-educated officials have a better
understanding of what is ethical and a broader understanding of the laws governing
public officials and government. Other theorists, such as Boylan and Long (2003),
concur that level of education is a “predictor of low level of corruption” (p. 8). These
results are consistent with the hypothesis, and authors such as Benson and Berg believe
that corruption can be eliminated through education. The result of the analysis supports
the notion that GST is applicable to the variable of education, thus education can be an
influence on an official’s behavior. From the perspective of GST, education is a factor in
the behavior of public officials and their decision to engage in corruption. Clearly, the
analysis of the covariate measuring education suggests a cause-and-effect relationship:
educated officials are less inclined not to engage in corruption.
Lastly, this research found the tenure variable was statistically significant and
indicated a correlation between the length of time public officials are in office and their
involvement in public corruption. These results were inconsistent with the stated
hypothesis, which was that public officials with less time in office were more likely to
engage in corruption. To the contrary, the results revealed that the longer officials
remained in office, the more likely they were to participate in public corruption. It was
theorized that the tenure of officials would prove to be positive because tenured officials
would seem to be financially stable, mature, and supportive of high ethical standards, but
the results were contrary to the hypothesis: tenured public officials were more likely to
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engage in corruption. One possible explanation is that the longer officials are in office,
the more knowledgeable they become regarding the inner workings of government.
These individuals have also established relationships with key staff and understand the
power structure. Tenured officials have the ability and skills to navigate complex
government systems, and would likely assist friends and individuals who had supported
them over the years. Interestingly, while these results may appear to be related to age,
the possible correlation is not as applicable as expected because the tenure of officials
does not show a relationship with their age.
Contribution of the Research Study
Public corruption is identified as a widespread problem (Xin and Rudel 2004), and as
previously noted, can have a profound and negative effect on the performance and
effectiveness of government. Previous research explored the influence public corruption
can have on government in general, but those studies failed to address the impact public
corruption might have specifically on county government. In fact, a review of the
literature found few studies that reviewed public corruption in county government and
attempted to explain why elected county officials might opt to engage in corrupt
activities. Unlike previous research, which explored public corruption among counties
and reviewed similar covariates, this study sought to identify specific covariates that
influence the decisions of elected county officials to engage in corrupt activities. As
discussed earlier, other studies have not analytically applied similar hypotheses of public
corruption in county government. This research study is aimed at identifying and
reducing the incidences of corrupt activities in county government, and attempts to
analyze the factors that influence corruption among elected county officials.
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The contribution of this research study is significant because despite all previous
research conducted, public corruption remains a serious problem at all levels of
government. This research study not only contributes to the body of knowledge, it also
provides a good understanding of factors identified as contributors to corruption in
county government. It provides scholarly information for further studies and offers a
better understanding of why some elected officials opt to engage in acts of public
corruption and others do not.
Although this study compiled a great deal of information, all public officials cannot
be expected to fit the mold of all the characteristics identified here as factors in public
corruption. In fact, personal experience attests that some officials are inherently prone to
corrupt behavior. While the study produced good results and will add to the body of
knowledge on the subject, identifying those factors thought to contribute to public
corruption is not an exact science. However, the study does contribute to the scholarly
literature theorizing why public corruption exists in county government.
In addition, the significance of the variables identified in this study is worthy of
additional review and consideration; these variables, if implemented, could reduce the
influence of public corruption on county government and elected officials. The study
identified a number of factors, such as transparency, public participation, an educated
citizenry, media and public review, and effective disclosure laws and policies, that
influence the behavior and decisions of elected officials. Local governments that have
suffered cases of public corruption can provide excellent examples of the ways it
negatively influences service delivery, financial stability, public trust, and government
operations.
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Conclusion
This research study found both governmental and individual profile characteristics
that predict public corruption in county government. Efforts have also been made to
ascertain the influence of GST on the corruption of county elected officials and county
government. This research study, along with GST, has provided a greater level of
understanding of the behavioral actions of elected public officials who choose to engage
in criminal activities, such as public corruption. As shown in this study, GST appears to
be a factor that induced elected officials to engage in public corruption, consistent with
the theoretical model. It is fair to conclude that the study found evidence that negative
strains exist and are an indicator of public corruption among elected officials.
Academic literature provided supporting explanations and justifications of how a
negative social environment, lack of educational attainment, and low financial
achievement are negative factors that influence the behavior and decisions of individuals.
The individuals in question here were elected county officials, who are no different from
any other citizens experiencing less-than-positive achievements; in these cases; however,
their behavior resulted in poor choices, such as engaging in corrupt behavior. The results
of the study suggest a positive correlation between public corruption and the environment
of public officials that, in many cases, can influence decisions and behavior. Not all the
covariates used in this study produced significant results, but the overall results produced
a substantial list of covariates that can be useful in predicting public corruption among
elected officials in large urban counties.
Although this research study is persuasive, additional research could improve the
overall model. The data used in this study could also be refined; conducting additional

151

research on state or city governments would provide supporting data and substantiate the
factors in this study identified as causes of public corruption. The data collected for this
study varied across states, but the results proved positive with a high rate of
predictability. Hence, the General Model for both county-level and individual-level
characteristics was successful in identifying factors that can be used to predict public
corruption.
If citizens demand an improved and honest government, reducing public corruption
becomes an important factor. The practical implication of this research study is primarily
the identification of factors that contribute to public corruption in county government and
among elected county officials in order to minimize corruption in county government.
This study identified nine factors that predicted public corruption, information that can be
used to deter corruption in county government. Improving the ability to predict
corruption can become a valuable tool in fighting it and restoring the public's trust in
government. The objective of this study was to identify possible factors that encourage
public corruption in county government, with the intention of creating a government
system that the public can trust and believe in. Rose-Ackerman (1999) believed that
“toleration of corruption in some areas of public life can facilitate a downward spiral in
which the malfeasance of some encourages more and more people to engage in
corruption over time” (p. 26).
Study Limitations
A few limitations were identified in this research study. First, the study did not
include individual data from county commissioners in counties with no cases of public
corruption. This lack of information limited the ability to analyze the effect personal
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characteristics might have on the decisions of public officials to engage in corruption.
Including data from non-corrupt commissioners in non-corrupt counties could have been
useful when interpreting the results for the domain of individual predictors, and could
have provided a more diverse data set to understand the influence of individual predictors
when identifying factors that predict public corruption. The lack of this information also
influenced the requirement of generalizability. The General Model for individual-level
predictors is 76.1 percent, which is slightly weak compared to the results for county-level
data. The low results for individual-level prediction may be a result of the limited sample
size and the non-corruption limitation noted above. A larger number of corruption cases
could have greatly improved the overall model.
Second, several of the variables used in the study did not produce valid results for
determining corruption and, in the end, were not useful for analyzing the data. For
example, outside employment was not a valid indication of corruption; the data did not
produce meaningful results in which outside income could be used as a factor for
determining the likelihood of public corruption. Outside employment was originally
thought to be a covariate that would result in a positive outcome for public corruption,
but the data failed to produce the expected results. The overall wealth of commissioners
would have been more useful in determining public corruption. Open meeting laws were
another variable that did not pan out as a good indicator of public corruption. The laws
varied too widely among counties, making the information problematic to analyze.
Third, this study was limited to large urban counties with cases of public corruption,
which turned out to be 43 cases. A larger data set could have produced improved results,
even if the explanatory variables were not applicable to counties of less than 300,000. It
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would be prudent to reevaluate some of the explanatory measurements to reflect
government size, as well as to provide additional opportunities to gather information
about the individual characteristics of elected officials in small counties.
Finally, much of the information about incarcerated elected officials was difficult to
obtain. The Justice Department’s process for obtaining information was not userfriendly, which resulted in limited information even when public trials occurred.
Eventually all the information was obtained, but alternative data-gathering methods were
needed.
Further research in this area can address these shortcomings and develop a broad list
of explanatory measurements that could prove useful for later studies. While this study
provided good information and can serve as the first step for further studies, several new
predictive variables could help in identifying public corruption in county government.
This research study produced some good results in explaining some of the reasons elected
officials decided to engage in public corruption. If future researchers could establish a
relationship with the Justice Department or develop alternative methods for gathering
data about incarcerated officials, they might be able to collect more data on public
corruption in government.
Recommendations for Further Research
This research study successfully identified explanatory measurements of public
corruption, but there are opportunities for improvement that could benefit the field,
enhance further research, and reinforce and strengthen results. The findings described in
this study are useful in expanding scholarly knowledge and literature, although there are
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limitations, as outlined above. However, changes to the study design might benefit
further research on the topic of public corruption.
First, undertaking a research study on public corruption was an enormous task.
Future research on the topic, with further identification of new explanatory measures,
might provide improved understanding and explanations of the influences of public
corruption on elected officials. For example, measures such as “family income” could
offer insight about the financial wealth of individuals and whether wealth is a valid
predictor for committing public corruption. A more in-depth analysis of anticorruption
policies should be included in future studies to determine the effectiveness of
enforcement policies and their impact on such components as conflict of interest policies,
gift-giving, and patronage. What impact could these policies have on curbing public
corruption in local government? The scope of review for this study on anticorruption
laws, such as ethics and open meeting laws, was limited to the strictness of the laws and
their influence on public corruption. Further studies on the effectiveness of these laws
and their role in curbing public corruption could be reviewed in future research. Political
campaign contributions and conflicts of interest are additional variables to include in
future studies; these added variables might explain the influence of campaigns and
political contributions on public corruption.
Second, a review of the findings suggests that adding domains to expand the scope of
the study or the areas of focus might improve the theoretical model and generate a better
understanding of public corruption. Additional domains might include a review of
private individuals involved in acts of public corruption, which could provide additional
insight into the potential for gain, as well as other motivations for acts of corruption.
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What is the connection between private individuals and corruption among public
officials? What is the relationship between these two parties?
Third, further research on the media’s influence on public corruption could provide
useful information and aid in reducing corruption in government. Including the influence
of the media would provide an opportunity to assess opinions on what more could be
done from the media’s perspective when communicating to the public, reporting the
news, and providing information about the decisions and behavior of elected officials.
Expanding the study to include the domain of media would more accurately reflect its
impact and importance in identifying, deterring, and reporting corruption.
Fourth, further research should include assessing citizen opinions, possibly through
the use of a public opinion survey. Public opinion would provide an assessment of
government and its elected officials, along with critical information that could be useful
in developing recommendations for reducing corruption. Additionally, a public opinion
survey could gather information about the problems created by government corruption.
This information would be useful in gauging the objections and perceptions of the public
about how corruption influences the decisions of their elected officials.
Fifth, the use of this model is the initial process in determining if it was a reliable
tool in explaining public corruption. Further work is needed to establish the reliability of
the model—for instance, the study of public corruption in other government agencies.
An analysis of public corruption in city and state government, police departments, and
quasi-governmental agencies (e.g., water, sanitation, health, transportation) might be
beneficial.
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Sixth, the research suggests that strain is perceived, but additional information would
have benefited the study. Personal interviews with elected officials would provide
greater insight to improve this aspect of the research study. Interviews would allow indepth questions to be asked of officials. This modification would improve the overall
study, since this change would allow the researcher to obtain specific information on
negative emotions, anger, negative behavior, social support structure, and financial
details.
Seventh, future research might further identify the influence term limits could have
on public corruption in county government. Recent voter-approved initiatives have
imposed limits on the length of time public officials can serve in elected positions. Some
of the arguments for enacting term limits are that they provide a check on concentration
of power, ensure long-term stability, and strengthen democracy. Research in this area
will broaden our knowledge and understanding of the influence term limits have on
increasing or decreasing public corruption in county government. It is recommended that
further research be undertaken to better understand their influence. Including this
variable would also allow a review of contract awards, campaign contributions, and
policy changes.
Finally, prior to any new research study, the General Models should be assessed and
refined to determine whether they accomplished the goals of predicting and explaining
public corruption. Further research in this area should include the removal or
modification of variables that did not produce valid results in order to improve the
study’s reliability in explaining public corruption within any government, regardless of
size or jurisdiction. Hence, it is suggested that future research studies on public
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corruption include characteristics on private individuals, administrators, police officials,
city officials, state legislators, and federal officials. Expanding the research of public
corruption to include other elected officials will broaden our understanding of public
corruption, with the intent of developing and identifying profiles of characteristics that
can be used to identify individuals likely to engage in corrupt activities. Expanding the
research will provide opportunities to explore cause-and-effect relationships between
additional covariates and public corruption among a broader base of officials.
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EXHIBIT I
MODEL VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA
Dependent Variables
Variable
Public
Corruption
No Public
Corruption

Data Sources
Primary: Public Access to Court Electronic Records service, U.S. Department of Justice
press releases, personal correspondence with county officials and county staff.
Secondary: LexisNexis, local print media, television broadcasts, newspaper articles.
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials and county staff.

Covariates
Domains

Variable
1. Outside employment

Primary: Personal correspondence received from county
officials.

2. Age of officials

Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.

3. Gender of officials

Elected Officials
Characteristics

Government
Characteristics

Data Sources

4. Formal education of
officials

Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.
Secondary: Published county documents, print media, and
biographies.
Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.
Secondary: Published county documents, print media,
biographies, district newsletters.

5. Display of religious
beliefs

Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.

6. Marital status of
elected officials

Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.
Secondary: Published county documents, print media, and
biographies.

7. Race of elected
officials

Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.
Secondary: Officials’ documents/Web site.

8.Tenure of elected
officials

Primary: Personal correspondence from county officials.
Secondary: County and state election records.

1. Office of inspector
general

Primary: Government documents, print, Web, personal
conversations with department staff, government reports.

2. Ethics Laws

Primary: County and state documents, print, Web.
Secondary: National legislative and county associations’ online
documents.

3. Structure of
government

Primary: Government documents, print, Web, personal
conversations with county staff.

4. Percentage of
employment growth

Primary: Government documents containing demographic
(county and federal), print and online.
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EXHIBIT I
MODEL VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA (cont.)
Covariates
Domain

Government
Fiscal Oversight

Community
Stability

Variable

Data Source(s)

1. Annual per capita
income

Primary: County and federal government documents containing
financial data, annual budget documents, comprehensive annual
financial reports (online and print).

2. Secured (revenue
pledged) general
obligation bond rating

Primary: Comprehensive annual financial reports, government
budget documents, personal correspondence with county staff, bond
rating services (print and online).
Secondary: Annually published bond-rating publications.

3. One year of annual
state and federal aid

Primary: County and federal government documents containing
census and financial data (print and online).

4. Auditors

Primary: Government documents and annual audit reports (print
and online), personal correspondence with county management
staff.

1.Percentage of
population below
poverty level

Primary: County and federal government documents (print and
online) containing census data,

2. Percentage of the
population 65 years of
age or older

Primary: Government documents containing census data (online).

3. Annual crime rate

Primary: Government documents containing crime rate data, county
and federal documents (online), personal correspondence from law
enforcement officials.

4. Percentage of voter
turnout

Primary: County and state government documents (print and
online).

5. Percentage of the
population with
secondary education

Primary: Government documents containing census data (online).

6. Percentage of total
workforce unemployed

Primary: County and federal government documents containing
census and labor force data (online).

7. Percentage of the
county population
growth

Primary: Government documents containing census data (online),
county and federal data.

8. Percentage of the
county population to the
state population

Primary: Government documents containing census data (online);
county, state, and federal data.

Primary: Government documents from county government,
9. Percentage of political
personal correspondence with county officials and administrative
party affiliation
staff.
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EXHIBIT II
RATING AGENCIES
BOND RATINGS
(Explanation of corporate
municipal bond ratings)

Fitch

Moody's

Standard & Poor's

Premium quality
High quality
Medium quality

AAA
AA
A

Aaa
Aa
A

AAA
AA
A

Medium grade, lower
quality
Predominantly speculative
Speculative, low grade

BBB
BB
B

Baa
Ba
B

BBB
BB
B

Poor to default
Highest speculation
Lowest quality, no interest

CCC
CC
C

Caa
Ca
C

CCC
CC
C

In default, in arrears
Questionable value

DDD
DD
D

DDD
DD
D

Analysis:
An independent assessment of the relative credit worthiness of municipal securities
is provided by three rating agencies: Moody's Investors Service, Standard and Poor's
Corporation, and Fitch Ratings. Each of these furnishes letter grades that convey an
assessment of the ability and willingness of a borrower to repay its debt in full and on
time. Credit ratings issued by these agencies are a major function in determining the cost
of borrowed funds in the municipal bond market.
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EXHIBIT III
MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA CODING
1. GENERAL MODEL:

Dependent variable is categorical (dichotomous) measure of public corruption.
0 = Did not commit public corruption
1 = Committed public corruption
Matrix of Covariates

Domain

Characteristics of
Elected Officials

Government
Characteristics

Fiscal Stability

Attributes

Variable

Method and Level of Measurement

Gender

Gender

Age

Age

Age of official

Race

Race

White=1, non-white=0

Religious belief

Attendance at religious institution

Education

Formal education

Marital status

Marital status

Tenure

Commission tenure

Number of years on commission

Outside employment

Outside employment

No outside=0, yes outside=1

Office of Inspector General

Inspector General office

Ethic laws

Seriousness of ethic violation

Structure of government

Management of government structure

Professional manager=1, commission=2

Open meeting laws

Seriousness of violation

No penalty=0, moderate=1, stringent=2

Employment growth

1 year change in employment hiring

Percentage change in employment hiring

Per capita income

1 year change per capita income

Percentage change in per capita income

Fiscal stability

Bond rating; general obligation debt

Female=1, male=0

No=1, yes=0
HS=12 through PhD=20
Married=1, not married=0
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No inspector=0, yes inspector=1
No penalty/moderate penalty=1, stringent penalty=2

Financial services rating

Domain

Community
Characteristics

Attributes

Variable

Federal & state aid

Allocation of aid from federal & state
revenues

Auditor

Auditor function

Poverty

Poverty rate for county

Percentage of community
65 & older

Senior citizens 65 and older

Crime rate

Rate of crime

Rate per 100,000 inhabitants

Civic involvement

Voter turnout

Percentage of voter turnout in general election

Community education
level

College degree

Labor force

Unemployment rate

Population growth

1 year change in population

% county population to
overall state population
Political party affiliation

Method and Level of Measurement
Percentage of federal & state transfers to the total revenue
No auditor=0, yes auditor=1

Percentage of households below the federal poverty level
Percentage of the senior population to the county population

Percentage of community with college education
Percentage of total workforce
Percentage change

County population and state population Percentage of county population to overall state population
Political party
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Democrat=1, non-Democrat=0

APPENDIX I
Indictments and Convictions
Gender
State
1. Male
Alabama
2. Male
Alabama
3. Male
Alabama
4. Male
Alabama
5. Female
Alabama
6. Male
Alabama
7. Male
California
8. Male**
California
9. Male
California
10. Male
Delaware
11. Male
Delaware
12. Male*
Florida
13. Male
Florida
14. Male*
Florida
15. Male
Florida
16. Male
Florida
17. Female
Florida
18. Male
Georgia
19. Male
Georgia
20. Male**
Hawaii
21. Male
Indiana
22. Male
Indiana
23. Male
Indiana
24. Male
Louisiana
25.Male**
Massachusetts
26. Male
Michigan
27. Female*
Missouri
28. Male
Missouri
29. Male
Nevada
30. Male
Nevada
31. Female
Nevada
32. Female
Nevada
33. Male
New Jersey
34. Female
New Jersey
35. Male
New Jersey
36. Male
New Jersey
37. Male**
New Jersey
38. Male**
Philadelphia
39. Male
Tennessee
40. Male
Tennessee
41. Male
Tennessee
42. Female
Texas
43. Female*
Texas
* indicted
**consolidated government

County
Jefferson
Jefferson
Jefferson
Jefferson
Jefferson
Mobile
San Bernardino
San Francisco
San Joaquin
New Castle
New Castle
Broward
Miami Dade
Miami Dade
Palm Beach
Palm Beach
Palm Beach
Fulton
Fulton
Honolulu
Lake
Lake
Lake
New Orleans
Boston
Wayne
Jackson
St. Louis
Clark
Clark
Clark
Clark
Essex
Hudson
Hudson
Hudson
Monmouth
Philadelphia
Hamilton
Shelby
Shelby
El Paso
Hidalgo
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Year Convicted/Indicted
2008
2007
2006
2006
2008
2003
2001
2007
2002
2002
2005
2009
2000
2005
2007
2007
2003
2001
2001
2000
2006
2002
2006
2002
2008
2002
2006
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2001
2002
2002
2002
2005
2005
2005
2004
2004
2007
2009

APPENDIX II
Large U.S. Counties with Some Form of Public Corruption
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

County

State
FL
MI
CA
FL
PA
NV
FL
MO
TN
HI
GA
NJ
CA
TX
MA
MO
NJ
NJ
TX
CA
DE
LA
IN
AL
AL
TN

Miami-Dade
Wayne
San Bernardino
Broward
Philadelphia
Clark
Palm Beach
St. Louis
Shelby
Honolulu
Fulton
Essex
San Francisco
El Paso
Boston
Jackson
Monmouth
Hudson
Hidalgo
San Joaquin
New Castle
Orleans
Lake
Jefferson
Mobile
Hamilton

2000 Pop. Estimate
2,253,662
2,061,162
1,709,434
1,623,018
1,517,550
1,375,765
1,131,184
1,016,315
897,472
876,156
816,006
793,633
776,733
692,493
689,807
654,880
615,301
608,975
569,463
563,598
512,370
484,674
484,564
455,466
399,843
323,162

Population data sources: U.S. Census Bureau and National Association of Counties.
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APPENDIX III
91 Large U.S. Counties with No Cases of Public Corruption
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

County
Los Angeles
Cook
Harris
Maricopa
Orange
San Diego
Dallas
King
Santa Clara
Tarrant
Alameda
Bexar
Cuyahoga
Alleghena
Oakland
Hennepin
Hillsborough
Fairfax
Contra Costa
Orange
Erie
Milwaukee
DuPage
Salt Lake
Pinellas
Montgomery
Bergen
Pima
Travis
Prince George
Hamilton
Macomb
Ventura
Middlesex
Baltimore
Montgomery
Mecklenburg
Monroe
Pierce
San Mateo
Jefferson
Oklahoma
DeKalb

State
CA
IL
TX
AZ
CA
CA
TX
WA
CA
TX
CA
TX
OH
PA
MI
MN
FL
VA
CA
FL
NY
WI
IL
UT
FL
MD
NJ
AZ
TX
MD
OH
MI
CA
NJ
MD
PA
NC
NY
WA
CA
KY
OK
GA
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2000 Population Estimate
9,630,575
5,283,888
3,515,210
3,259,093
2,896,130
2,813,678
2,249,981
1,720,682
1,653,545
1,504,081
1,444,656
1,409,834
1,323,033
1,229,569
1,188,898
1,094,447
1,035,294
990,830
981,043
927,463
913,554
913,090
909,476
905,259
903,895
900,706
883,742
859,187
830,649
815,417
814,747
799,686
770,658
754,729
752,266
743,177
722,367
711,649
710,419
692,752
685,285
665,333
663,118

Rank
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

County
Kern
Multnomah
Wake
Lake
Gwinnett
Cobb
Snohomish
Bucks
Kent
Collin
Tulsa
Bernalillo
Denver
Montgomery
Summit
Delaware
Bristol
Ocean
Jefferson
Union
Arapahoe
Ramsey
Anne Arundel
Polk
Brevard
Denton
Stanislaus
Plymouth
Johnson
Lee
Morris
Washington
Lancaster
Douglas
Sedgwick
Jefferson Parish
Onondaga
Volusia
Lucas
Genesee
Guilford
Spokane
Greenville
Adams
Washoe
Clackamas
Washtenaw

State
CA
OR
NC
IL
GA
GA
WA
PA
MI
TX
OK
NM
CO
OH
OH
PA
MA
NJ
CO
NJ
CO
MN
MD
FL
FL
TX
CA
MA
KS
FL
NJ
OR
PA
NE
KS
LA
NY
FL
OH
MI
NC
WA
SC
CO
NV
OR
MI
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2000 Population Estimate
663,106
660,938
656,781
654,067
644,386
644,186
624,729
601,357
575,097
563,463
563,299
563,002
547,696
538,867
537,238
531,048
530,526
529,187
523,993
522,958
505,289
493,283
487,243
486,876
485,936
479,425
474,939
474,240
471,558
470,002
469,544
469,162
464,352
460,972
455,659
448,436
447,124
444,718
444,610
436,129
416,987
412,360
380,333
370,685
356,915
348,937
312,702

APPENDIX IV
DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE- INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
1. What was your age when you were a County Commissioner in (year)?
Please circle one
20-29

30-3940-49

50-59 60-69

70-above

2. What is your gender? Please circle one
Male or Female
3. What is your race? Please circle one
Caucasian
Non-Caucasian
4. Are you religious, display religious beliefs or attend church frequently?
Please circle one
Yes or No
5. What was your level of education as a County Commissioner in (year)?
Please circle one
High School
Associate Degree
Bachelors Degree
Masters Degree
Professional Degree i.e., JD Degree
Ph.D. Degree
6. What was your marital status when you were on the County Commission in (year)?
Please circle one
Married or Not Married
7. While serving as a County Commissioner, did you maintain outside employment.
Yes or No
8. List the number of years (tenure) as a County Commissioner from the time elected
until (year).
9. What is your political party affiliation while serving on the County Commission?
Please circle one
Democrat, Republican, Independent or _____________other
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DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE- COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS
1. In (year) what was the political party affiliation of County Commissioners? How many
of the Commissioners were?
Democrats___________ Republicans__________ Independents__________
Others___________
2. What was the bond rating for (General Obligation bonds) for your County in (year) or a
recent bond rating?
Moody's______ Standard & Poor's_________ Year_________
3. What was the voter turnout rate for your county in (year)? General election only
Voter Turnout Rate______________ Date_____________
4. Does the county have an independent internal audit function?
Yes_______ No_________
Definition of the internal audit function: The Audit department promotes economical,
efficient, and effective operations and combats fraud, waste and abuse by providing
management with independent and objective evaluations of operations. The Department
examines and reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of County activities and programs.
In addition, the Department reviews financial statements that present the results of County
financial operations. The Department also helps keep the public informed about the quality
of county management through audit reports.
5. Does the County have an office of Inspector General?
Yes_________ No___________
Definition of the office of Inspector General: Was created and approved by the Board of
County Commissioners to implement clean government. The Office of Inspector General
(OIG) is authorized to detect, investigate and prevent fraud, waste, mismanagement and
abuse of power in county projects, programs or contracts. The OIG is independent and
insulated from political influences. The Office has the jurisdiction to investigate officials at
any level, including elected officials. The goal of the office is to prevent misconduct and
abuse, expose it publicly, and seek appropriate remedies to recover public monies. Above
all, the OIG's principal objective is to promote ethics, honest and efficiency in government
and to restore and promote the public's trust in government.
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APPENDIX V
STRAINS- (Stressors)
Jang and Johnson (2003)
1.

Negative emotions

2.

Poor of declining financial status, fewer assets than liabilities, loss of assets,
problem with car or other material good, excluding housing

3.

Poor academic performance, negative school related events, admission
problems, failed grades, and bad and negative things happened at school

4.

Unemployment, problems finding a job, quit or laid off, business problems, job
demotion, trouble with supervisor/ boss/ or co-workers, negative events at work,
work related tension and poor working conditions

5.

Failed marriage, lost custody of children, legal actions involving court action,
lawsuit/arrest/ conviction of crime/violation of law

6.

Poor neighborhood, live or moved into poor housing, theft or destruction of
housing

7.

High rate of crime in neighborhood

8.

Lack of personal achievement

9.

Trouble with family/spouse/child(ren)/parents, relative and friend(s), (unwanted
pregnancy or child(ren), marital separation, divorce, break-up

10. Death of someone close, family, friend
11. Poor health or sickness, physical health issues, disability, chronic and other
health related problems
12.

Victim of violence or a crime, accident or injury

13. Declining age coupled with a decline in health
Agnew (1992) defines strains as "negative or aversive relations with others"
(p.61), which has three types: strain as the actual or anticipated failure to achieve
positively valued goals, strain as the actual or anticipated removal of positively
valued stimuli, and strain as the actual or anticipated presentation of negative
stimuli" (p.59). In summary, GST is deduced as strains that result in generating
negative emotions that provide in situations the motivation for deviance as a coping
strategy because such emotional forces can create pressure for corrective action.
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